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Near East & South Asia

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Trade Among GCC States Outlined

44040401C Muscat *UMAN in Arabic* 9 Apr 89 p 7

[Text] Riyadh (WAKH)—The volume of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states trade among themselves and with the rest of the world totaled some \$92.5 billion in 1987, compared with \$82.4 billion in 1986, declining to 6 percent in 1987. However, trade among GCC members increased to about \$5.9 billion in 1986, from around \$5.4 billion in 1987. This increase in intra-GCC trade is considered both an objective and a consequence of measures to achieve GCC economic complementarity.

Issue no. 4 of the economic bulletin published by the [GCC] secretariat said that GCC trade with other Arab states remained in 1987 at the same 1 percent level [as published]. Trade with other Islamic countries increased in 1987 but at the lower rate of 3 percent compared with about 4 percent in 1986.

Trade with the European Community [EC] was about 30 percent in 1986, dropping to 27 percent in 1987. Trade with Japan dropped from 24 percent in 1986 to 22 percent in 1987. Trade with the United States rose to 12 percent in the same year.

The bulletin said yesterday that 1987 differed slightly from 1986 in the overall geographic distribution of GCC exports. Exports to the EC, Japan, and United States still enjoy the largest share but dropped to 56 percent in 1987 from 58 percent a year earlier even though exports rose in 1987 to about \$29.8 billion from \$27.2 billion the year before. That is because the value of 1987 GCC exports to the rest of the world increased to about \$18.21 billion from about \$4.1 billion in 1986, therefore boosting its share in the same period from 24 percent to 27 percent.

Japan is still the largest importer of GCC oil and petrochemicals. Japan's largest GCC supplier is Saudi Arabia with exports of \$5.1 billion or nearly 36 percent of total Japanese imports from the GCC, followed by the UAE [United Arab Emirates] with 35 percent, Kuwait with 12 percent, Oman with 9 percent, Qatar with 6 percent, and Bahrain with 2 percent.

GCC exports to EC countries rose slightly from 1986 to about \$27.5 billion in 1987.

Saudi Arabian exports to the EC were valued at some \$6.4 billion in 1986 but dipped to about \$5.5 billion in 1987. Its share dropped to 51 percent in 1987 while Kuwait's increased from 21 percent to 28 percent; the UAE's from 7 percent to 15 percent, and Oman's from 1 percent to 3 percent. Qatar's share decreased from 4 percent in 1986 to 2 percent in 1987. Bahrain's share remained at 1 percent.

The U.S. share of GCC exports increased from 10 percent in 1986 to 12 percent in 1987. GCC exports to the United States were valued at \$5.9 billion in 1987 compared with about \$4.1 billion a year earlier. Saudi Arabia, even though its share dipped by 5 percent in 1986, remained the largest GCC supplier to the United States with 75 percent of 1987 American imports from the Gulf.

The UAE, on the other hand, increased its share from 8 percent in 1986 to 11 percent in 1987. Kuwait's share also rose from 7 percent to 9 percent and Oman's also increased to 4 percent from 1 percent. Bahrain's share dropped to 1 percent in 1986. Qatar, on the other hand, had virtually no exports to the United States in 1987.

Total GCC imports were valued at about \$38.9 billion in 1987, compared with some \$35.8 billion a year earlier. Despite higher prices for European products, EC countries remained the largest source of GCC imports despite higher values for their currencies. Their [the EC countries'] share rose from about 53 percent in 1986 to 54 percent in 1987, followed by the UAE with 21 percent (an increase of 3 percent compared to 1986), then by Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar.

Crude oil and derivatives represent about 89 percent of total GCC exports. Imports by GCC states, on the other hand, cover almost all their needs of consumer, capital, and intermediate goods. Primary exports, defined according to international classifications, are fossil fuels and lubricants, followed by chemicals, classified manufactured goods, machinery, and transport equipment.

Magazine Names Alleged Libyan Intelligence Officers in Sudan

45000164 London *AL-DUSTUR in Arabic*
5 Jun 89 p 11

[Text] In past issues, AL-DUSTUR has published the names of some Libyan intelligence men in Sudan, among them the so-called Muhammad 'Ali al-'Ati, who used to work for the Libyan airline in Khartoum after being expelled from Britain in 1985 on charges of participating in the plot to assassinate several Libyan opposition members residing in Britain. His name then appeared in a security group responsible for shipping 150 tons of arms and explosives to Ireland in the summer of 1987. "Al-'Ati" [quotes as published] was killed in the Marmara Hotel in the Turkish city of Istanbul on 23 December, the same day he had arrived in the city under the name Muhammad al-Zalitni.

There is now in Sudan a Colonel Salim Bu-Sharidah from Libyan military intelligence, who AL-DUSTUR confirms has taken the place of al-'Ati with an impressively large group of Libyan intelligence members.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

'Arafat on Charter, Elections, Right of Return

Charter, Election Issues Discussed

44040435 Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH*
in Arabic 7 May 89 pp 10-12

[Article by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Haqq]

[Excerpts] The Palestinian presidential trip to France resulted in the development of means and channels of communication for coordinating efforts intended to facilitate a just solution in the Middle East. Paris requested Palestinian clarification regarding the Palestinian national charter, and the Palestinian president served notice that the charter is "abrogated" by virtue of the political declaration issued by the Palestine National Council [PNC]. [passage omitted]

It is clear that the most controversial issue here is brother Abu-'Ammar's statements about the charter, such as his statement that it is "outdated and abrogated," following the decision made at the 19th session of the PNC. It is well known that many Israeli fabrications exist regarding the provisions of the national charter, including the claim that the charter calls for the destruction of Israel, the throwing of its inhabitants into the sea, and the like. Such propaganda is the basis of a long-standing United States, Israeli and western European demand for the revision of several paragraphs, or the corpus, of the charter.

Brother Abu-'Ammar's statements regarding the charter were made in response to French questions, which is to say that they bear an explicatory, non-stipulatory character, inasmuch as the PNC is the only party authorized to amend articles of the charter or to abrogate it, provided such actions are taken in a special session of the PNC, and are approved by a two-thirds majority of PNC members, not [merely] those in attendance.

It is well known that minor, appended changes have been introduced to the national charter. The Palestinian position does not regard the charter as inviolable holy writ. Rather, the PNC has faced numerous problems in establishing more dynamic policies in its sessions dating back to the mid-1970's, because of the charter. In other cases, decisions were obtained and finessed by using a certain amount of "trickery" to circumvent the charter's stipulations.

However, the refusal to amend or abrogate the national charter stems basically from the suspicious nature of demands for such measures, inasmuch as there appeared seemingly pro-PLO demands for the PLO to abolish itself, or to at least restructure itself based on new criteria, in the absence of a political quid pro quo regarding a solution to the national problem of our people.

Needless to say, the decisions made in the PNC session dealing with the intifadah [Palestinian uprising] in Algiers, especially the proclamation of independence, constitute

the greatest turning point ever in our liberationist struggle, and have affected the organizational structure and political program of the PLO. The PLO is currently in a transition period—organizationally and structurally—between organization and statehood. It is preoccupied with responding to questions pertaining to the creation of the most appropriate formulae to link these two situations. For all of these reasons, the PLO has relinquished many of the articles of the national charter. Thus, the new, qualitative, situation of the struggle has come to necessitate changes in the charter, because one of the charter's main goals, namely national independence, has begun to be realized gradually. In this context, it is possible to understand the statements of the Palestinian leader in Paris.

Another concern raised by President 'Arafat's statements pertains to the proposal for elections in the occupied areas. Abu-'Ammar again clarified the Palestinian position, which was agreed in meetings of the leadership in Tunisia on 22-24 April 1989. This position is based on a number of foundations and principles, the most salient being:

That the PLO does not in principle oppose the right of the masses of our people in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip to nominate and elect. The PLO does not fear the results of these elections. On the contrary, these results will only highlight the degree of its influence, and the degree of popular support for its political program and initiatives. However, the election process must occur in the framework of a comprehensive political process entailing a solution which affirms the role of the PLO, and its capacity—as perceived by the entire world, and by our people—as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

In order to first of all guarantee honest elections, and then obtain prior guarantees to protect those elected, there must be withdrawals of Israeli forces, and international supervision of the election process from beginning to end. In this context, it is possible to agree on the size and phases of Israeli military withdrawals, and on international supervision. This is entirely in keeping with UN conventions and covenants and international law. The PLO also approves of the model of Namibian independence, which Washington played a primary role in achieving. Based on the foregoing, the PLO sees a need for defining the character and goals of these elections. Once this is achieved—through intermediaries—practical measures for holding elections could be taken immediately.

Charter, Right of Return Discussed

44040435 Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH*
in Arabic 7 May 89 p 13

[Commentary by Hasan al-Batal]

[Excerpts] Protocol can be very important, or completely insignificant. However, the visit of the Palestinian president to Paris is a first-rate presidential, political visit,

even if employees of the French ministry of foreign affairs complained that they had not faced, since the Second World War, pressures such as those brought to bear on the eve of 'Arafat's visit to the heart of the western world. Perhaps the French "Jewish lobby" is more irksome than the French colonialists' lobby in Algeria before independence. However, has any master of the centuries-old Elysee Palace not aspired to lead France so as to enable it to lead Europe, so that old-world continent can create the image of a new world? [passage omitted]

Palestinians are cautious as to whether the abundance of "magic words" being issued in close succession by the Palestinian president will cause Shamir to change his policy. After the new Palestinian interpretation of the Palestinian national charter, perhaps Washington will demand that the PLO renounce "the right to return" as a condition for U.S. recognition of it.

As a matter of fact, the primary obstacle has been surmounted by the Palestinian side. This obstacle pertains to the charter. It is the last Palestinian card. To be more precise, interpretation of the "right of return" is easier for the PLO, because it can employ the formula of Faysal Husayni, which advocates Palestinian and Israeli acceptance of the two concepts of the right of return, in a way which neither threatens the security of Israel first of all, nor that of Palestine secondly. Inasmuch as Israel no longer attracts Jewish immigration, whereas Palestine is an attraction for the return of Palestinians, equality between the two rights of return could be balanced. An interpretive formula for this equality could be created. Such a formula would accept the right of citizens of both states to reside and travel while maintaining their national citizenship.

Whatever happens, the Palestinian visit to France put the ball in the Israeli-American court, after less than a month, in which Shamir attempted to throw the ball into the Palestinian court.

Mitterrand gave a "resuscitative blow" to Israel. Curative blows will all come from Washington and/or the Palestinian uprising...the latter before the former.

Abu-Al-'Abbas Describes Need for Armed Struggle

44040442A Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic
21 May 89 pp 16-17

[Interview With PLF Secretary General Muhammad 'Abbas, alias Abu-al-'Abbas; Date, Place not Given: "Stones Alone Are not Enough, Where Are the Rifles?"; first seven paragraphs are AL-WATAN introduction]

[Text] AL-WATAN Exclusive—We believe that transmitting verbatim 4.5 hours of questions, answers, and information to the reader constitutes a heavy dose, rather an exhausting dose even to people interested in

political affairs. So how would it be when the conversation is with Muhammad 'Abbas, alias Abu-al-'Abbas, the PLF [Palestine Liberation Front] secretary and PLO Executive Committee member? How would it be when our conversation is with the man who stole the limelight from Yasir 'Arafat for a long time in the wake of the Achille Lauro operation which turned Abu-al-'Abbas into a man wanted by more than one country and one party—the United States, Italy, and the press which are still pursuing him from place to place.

On an air trip, Abu-al-'Abbas happened to accidentally be on the plane taking us to an Arab country. Perhaps this was the chance meeting which the proverb says is better than a thousand appointments. Without disturbing Abu-al-'Abbas, we asked one of his aides for permission to interview him, and we got what we wanted quietly.

The main points covered by our interview were the occupied territories' intifadah [uprising], the PLO's course since the PNC [Palestine National Council]'s 19th session and the PLF's internal conditions.

Because the popular intifadah is above all other considerations, unity has been achieved within this front which was divided for a time. And because of the intifadah, we support the PLO, whether oppressor or oppressed. Our option is unity and then more unity.

Abu-al-'Abbas' vision of the intifadah is realistic, not theoretical. This is why he sees it as it really is: stronger than the occupier but not bigger or smaller than those who have staged it and who are participating in it. Within the general context of the Palestinian people's struggle, it is a fact which has imposed itself on the enemy as it has imposed itself on the defeatists and on those who like to separate the leadership at home and abroad. The intifadah has unified, not shaken, the PLO political leadership's course despite the presence of the opposition—an opposition which Abu-al-'Abbas views as necessary, but within the PLO's legitimate frameworks.

Because the PLO is the origin, we must safeguard it as we safeguard the intifadah. Because 'Arafat is the symbol, we must continue to be with him and on his side. The emphasis on the political movement must be reinforced with military backing. Both are required and both are necessary. Operations backing and supporting the intifadah are on the way. It is unreasonable for us to continue without military operations that support the intifadah and back up the Palestinian peace offensive. Our fist is no less effective than the Israeli fist.

Abu-al-'Abbas has a lot in his quiver. He answered all the questions we asked. But our awareness of responsibility and of the serious phase we are in makes us content with what we are offering you now. A proper opportunity may arise to publish what has been kept confidential. Following is the interview:

[AL-WATAN] We want an assessment of the Palestinian policy's course since proclamation of the Palestinian state in Algiers last November.

[Abbas] Answering this question requires us to pause at the junctures of the Palestinian political movement since the latest PNC proclaimed independence. The PNC approved a specific program which it reflected in the proclamation of independence. The program is also in the Palestinian document which approved a number of points, the most significant of which is action to convene an international conference on the basis of international legitimacy and of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and repatriation now that the PNC approved and proclaimed the Palestinian state charter, i.e. Palestinian independence. Out of adherence to the Palestinian objectives embodied in repatriation, self-determination and establishment of the Palestinian state, the PNC established a political document which was approved by the majority of the council's vote. It has been our assessment that this political statement, along with the declaration of independence and the proclamation of the Palestinian state, depend on our Palestinian people's struggles, reinforced by a wise political and diplomatic movement capable of pushing matters closer and closer to the accomplishment of our people's desired objectives. In this regard, our people's intifadah in the occupied territories, bolstered by our people's struggles everywhere and backed by the military presence of the Palestinian revolution forces in Lebanon, has been able to create the proper climate for an active Palestinian political movement that serves the political program approved by the latest PNC. The intifadah has actually escalated and moved from one condition to a more advanced condition, whether organizationally or in terms of performance. This development has been countered by extreme violence on the Israeli enemy's part in confronting the events. The number of our people's martyrs has been rising daily. But extremely important foundations have been laid and bolstered in the occupied Palestinian territories and these foundations can be developed to bring our people closer to their objectives. On the other side, the Palestinian leadership has, through a number of political positions, moved to underline our PNC's resolutions and to reaffirm our people's objectives. This leadership has succeeded in bolstering proclamation of the independent Palestinian state with more than 100 acts of international recognition. The PLO's international political reputation has been developed and the PLO's birth, in the political sense, has been established within the UN Organization where the seat of the state of Palestine has replaced the PLO seat in the organization's political idiom. Matters have developed in various directions. But these successes, which were fully clear and which immediately followed the proclamation of independence, have not passed through the framework of the plan which could contribute more and more to bringing the outcome closer. It is my assessment that some violations have been committed on the peripheries of these accomplishments. The main reason for these violations is that Palestinian diplomacy has

permitted itself to be drawn into the details of numerous issues. To put it more precisely, in some cases this diplomacy began at a premature stage to discuss extremely significant and serious issues in the press and through official and unofficial communication channels. The raising of such issues contributes to clouding the main objective, if it does not lead to eliminating it. This [approach] has been embodied in more than one junctural point of detail. An example is the statements which some of our comrades made and which, in some cases, provided the Israeli enemy with ideological justifications. Some of the answers which have been offered and which have caught us by surprise are, in fact, some sort of discussion of the settlements' future and discussion of how the future dialogue can be held with the enemy. The answers have even waded into more serious issues, including the Palestinian charter issue. It is my assessment that if the Palestinian leadership or Palestinian diplomacy had not embarked on these details, matters would have continued to develop in a better direction. I think that when the Palestinian leadership agreed to embark on the details, it agreed to be trapped prematurely. By entering this trap, this leadership or diplomacy has canceled many of the weapons which it holds and which can be used at beneficial moments.

The junctures which have been discussed to date, regrettably in an unofficial manner, have caused these cards to be dropped prematurely and have pushed us in our Palestinian life toward new interpretations which have led and which will lead in the future to conflicts that may not serve the interest of Palestinian unity or of the Palestinian card.

It is in this manner that I wish to point out that we are not required to always answer the questions addressed to us because we are not the subject of testing by journalists or by world diplomacy. We should be content with the resolutions we made at the PNC as a general framework and should wait for the reactions to this general framework. If the response to this general framework is positive, meaning that if the response to convening the international conference is positive, we can discuss the other details and issues at the conference. But to be divided as of now between a Palestinian who says yes and a Palestinian who says no to so and so, a Palestinian who offers in advance a demilitarized Palestinian state or a Palestinian state in which the settlements are preserved just to please a journalist or please the west, then in truth I profess that I fear that the media may afflict us with that with which they afflicted al-Sadat.

Al-Sadat was lured by U.S. propaganda and was lured by his presence on the covers of magazines and frontpages of newspapers as the man of peace. They blinded him and he ceded everything even before we got to Camp David.

The U.S. position is totally clear, the Israeli position is very clear and the European position is also clear. Consequently, we may not spell out our conditions and

then cede them the next day and may not project possibilities and disregard them the next day so that we may reach a point where we lose whatever may contribute to our future political or military battle. The constant proclamation of Palestinian forbearance and the constant proclamation of some sort of premature concessions are, in fact, in conflict with the PLO's main course and with the PNC's resolutions and it will lead to a flaw in the sphere of the unified national action. This flaw will not serve the intifadah's interest, the Palestinian issue's interest or the Palestinian revolution's interest. To safeguard the objective, we must safeguard Palestinian national unity, which is a decisive and fundamental element in perpetuating and developing the intifadah which is, in turn, the fundamental element in strengthening the PLO and the Palestinian instrument in the struggle.

To be accurate, this Palestinian national unity is not as pure as the unity we witnessed in the PNC's latest session. Numerous questions are raised regarding the feasibility of the proclamation and regarding the extent of one's right as a member of the Executive Committee to offer a political formula that binds one's people when such a formula has not been debated in advance. On this basis, we examine the true nature of the Palestinian statements, of the Palestinian political movement and the Palestinian interpretations in order to ultimately judge the Palestinian course. If we offer everything too early, we will find nothing to offer in the future. If we put all our cards on the media game table now, we will not find enough cards to use in the decisive moments, that is if we do not lose the trust of our kinsmen and comrades in the future upon reaching a phase when such cards can be used beneficially.

[AL-WATAN] You say that it is premature to embark on such matters even though two rounds of dialogue have been held with the United States since the PNC session.

[Abbas] I say it is premature because the PNC resolution calls for an international conference. If it called for dialogue with the United States, the matter would be different. The international conference as a framework for discussion is totally different from the U.S.-Israeli framework for discussing the issue. If we assume that the solution is American, then we should implore God to have mercy on al-Sadat for Camp David. If we make this assumption, then the formulations should be made with a different logic. But when we insist that the international conference is the basis, then there are numerous issues that belong in the international conference, not in the current dialogue with the United States.

[AL-WATAN] Don't you consider the dialogue with the United States a step toward reaching the international conference, considering that the power with which the PLO is holding dialogue is a superpower?

[Abbas] There is no doubt that the international conference cannot be held without U.S. approval. But what can we discuss with the United States now? We should discuss with the United States that which can lead us to the international conference. But to reach the international conference when we have discussed everything in isolation from our friends, comrades and partners, then we will have developed a formula in which the international conference will merely be a place to ratify what has already been discussed.

[Al-Watan] We understand from your words that you are not pleased with the two dialogue sessions and with their outcome?

[Abbas] No, what has been discussed in the dialogue sessions to date has been delicate. The sessions have been objective, delicate and successful. My criticism concerns what occurs outside the dialogue. What I mean precisely is that the press statements and the political positions we read daily make us feel that there are one million Palestinian foreign ministers. There are numerous Palestinian officials who speak as if they are the Palestinian decisionmakers who make the concessions or change the course. Some Palestinians have said explicitly: We want a disarmed Palestinian state. There are also those who have said: We want to uproot the settlements. If these issues are to be discussed, then the place for discussing all of them is the negotiations table at the international conference, not the answer to a press question. One should also not discuss them in order that one may be received by this or that minister. If one does this, then one is like a person who sells a position in advance at the expense of one's people and cause.

[AL-WATAN] There are in the Palestinian arena opinions which say that this is Palestinian democracy. We cannot obscure anybody's opinion. The other thing is that there are opinions which say that there must be clarity in our dealings and that there is no need for ambiguity.

[Abbas] There is no doubt that democracy has its meaning and its purpose. Palestinian democracy falls within the framework of what we have agreed upon in our Palestinian institutions. When we agree on a certain formula, it is our right to express our conviction in this formula. When we exceed the formula, then we do not reflect the democratic framework. This is the first point. The second point is that the PNC's resolutions and the resolutions of the PLO's latest council are very clear, understandable and precise. They do not require additional clarifications. We should act on the basis of these resolutions and of the world public opinion's reactions to them. If world public opinion, the countries of the world, or the international institutions have decided to deal with us on the basis of these resolutions, then let them say yes. If they say yes, then let us wait for the international conference. The political pronouncements that are

uttered in some cases at present exceed even the resolutions. This does not mean clarity but signifies that one is always prepared to offer what pleases the others. What pleases the others exceeds my objectives and my people's cause.

[AL-WATAN] Do we understand that you are calling for a degree of strictness?

[ʿAbbas] I am calling for close adherence to the unified Palestinian national resolution. Close adherence means holding fast to the international conference as a framework and to the declared objectives, represented in the state, in repatriation and in self-determination. I stress that it is unnecessary for us to prematurely squander our cards which may represent an element of strength for us in our future struggle.

[AL-WATAN] Do you feel that the radical basis in the PLO or in the Palestinian arena is undergoing a crisis currently?

[ʿAbbas] To be true, there is, in my opinion, a difference between discussing affairs within the PLO's framework and discussing them among the forces in the Palestinian arena. In the first case, there is an agreed national program. To date, the main forces that have approved this program are adhering to it, even though there have been some violations or some incomprehensible tactics which are ordinarily arbitrated within certain frameworks. As for the Palestinian factions that are outside the PLO, the matter is different because these factions have not succeeded so far in entrenching their program on the real political or military ground. If these factions succeed in entrenching their political and military program, they would constitute the best support for the PLO. I do not feel that they would be in conflict with the PLO if they implement their political and military program. But because these organizations proclaimed numerous verbal slogans which they have not been able to implement, they represent a frustrating condition for numerous Palestinian popular wagers on this condition. This frustrating condition is embodied in the fact that the organizations are unable to implement their slogans. These organizations' position, which calls for greater strictness, for further escalation of the struggle and for a decisive confrontation with the enemy, represents in fact a logic which we need. But we need it implemented on the ground, not just to further revile the PLO. We don't need it to transform the battle of radicalism from a confrontation with the enemy to a confrontation against the PLO's program and to confrontation against Palestinians. The more these factions are able to entrench their political program and their struggle program on the real ground against the enemy, the stronger will the Palestinian citizen's march toward achieving the objectives be made. There will then be a balance between the two programs within the Palestinian framework. The current conduct of the organizations that are outside the PLO's framework further weakens the PLO because this conduct amounts to no more than propaganda and to

clashing with the PLO whereas what is required is that these factions (battle) with themselves to bolster the Palestinian role. This is what has created the dilemma of the big gap between slogan and action. It is completely obvious that these organizations have failed to adhere to mobilizing the masses at home and abroad. All these things can be corrected if these organizations adhere to a specific political program tied to a specific system and if they are unable to break this bond. What degree of relative independence can these organizations have on the basis of supporting our Palestinian people with a greater struggle that creates a balance with the PLO's political and diplomatic program, that gives them a justification for their existence in our Palestinian arena, that contributes to leading them out of their crisis and that, moreover, indirectly contributes to supporting the PLO program?

[AL-WATAN] Can we consider these words proposals made by you? The Palestinians, especially in the occupied territories, want national unity and want a settlement in order that they may eliminate the tribulation and the homelessness.

[ʿAbbas] Even those outside the occupied territories suffer greatly. Therefore, there is singular hardship among our people everywhere, even though the reason for the hardship may differ in the immediate sense. The source is the same. The Palestinian leadership's serious endeavor to accomplish the program approved by the PNC, which is, of course, our Palestinian people's program, emanates fundamentally from an objective view of the current situation and of the struggle's current horizons. This endeavor is embodied in a movement of struggle and in a large-scale diplomatic movement aimed at approaching our objectives. But we must absolutely not imagine that these objectives can be achieved with diplomatic movement alone.

We would truly err if we believed that Israel will commit suicide or that the Zionist enemy will retreat from the occupied territories with diplomatic action or with greater political clamor. This diplomatic movement is supported by and based on our masses' daily struggle at home. What is required is to develop the intifadah, to generate greater momentum in this arena and to add combat struggle against the Israeli enemy outside of or across the Arab borders.

The losses continue, whether through the intifadah or through other efforts. This requires imposing new given facts so that the Palestinian diplomatic effort may receive a broader response. On this basis, I believe that it is necessary to develop efforts of combat and struggle, regardless of these efforts' tendencies or of who makes them. Therefore, the Palestinian conditions in their totality can, if they act to achieve these objectives, create a state of creative balance that pushes matters forward and that contributes to lifting our masses' hardship as soon as possible.

[AL-WATAN] You have said that there are some violations. Don't you, as a result, fear for Palestinian unity?

[Abbas] Of course. The number one objective for which we fear and which we struggle to protect, rather strengthen, is Palestinian unity. Our victories and our forces accumulate on the basis of this Palestinian national unity. If this Palestinian national unity is undermined, our entire Palestinian national struggle will be undermined. So far, it has been possible to discuss issues within the spheres of our Palestinian arena. Our Palestinian institutions are fundamentally democratic institutions in which we can engage in criticism, opposition and unity and can battle to develop a unified conviction. But if these violations persist, they may cancel or torpedo democracy's credibility inside us. The danger is that if some Palestinian factions and forces feel that their sole role is to oppose and argue, their attitude may in the future affect their vision of the democratic process within the PLO. I hope that we will not reach this point and I hope that we will give maximum consideration to our national unity. Our premature discussing of certain political junctures may be controversial if they are given expression before the debate [at the international conference].

[AL-WATAN] In your capacity as secretary general and a Palestinian decision-maker, do you think that the international conference is near?

[Abbas] After the PNC session, I pointed out that getting to the international conference requires a broad program of struggle, especially since the conference will not be held merely as a result of a Palestinian decision. For the international conference to be held, it requires a large-scale amassing of Arab and international forces and introducing changes that impose new given facts, taking into consideration the developments at the Arab and international levels, the international detente and the Palestinian momentum. The fact is that all these given facts have pushed matters forward. Now I think that the international conference is nearer than I thought it was in the past. But it is not so near as to be in the foreseeable future. What I mean is that I do not agree with those who say that the conference will be held by year's end or next year. If the momentum of our struggle and our activities continues, it will lead to holding the international conference, but not in the foreseeable future, "i.e. not in the next 2 years." Even in this regard, I don't think that matters have ripened enough that we may see the result before us and may await the political and moral harvest. If we convince our masses that the objective is within a stone's throw and if the objective then takes long to achieve, this may lead to inverse results.

[AL-WATAN] The PLF approved the PLO's political program in the PNC session. What would your position be if the PLO does not get self-rule, for example? What ramifications would this have on the intifadah?

[Abbas] To begin, we approved the PLO program on the basis of the constants contained in the program, headed by the independent Palestinian state, repatriation and self-determination. To us, these are three main and decisive points which cannot be separated from one another. We, as an organization and as the other factions and forces participating in the PLO, approved the PLO program. It is fully obvious that they all had before them the reasons and causes on whose basis this program was drafted. It is my assessment that if this program is not implemented and if all parties do not respond to it seriously, it will cancel itself by itself. But if some Palestinians believe that this program can be divided into phases, that there is no objection to self-rule or to a compromise between independence and non-independence, then this does in fact constitute a total contradiction with our program. We believe that the Palestinian state is a sacred and untouchable issue and that the right to repatriation is a sacred and untouchable issue. Therefore, any disregarding of the repatriation right or of the independent Palestinian state will take us to a new position. But it is our duty to struggle within the PLO's framework so as to keep all hands holding to this objective. Even within the PLO's framework, I believe that all hold to this objective. As for the future possibilities and for the likelihood of imposing autonomy, the fact is that this is an issue of struggle between us and the Zionist enemy. There is no likelihood of a Palestinian wish for [mere] autonomy, and there will be none in the future.

[AL-WATAN] Are you betting on time?

[Abbas] Not exactly. We do not bet on time, considering that we are partners in the PLO. We struggle daily side by side with our people and with the Palestinian people's forces and sectors to implement our program. Therefore, it is our national duty to support and push for implementing the program as it was approved by the PNC. Consequently, we are not wagering on and not waiting for what will happen. We have been facing possibilities. I do not imagine that the possibilities will materialize or that we should wait before taking a position. Not at all. We struggle daily to strengthen the Palestinian national decision and to reach a phase in which the Palestinian state will materialize on the real ground. We fully adhere to our Palestinian people's right to repatriation and self-determination.

Under the umbrella of different assumptions, the different assumptions will come from the enemies, not from the Palestinian arena. There may be a hostile movement seeking to impose autonomy. This likely assumption will be confronted by all our Palestinian people and by all our Palestinian forces and factions, including ourselves. If some within the Palestinian circle violate or stray from the Palestinian resolutions, then we will have our position on such conduct.

[AL-WATAN] What are the dimensions of the opposition's influence within the PLO?

[Abbas] In the PLO institutions and in the Executive Committee, all are in the establishment. Therefore, we cannot say that a certain force is in the opposition or a certain force is in power. All are in power. Some political steps may be taken and one may not agree with this or that faction's vision or with this or that struggler. So one expresses his opinion on this tendency and one debates to establish one's viewpoint. This conduct strengthens the democracy within the PLO. On this basis, I believe that the opinions that battle within this framework to reach the best decision contribute very positively to making the soundest decision. The presence of these voices within the PLO purifies or regulates the decision-making process. Consequently, all impurities that may be harmful are ejected from the process. These voices perform a very important fundamental role.

[AL-WATAN] What is your position with regard to the Palestinian intifadah, and are the intifadah's proclamations presented to you?

[Abbas] I do not wish to talk about the dimensions at home [inside the occupied territories]. The intifadah is the movement of our entire Palestinian people in the occupied territories. When we say the Palestinian people's movement, we—whether the PLF comrade members at home or abroad—are a part of this people. Within this framework, the quantitative or dimensional criterion is inaccurate. No organization can claim that it has the majority or the minority in the intifadah, especially since the Unified National Leadership [UNL] at home fully reflects the PLO. What I mean is that my attending or not attending an Executive Committee meeting does not mean my remoteness from the decisionmaking. Therefore, participation or non-participation in drafting a proclamation at home does not at all represent distance from that situation. Our comrades are present there and they, along with their people, contribute daily and actively to perpetuating, advancing and developing the intifadah.

One of our PLF comrades is a participant in the Higher National Committee. Our comrades are participants in the subsidiary committees and in some, but not all, cadres within the occupied territories. But this presence is influential inasmuch as it can contribute to enhancing and advancing the intifadah. The directives or the leadership in the Palestinian arena supervise all activities of Palestinian action. As long as we are present in this leadership, we operate as other organizations do. We do not at all allege that our role is more notable.

[AL-WATAN] Don't you think that the armed struggle is going through a weak phase and that the stone is what has imposed the PLO's power?

[Abbas] No. The former is correct but the latter is not. The armed struggle has been retreating since our departure from Lebanon as a result of the peripheral battles imposed on us and as a result of the dispersion and the situation that has developed since 1983. The stone has

reinforced the PLO's power, but has not imposed it. The PLO is present and it has a very strong weight in the area and, now, in the world. This weight has been acquired as a result of our Palestinian people's ceaseless struggle throughout a quarter century and as a result of our masses' struggle everywhere prior to the PLO's emergence. If this very strong practical and material presence had not been influential, Lebanon would not have been invaded. Before the Israeli enemy invaded Lebanon, the PLO had succeeded in making a number of accomplishments and successes for our popular masses at the Arab and international levels and had redrawn the political map with clearer orientations. But the crisis the PLO experienced in the wake of the split and of the departure from Lebanon contributed to weakening the PLO's image at the Arab and international levels. However, the PLO was generally able to overcome the crisis and to preserve its institutions and its pioneer role in leading the Palestinian people's struggle, thus adding to its strength. The intifadah then followed to take up this strength and to make a new qualitative addition to the PLO when all sectors of our people participated at once in confronting the occupier. This qualitative addition to the reality of the situation has also added quantitative strength to the PLO. The intifadah is not the sole source that has given the PLO and the Palestinian people their strength. In this sense, there may be more additions as a result of the diplomatic effort or the military effort—additions that give the PLO more strength.

Regarding the armed struggle, and I always link all means of combat and struggle, I call for creating broad support for this stone so that it may reach its maximum range. Thus, the required addition is addition of the rifle. On this basis, we have raised the slogan of adding the rifle to the stone and have said: Let the rifle join the stone so that it may create a qualitative leap in our confrontation with the Zionist enemy. Regardless of the details of how the rifle can join the stone, I personally believe that the stone alone will not be enough in the future, especially since we are facing the momentum of the hostile onslaught against our people and facing the daily massacres perpetrated against our people. Some brothers and comrades are afraid that the use of weapons will lead to massacres. We ask: What is happening now? At least, 200 injuries are suffered daily, not to mention the detainees. Real massacres are being perpetrated from the northernmost to the southernmost parts of the occupied homeland. Massacres, such as the Nahalin massacre, are perpetrated daily in various parts of our Palestinian territories. Therefore, the Israeli enemy needs no justification to escalate his massacres. Conversely, I believe that if the enemy feels that there is a possibility that bigger losses may be inflicted on him, this feeling may deter him and may create a balance in field operations between the Palestinian effort and the enemy's effort. In the future, we may be compelled to put a rifle in every Palestinian's hand, and I hope such a day will not come when we are not prepared. There is talk of comprehensive civil disobedience in the future. The fact is that I am talking of a comprehensive Palestinian

confrontation in the future. The day may come when we will say that we wish we had put a rifle in every Palestinian hand in advance. To reach this level, we are at least required to support the stone with the rifle so that we may deter the enemy and stop his massacres. There has been enough waiting, now that 6 months have passed since the PNC proclamation. As for the advocates of the idea that we have presented our political plan, let us wait to further expose the enemy, his lies and his program. This high Palestinian flexibility has been countered by Israeli crimes against our people. The Palestinian words of love—which reached a such a level that we have had disagreements among ourselves—have been countered by extraordinary Israeli extremism. In this case of continued words only, of a continued diplomatic offensive and of what may be called a high degree of Palestinian flexibility and a high level Israeli assault, the assessments differ and the Palestinian position means the position of the incapable and is viewed as the position of the Palestinian who can do nothing but utter nice words. But if we succeed in adding to our national struggle and in truly supporting our people by fighting the enemy, then our diplomatic offensive will have another meaning, and a creative balance will be established between the political process and the process of struggle. However, if we keep on merely waiting for the outcome of the proposal we have made and of the words we have said, our words and our existence will become devoid of all substance. The Israeli will then become more ferocious and will further oppress our people and our revolution's masses. This does not mean that the Palestinian diplomatic offensive has lost its glitter. But it will lose its glitter if it is not reinforced. We must at least protect our people, who are exposed to death and destruction daily with the most sophisticated means of killing, while they have only traditional means of protection, in addition to political protection.

[AL-WATAN] In light of the Israeli measures and crimes against the intifadah, is it your conviction that the Palestinian leadership is thinking of or is about to give thought to a future plan to escalate the intifadah, especially since you have called in one of your statements for creating new given facts to support the intifadah?

[‘Abbas] At the political and organizational level, there are, in fact, existing programs which have been enacted and which have produced very important results in the field insofar as the intifadah is concerned. At the military level, military action has its special characteristics and formulations, is tied to the programs of each [PLO] organization separately and is connected with the particular nature of this [military] performance. Some see that continuation of the intifadah's peaceful aspect is very important and some see that the intifadah is a process of armed struggle with stones. We do not, in fact, share this vision. We believe that it is unreasonable to leave our camp, city and village masses to confront the Israeli enemy with stones and to pay the price without any support. We find that even the Palestinian political movement needs serious support in the field. We in the

PLF believe that the answer to the enemy's massacres is not provided with gentle calls. We believe that duty requires us to support our masses as much as possible.

The Israeli enemy must learn that the Palestinian fist is still strong and that not only he can engage in acts of killing against the masses. He must realize clearly that the Palestinian flexibility falls within the context of the Palestinian awareness of all the Arab and international developments and is not the result of incapacity. The Palestinian state is not a state of incapacity, and it can strike and wound also. Any reluctance to strike and wound may not be in our interest. I urge all the armed Palestinian forces to chart their programs in such a way as to make it understood to the enemy that the Palestinian fist is capable of inflicting damage. Our people are prepared not just to be killed in Nahalin, Gaza and the various areas. This is absolutely not in conflict with the Palestinian diplomatic movement because this movement will be useless in the face of Israeli arrogance.

[AL-WATAN] Do we understand from these words that you are planning operations, for example?

[‘Abbas] In fact, this has nothing to do with the plan. We in the PLF believe that our struggle moves through all the possible channels. We believe that our loyalty to our people and to the PLO program requires us to struggle in all areas and in all directions. To begin with, the credibility of our political position can be crowned only with the use of all means of struggle—social, diplomatic, economic and military struggle. All these means are available. From this perspective, we have not really stopped our military struggle even though we have not recently achieved success in notable military operations. In recent years, the PLF forces have continued to carry out their combat action within the possible limits. They have supported our masses at home with combat programs, within the limits of the possible. We did not stray from our masses and from supporting our masses in that period. It is true that major operations did disappear for a time. This absence was tied fundamentally and to a large degree to the developments of the Palestinian struggle process. The truth is that we are convinced that there is a time for diplomacy, a time for stones and a time for weapons. I believe that the time has come for the weapon to support the intifadah, the Palestinian political process and the PLO program—a program to which the other forces have not responded correctly and soundly.

[AL-WATAN] Do you think that there are PLF operations that are in violation of the Cairo proclamation?

[‘Abbas] The Cairo proclamation did not call for stopping the fight against the Israeli enemy. I have not heard that there is a Palestinian position which says no to fighting the enemy. We do not call for fighting the enemy anywhere. We are opposed to any military action outside the occupied territories. Very regrettably, even that major operation—the Achille Lauro operation—was not

fundamentally an external operation. Its target was the Palestinian port of Ashdod but it was not destined to reach it. We view the Palestinian soil as the main arena for the struggle. On this Palestinian soil where the enemy is engaged in killing our people daily, this enemy can be deterred only by counter-force.

[AL-WATAN] What is your opinion of the Palestinian political coordination with Egypt on the international conference?

[‘Abbas] In principle, I support opening the PLO doors for dialogue with all the forces, including Egypt, regardless of the details. Egypt is an Arab country which has its weight in Arab society. Egypt’s role and Egypt’s influence cannot be overlooked. Therefore, dialogues have to be held with it on all issues that concern whatever is Arab and concern all the Arab countries. But I am opposed to limiting the coordination to Egypt. This coordination must be established at the Arab level and at the level of friends so that Palestinian decisionmaking may gain its sound momentum and thrust at the level of the Arab and friendly nations. But if this coordination is confined to Egypt, then this is a different matter and it will be assessed from a different position. So Egypt’s presence as an Arab country on the Israeli enemy’s borders must be taken into consideration.

[AL-WATAN] Would you give us full details on the PLF? Where does it stand now and at what point are your efforts to unify it?

[‘Abbas] I can now say that the PLF is unified, thanks to the conviction developed by all the comrades at the latest meeting we had together—a meeting which was crowned with the 27 April 1989 agreement that coincided with the PLF’s anniversary. That was an occasion for concluding this agreement on the day on which the PLF’s birth was announced. With complete assurance I say that the PLF is now unified and that it is now moving to consolidate this unity within the comprehensive organizational framework. This unification was not accomplished in a single dialogue session or in a debate of 1 or 2 days. Fundamentally, the unification came about as a result of the objective development of the PLF from all aspects. To begin, the PLF did not split in the organizational sense and did not splinter in the conventional sense of splintering. The PLF experienced disagreement in viewpoints at those moments when the entire Palestinian arena was shaken during the major split. Interpretations varied, thus creating some sort of a political, not organizational, disagreement. This political disagreement persisted for a long time until the unifying PNC session was held in Algiers. This PNC was the first serious step in the direction of rearranging the organizational and political conditions within the framework of a unified PLF.

Here it must be noted that the political disagreement phase did not generate organizational estrangement among us. In the disagreement phases, the dialogue and the meetings continued. More than once, we let our

internal relations be the arbitrator so that we may overcome some crisis or to chart the future horizons. Martyred comrade Tal’at Ya’qub headed those meetings and contributed constantly and seriously to putting our affairs in order and to putting them within framework that serves our national struggle. In the unifying PNC in Algiers, agreement was reached on field operations to strengthen the PLF’s organizational unity. This agreement was followed by a number of sessions and meetings which produced a number of other agreements, the most significant of which was concluded with comrade Tal’at Ya’qub in Prague. This agreement established a material basis for unity, meaning that it dealt with political, organizational and procedural details. But the fact is that this agreement was not destined to succeed and to be implemented as a result of a number of interventions and developments, some internal and some external. For our part, we made immense efforts with our comrades to develop the field applications of this agreement. But we were surprised at a later phase to find that some comrades had objections to the Prague agreement. We met again in Algiers and we introduced the modifications required for the unification step. The dialogue went on, but without agreement to merge the institutions. The dialogue continued and rapprochement continued to develop on joint action in some areas. Despite the disagreement in some external arenas, organizational unity was there. A week or 10 days prior to the latest PNC session, a meeting was held with comrade Tal’at and other comrades, and a final resolution was made on our need to complete the organizational unity phase after the PNC.

It was fate’s wish that comrade Abu-Ya’qub be snatched from among us and martyred on the eve of conclusion of the PNC session. Regrettably, his martyrdom came hours before our meeting to sign our documents. Thus, comrade Tal’at Ya’qub left a great void and passed on to me tasks much heavier than those I had shouldered previously, especially the nationalistic, psychological task of uniting the organization at any price. We had to use our utmost efforts and all our resources with our comrades in order to reunite the organization and to get to the end of the path on which we had started with comrade Abu Ya’qub. We held a number of meetings in which we discussed the manner in which we could draft our likely program. The meetings were crowned with a full and final agreement on a unification program that takes into consideration the need to combine all the capabilities and all the organizational efforts within a single unified framework and that crowns this unification effort with a congress to be held in July. On this basis, a number of working committees were formed to arrange and prepare for holding the unification congress. A number of other committees were formed to push matters early in the direction of unified action. It was also agreed to hold a meeting in May. At this meeting, a number of programs and tasks will be unified. In every meeting, a number of committees will be unified so that the unification congress may be crowned with a united organization.

The next meeting will unify the information and political expression committees, the administrative and financial action committees and other committees concerned with our action in the various arenas.

In this coming meeting, efforts concerning the occupied territories will be united. There are some urgent issues that must be united. In some arenas where we envision further discussion, matters will be unified gradually so that the PLF may have full organizational unity now that it has established in an internal document the basis of political and organizational unity.

We greatly hope that all the PLF comrades will have a role within the framework of the unification move and that each comrade will take up his position of struggle with his comrades. The statements made here and there denying conclusion of the unity agreement are totally inaccurate. I feel that our comrades are fully committed and eager to crown this unification agreement with complete PLF unity at all levels, keeping in mind that all the comrades are extremely eager for the national front's role in the Palestinian arena. The unification step may, like any other case, encounter some obstacles.

We seriously seek to eliminate these obstacles with dialogue and through arbitration within a democratic framework. The PLF congress will be held next July.

Strike Forces, Collaborators, Intifadah Discussed
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in Arabic 7 May 89 pp 14-15

[Article by Mazin Bakr]

[Text] The occupation authority continues to be alarmed, because the Union of Palestinian Journalists in Jerusalem is the agency accrediting press passes for foreign journalists. In another development, occupation soldiers destroy the hands of clocks in public squares, which indicate "Palestine local time."

What is happening is that the power of the intifadah [Palestinian uprising] is gnawing away at the power of the occupation.

The term "Palestinian-Israeli conflict" is no longer limited in its usage to Palestinians. [It is also used by] a few Israeli intellectuals, such as Meron Benvenisti, who deemed it advisable relatively early on to examine the most important components of the conflict in the Middle East.

This is largely due to the intifadah in the occupied lands, which has presented the world with a living, audio-visual picture of the daily struggle, which had long been waged silently, and in which the Israelis had been victorious in "gnawing" and "digesting" by confiscating land and

wealth and gradually annexing the occupied areas to Israel, while maintaining the image of a "bastion of free democracy," which fears for its very existence amid a sea of Arab aggression.

The world has now come to acknowledge that this term, and what proceeds from it, has a well-defined political essence and definition. It is no mere coincidence or isolated event that the UN Security Council, in its resolutions 605, 607, and 608 of last year for example, designates the West Bank and the Gaza Strip "the Palestinian occupied lands," and recognizes Arab Jerusalem as a part of them. There is more to this than mere triumph over the American veto by embarrassing and neutralizing it. Rather, we can see in it a U.S. compulsion to adjust to international recognition of the central issue of the Middle East crisis, and to vote positively in favor of some of these resolutions, at a time when "Palestine" is the hottest of the Arab-Israeli fronts.

Since Resolution 605, it has become clear that influential international society, including states and institutions, clearly acknowledges—as indicated by the new designation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—that the struggle between Palestinian and Israeli wills has entered the stage of an overt struggle for authority and sovereignty in the occupied fatherland. It has also become clearly understood that this conflict is worrying the world, and that it has legitimacy. These factors make it possible for one of the parties to the conflict (meaning the Palestinian party) to have recourse to an international, sanctioning authority, namely the Security Council, in order to lodge a complaint, appeal for a decision, and seek protection. Thus, in specific circumstances, it has become clear that the issuance of resolutions supportive of the cause of Palestine is a real, albeit still difficult, possibility.

Of course, the same level of success was not achieved vis-a-vis recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian side. However, recognition can be viewed as "a matter of course," whose circumstances require gradual development and the clarification of particular facts, one after the other. It appears that progress in this direction is considerably satisfactory, when we direct our attention to the intifadah's achievements, both in the field and internationally. These achievements include growing international and Arab support for the legitimacy of the PLO, and, especially, the "cracking" of the American "door" to the PLO in its dialogue with the United States, and the "relative opening" of the European "gate" to the PLO. In this regard, a most important phase was crowned this week by the visit of chairman 'Arafat to Paris. All of these are achievements which are taking root and developing on the strength of other progress in the "occupation and resistance" game.

Regarding the field, the current phase of the intifadah can be described as a phase of "relative persistence" and noticeable progress in undermining and breaking "the

power and domination," of the enemy during demonstrations and actual engagements with it, inasmuch as it has become possible to impose a type of local, temporary sovereignty, extending into hours of quiet, which means "times of peace" in the sense of states. A situation such as this is leading to popular mastery in expressing the manifestations of this sovereignty, critically examining it, and moreover, creating new, practical methods to practice it. For this purpose, the popular local committees have assumed authority. In addition to organizing popular resistance activities, and supervising the affairs of citizens in the areas of education, health, social welfare, etc., these committees exercise their mandates with full authority and calling to account, both of which constitute the backbone of sovereign authority. The popular committees find in the "strike forces," a powerful executive tool able to give practical expression on the ground to the concept of authority.

Here, two basic principles of great importance should be mentioned:

First, every disruption of the balance of force will disrupt the balance of sovereignty.

Second, every step on the way to eroding Israeli sovereignty represents a step on the way to building Palestinian sovereignty.

There are many manifestations of the retreat of Israel's power and the erosion of its sovereignty, the most prominent being the failure to end the intifadah or to prevent it from achieving politically significant gains. This type of challenge is directed primarily at military rule. The retreat of Israeli power has also become significantly clear in the great paralysis that has struck the centers and institutions of the civil administration in the occupied land, as reflected particularly by the paralysis of tax-collection agencies and the recent announcement of the authorities' decision to close half of their police stations in the West Bank and Gaza because of a lack of the necessary police personnel to staff them as a result of the collective resignations.

Paralleling this, we observe the tireless construction, under the occupation, of the foundations of an alternative Palestinian rule, which enjoys widespread popular good will. Here, four illustrative examples can indicate the state of interference with, and undermining of Israeli authorities on the part of Palestinian authorities:

First: a noticeable increase in the phenomenon of the paramilitary parades put on by the strike forces. The organization of such parades perhaps first requires financing sometimes to buy uniforms for example. However, the most crucial factor here is the close relation between the display of force (a para-military display as such) and defending oneself, indeed, enjoying the relative security offered by an atmosphere of local sovereignty. The organization of these parades requires security coverage in a

"liberated" area, which permits freedom of movement and allows for an organized parade accessible to journalists, media personnel, and their cameras.

To further clarify this relation, we will attempt to formulate a technical definition of a liberated area: It is a geographic locale from which enemy forces have decided to withdraw or which they have decided not to enter, due to an actual or possible force preventing their entrance, if only temporarily. This operational decision frequently results in political consequences in accordance with the size and number of obstacles and the period of the withdrawal. Therefore, special significance was attached to the appearance of 200 Palestinian youths on Israeli television screens, walking in the streets of the village of Buruqin, on the anniversary of the martyrdom of brother Abu-Jihad, dressed in uniforms, and armed with chains, axes and wooden Kalishnikovs.

Second: To complement the concept of "external security," which is to make occupation soldiers remain at a certain geographical distance, the national authority, represented by the unified leadership and the popular committees, is addressing itself to internal security, which rests primarily on deterring agents of, and collaborators with, the occupation authority.

The problem of settling accounts with and punishing agents and collaborators is definitely linked to the two concepts of "security" and "sovereignty." Therefore, we find this problem related to achievements made on the ground, and the need to advance to more distant objectives or fields in which the intifadah leadership expects Israeli counterpressure. We note, for example, in the light of the current escalation of oppressive Israeli measures, an increase in the rate of punitive operations against agents. Thus, in the last two weeks, according to one set of statistics, 25 operations of this type were carried out, which led to the death of about 11 collaborators, the wounding of more than 10 others, and the damaging of their property.

A good sign is that the punishment of agents and collaborators enjoys general, national, popular legitimacy. Such legitimacy removes such punishment completely from the purview of murder and crime and allows it to obtain the meaning of punishment and justice. If not for this enlightened view, the result would be a series of acts of revenge and counter-killings. This legitimacy is supported by the designation, by the intifadah's unified leadership, of special days for the punishment of those who break national ranks.

Third: The struggle for power is taking new twists every day, and is making its way into everyday life. The national unified leadership called on citizens recently to observe a one-hour time difference compared to Israeli time on 15 April. In this game of "occupation and resistance," enemy forces destroyed a number of citizens' clocks which had been changed. A press report stated that occupation soldiers destroyed 12 clocks in the

suburbs of Jerusalem and that many citizens were subjected to beatings when they responded with Palestine time to soldiers' questions regarding the time.

Fourth: Several practical considerations are being imposed primarily on others, who must also take a neutral position on accepting several manifestations of Palestinian sovereignty. In this connection, there is currently a controversy in Israel revolving around the acceptance by foreign correspondents of press credentials which facilitate their movements in Palestinian cities and camps. Despite the fact that these credentials, which are issued by the Union of Palestinian Journalists in Jerusalem, do not bear a Palestinian flag or any motto indicative of the practice of sovereignty, as if they were issued by "the state of Palestine," their political meaning is more clear to Palestinians and Israelis than anything else.

Almost in the same context is the request made by the family of kidnapped soldier Avi Sasportas to Israeli authorities to permit it to meet with "Palestinian leaders" in the occupied land to inquire about the fate of their missing son.

In addition to the preceding, it is a constant that Israeli violence in confronting the intifadah will lead to results opposite of those hoped for, as conveyed in an expression which does not conceal a Palestinian bias in its choice of words: Every act of brutality will be countered by Palestinian vitality.

Perhaps the aforementioned concept had a role in determining the premises which impelled Israeli chief-of-staff Dan Shomron to affirm the impossibility of ending the intifadah with force, when he said: "Whoever promises to eliminate the intifadah or promises that no stone will be thrown anywhere in the territories, is deceiving the public, because such a matter could not occur. The role of the army is to strive to keep the violence at a level which does not force the political leadership to accept dictates contrary to Israel's vital interests."

The previous statement, made by Shomron to be exact, demonstrates political wisdom which surpasses that enjoyed by Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, who continues to insist upon ignoring the facts in his proposals and recommendations, as well as in his plan calling for elections to select representatives for the residents of the West Bank.

Few are optimistic that Shamir will manage to hold elections according to the conditions which he laid down, because that would mean that Israel would be able to end the Palestinian uprising, and nullify its gains. It seems more logical and probable that the current escalation and the consequences of the proposed solution concerning elections—if it continues to be the focus of attention—will lead to a struggle between Palestinians

and Israelis over the stipulations, circumstances, and goals of the election process. It is probable that the two parties to the struggle (and Shamir personally), as well as concerned parties, are well aware of this. On this basis, it is possible to consider the respite of the coming months—during which Shamir promised Washington that he would arrange the process of electing Palestinian representatives from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—a respite for all parties in fact.

It is first of all a respite for Israel to use the most extreme possible means of suppressing the intifadah in an attempt to deal a blow to it and break its spine in order to suppress its aspirations and demands to a minimum, and consequently set the ceiling for what the Israelis consider a "concession" for the sake of a solution.

It is secondly a respite for the United States, whose new administration has so far not formed an a comprehensive policy on the Palestinian problem and the Middle East crisis, especially because of the emergence of the Palestinian factor to such a surprising extent locally and internationally. Perhaps the United States requires more time to examine the horizons of the dialogue which it is conducting with the PLO and to study the results deriving from Shamir's scheme to apply all specifications of his plan.

Thirdly, it is a respite for the PLO in order for it to produce, in final form, its response to current Israeli and American proposals, with a degree of diplomacy and flexibility that complies with the requirements of a political solution.

The new phases occurring on the ground in the game of "occupation and resistance" are the most decisive element in determining everybody's positions. However, the minimum basic Palestinian position is not to fall back from the gains achieved by the intifadah, and to pursue the achievement of more gains. This position is supported by a popular willingness to be more freely giving in the clash with the enemy in order to reap the fruits of a more "mature" policy.

A particularly indicative example of unequivocal popular rejection of Israeli occupation, authority and sovereignty, is that of female "security" prisoners (Palestinian of course), who have taken upon themselves to neither kiss nor embrace their children and relatives during visits, because that—as explained by the prison administration—requires the issuance of a special permit from the prison commander. None of these female prisoners has submitted such a request, "perhaps because of their unwillingness to accept the authority of the director of an Israeli prison," as stated by a prison administration spokesman to the 'AL HAMISHMAR newspaper (24 April 1989).

Farmers Facing Financial Ruin in West Bank
44040442B Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 27 May 89 pp 29-32

[Article by 'Izzat Daraghimah: "Farmers: Hardship, Concerns, Markets; More Than 300,000 Feddans Cultivated With Vegetables Are Threatened With Destruction; Over 2,000 Families Threatened With Loss of Livelihood"]

[Text] The West Bank's northern valleys, or the so-called Tubas and al-Jiftilik valley, are estimated at more than 370,000 dunums of irrigated and dry farmlands. These areas, what is left after the occupation authorities' land seizure and confiscation, provide more than 65 percent of the West Bank's production of all kinds of produce—tomatoes, eggplants, green peppers, zucchinis, cucumbers, carrots, potatoes, and broad beans. These lands are threatened with abandonment and, consequently, the livelihood of the farmers who cultivate and serve these lands with their sweat and efforts, as well as the livelihood of their families, is besieged and threatened.

Piles of vegetables—vegetables cultivated and harvested to support the farmers and producers—are sold at the lowest prices. But it is as the economic rule says, the greater the supply the smaller the demand.

Last winter, the frost wave which afflicted the area, especially Tubas valley, destroyed more than 70 percent of the cultivated crops. Motivated by the hope of a good season and a good yield that would meet their families' needs, the farmers replanted. But their hope has been disappointed. The season has been good but the prices are very low.

The farmers are not asking for any financial aid. All they are asking for is help in finding international and Arab markets and buyers to purchase their produce.

In Tubas Valley and in the areas of 'Ayn al-Bayda, Bardalah, 'Ayn al-Hulwah, al-Jiftilik and al-Nassariyah, the farmers live through the heat of the summer and the severe cold of the winter in homes made of mud, straw, tin, and corrugated iron. They endure this in their struggle to protect the land and to provide us with the fresh vegetables we desire and demand.

The farmers' patience has begun to wear out these days. Uncle Abu Fayiz, a prominent farmer in 'Ayn al-Bayda, has said: "I have worked and cultivated the land with my efforts and the efforts of my sons and their families and we send thousands of boxes of vegetables to the markets. What is the result? Our zucchini sales have yielded nothing—and may God compensate us—other than exhaustion and costs. If the "brothers" do not find us markets, we will preserve what we have, that is if we have anything to preserve. But to exhaust ourselves and end up losing money, this is something we will never accept."

For further familiarization with the hardship of the brother farmers, financiers and marketing agents, we have toured the valleys, Tubas, Nablus and Janin.

High Production Exceeds People's Needs

Ahmad Nasuh al-Kaylani, a farmer, landowner, and marketing agent in Nablus' central vegetable market, said to us:

"More than 5,000 boxes of various kinds of vegetables come to our market almost daily. A 15-kg box of tomatoes is sold at no more than 3 shekels, of cucumbers at 1.5 shekels, of zucchini at one shekel and of corn at one shekel also."

Zucchini and cucumbers are the varieties whose price have mainly afflicted the farmer with a loss amounting to nearly 90 percent of the cost, not to mention the loss of labor.

As for the reason for the low prices, al-Kaylani said: "The low prices are due to several reasons, of which the most important is the occupation authorities' frequent closure of the West Bank areas. Thus, the farmer or merchant is unable to proceed to bring the produce to the market. Consequently, the produce is exposed to damage. If sold, it is sold at very low prices because it is no longer fresh and because it is damaged.

"Another reason is that agricultural production is very abundant and there are no buyers. The abundant production exceeds the citizens' needs.

"A third reason is the absence of markets to receive our produce, even though it is of the highest quality. The occupation authorities have prevented Arab farmers from selling their production in the Israeli markets. They have also banned Arab merchants within the green line from purchasing the produce of their brothers in the West Bank. As for the Arab markets, one can talk about them endlessly. Syria is in dire need of the produce, and so are Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. But nobody wants to purchase our produce. As for the European markets, they want certain varieties. Moreover, their production hits their markets at this time.

"Concluding, al-Kaylani said: We appeal to our brothers in Hebron, Bethlehem, Bayt Sahur, Ramallah, and the south to support us because this support is in everybody's interest. We appeal to them to come to our markets and farms to purchase the produce they want. This is better than their buying from other markets which boycott our production."

Farmer Salih Sulayman 'Abd-al-Razzaq said: "I receive more than 12,000 boxes of vegetables in my market daily. A box is sold at a price ranging from 1-3 shekels, depending on the variety.

"The cost of transportation from the valley to the market is one shekel per box, the commission charged for produce sale is six percent the gross price, and four percent the price goes to Nablus Municipality.

"So what is the farmer left with after these deductions? Compensation from God.

"We have cultivated more than 2,000 dunums this year. The cost per dunum is more than 200 dinars, divided as follows:

"The cost of a [square] meter of plastic [sheets] is 20 Jordanian piasters, the cost of irrigation hose is 5 dinars per meter and the cost of pesticides and fertilizer is more than 100 dinars [per dunum], not to mention the cost of tractors, ploughs and labor, all of which raise the cost per dunum to more than 200 dinars."

Speaking of the low prices, 'Abd-al-Razzaq said: "There are numerous reasons, the most significant of which are the repeated announcements about the closure of areas and about curfews which may last for long periods of time, as happened at the beginning of this month. All the northern parts of the West Bank were sealed off for more than 7 days. So can the farmer harvest his crops? If he does harvest them, can he take them to market? If he does take them to market, who will buy them? Nobody can stir or move in any area.

"Zucchini, cucumbers or tomatoes ripen in the valleys within 10 hours, meaning that the crops need to be harvested daily. The production season is the month of May. The prices are high at the beginning of the season. But at the beginning of the season, the northern parts of the West Bank were sealed off repeatedly."

As for the other reasons, 'Abd-al-Razzaq said: "There is a problem that must, with God's help, be overcome, namely the problem of finding markets for our vegetable production, regardless of whether they are European or Arab markets. What is important is to find markets."

Regarding production quality, brother 'Abd-al-Razzaq said that the varieties cultivated and, consequently, produced in the west bank are of the highest quality, thanks to the educated Arab farmer.

Yahya 'Abd-al-'Aziz, a farmer who has lands in Tubas Valley, al-Jiftilik Valley and Abu-al-'Ajjaj, in Jericho area, told us:

"The land I cultivate is divided among 80 farmers and their families. I supply them with all the materials and machinery they need for their farms. I have more than 2,000 dunums divided between Tubas Valley, al-Jiftilik and Abu-al-'Ajjaj and cultivated with all kinds of vegetables. During last winter's frost wave, more than 700 dunums were damaged, keeping in mind that a dunum costs more than 125 dinars [to cultivate]."

With a sigh, brother Yahya added: "Complaint to anyone but God is humiliation. Brother, the working farmer has suffered less harm than we have. I finance 2,000 dunums and pay their costs. I lease land from the landlords for 25 dinars per dunum, water included. My loss this year will be no less than 40,000 dinars and I owe payable debts.

"When the European markets began importing our eggplant production, most of the crop, especially in Tubas Valley, had been destroyed by frost. This is why we did not sell the eggplant crop. The price of eggplants at the time was high and good."

As for the low prices at the central markets and high prices charged by the retailers, he said:

"The beneficiary is the retailer who sells by the kilogram. He purchases a box (15 kg) for 2 shekels and sells the kilogram for 2 shekels. As a result, the consumer complains of high prices. The farmer has lost his labor whereas we have lost our labor and our money and have been saddled with accumulated debts."

"What do you suggest, brother Yahya?"

"We must get together with all the farmers and all those concerned with agriculture. Well-studied agricultural programs and plans must be drafted and markets must be found. Otherwise, our only option is to leave the land for the heavens."

"You mean divorce the land temporarily?"

"Until God sends us relief. We must achieve quantitative and qualitative agriculture. Next year, I will not cultivate a single dunum if the conditions stay as they are at present."

"What can the farmers do?"

"I don't know what we can do. It is true that there will be unemployed families whose livelihood will be blocked. But the entire solution lies in finding markets for our produce. I want to sell my goods and repay my costs."

On the cultivation and production of watermelons, he said: "We hope that the prices will be good and profitable. The price of a kilogram of watermelons has reached 20 Jordanian fils or [Israeli] agoras, keeping in mind that the crop is good this year and that even though the costs have amounted to 100 dinars per dunums, this crop can cover its costs, with a little profit, if the prices stay as they are."

Al-Hajj Nasir Sulayman Daraghimah, a farmer from Tubas area, told us:

"This year, I have reduced the acreage I cultivate annually, confining myself to 150 dunums which I cultivated with tomatoes, cucumbers, and zucchinis. The frost wave damaged 60 percent of the crop, meaning that the winter crop was lost and did not cover its costs. As for the irrigated summer crop, we hope that the loss will not be exorbitant and that it will cover its costs."

As for the reasons leading to the farmer's loss, al-Hajj Nasir noted that the prices of requirements, such as pesticides, plastic and drip-irrigation piping, multiplied fivefold over the previous year's levels.

After a pause, he said: "I have a nationalistic hope and request, namely that the central markets keep their doors open during the morning and evening periods so that the farmer and merchant may be able to sell and buy their goods, because the morning period is not enough and does not meet the desired objective, i.e. offer the goods and wait for the merchants to arrive. A merchant coming from Hebron needs 2 hours to make his trip, a similar period to purchase his goods, 2 more hours to load them and a further 2 hours to return."

As for his other proposals, al-Hajj Nasir said:

"Committees must be formed of people connected with agriculture to examine the farmers' problems, issues, and hardships and to produce a coordination committee that looks for markets, regardless of whether Arab or European markets, to study the developing issues month by month and to draft agricultural programs that regulate the farming process and all that is likely to help our farmer, to elevate him and to encourage him to keep on farming."

As to what the Cooperative Union offers agriculture, he said that the Agricultural Cooperative Union does not ultimately offer the farmers anything noteworthy.

Samir Ahmad al-Fuqaha', a farmer from Tubas Valley-'Ayn al-Bayda', said: "To put it briefly, farming is like gambling. It is a matter of luck.

I cultivated this year more than 1,200 dunums at a cost of more than 150 dinars per dunum. Cost and personal labor have been lost in half of what I cultivated and price has been lost in the remaining half.

Produce prices are high early in the season. At the beginning of the season, the occupation authorities declared our areas closed areas and panic hit us in the heart. How can one withstand [seeing] his red tomatoes, his zucchinis, his cucumbers and his beans turning yellow on their vines? Do you want us to laugh while we see our labor and our money burning before our eyes? For 8 days, the tomatoes—a heap of tomatoes on every plant—were beckoning the farmers [to harvest them]. Zucchini reached a weight of more than 1.5 kg a zucchini while still on their vines. We have not harvested

the crops. To whom can we sell if we harvest them? The labor of days and months is burning before one's own eyes and one can do nothing to save it." Al-Fuqaha' paused then added:

"In plain words, we want markets. We want people to purchase our produce. We are prohibited from selling even a single tomato in Israel, and the Arab countries have shut their markets in our face."

Al-Hajj Samir Abu-Khadr has said: The carrot crop promises well and may make up for a little of our loss even though the price of a 15-kg bag does not exceed 4 shekels. We are now early in the carrot season. Therefore, we beg the brothers in the West Bank and Gaza to import [from us] what the markets of their towns and villages demand. Brother Samir has not forgotten to appeal to the Arab and European officials to open their markets to the Palestinian goods because this is the biggest aid to help them face the hard and difficult circumstances we are undergoing."

Worst Agricultural Season

In 'Ayn al-Bayda' and al-Dayr area, we met farmer Fayiz Yusuf Mufaddi who said:

"This year has been the worst year for all farmers. Last winter's frost wave damaged our vegetables. Things have been made worse by the low prices resulting from curfews and the closures imposed in all areas on more than one half million people.

"Are we to transport our goods by plane? To whom are we to transport and sell them when a curfew is imposed on everybody and when all areas have been sealed off for more than 8 days?"

"Will you abandon agriculture?"

Brother Yusuf answered: "No, I will not abandon it. I am from the land, the son of the land and to the land I belong. I will serve and cultivate the land and will not divorce it, as some want me to do. Hope in God is great and hope in our people is great. Nothing but release follows distress."

If Your Goat Goes Dry for One Year, Don't Slaughter It

Brother Fayiz added: "My brothers and I cultivated more than 150 dunums this year. Frost destroyed three fourths the cultivated area and low prices killed whatever hope we were left with. We re-cultivated to make up for the 'cost and the loss we suffered.' Despite this, there is hope, God willing. A proverb says: 'If your goat goes dry for a year, don't slaughter it.'"

In the central valleys area—al-Jiftilik, Abu-al-'Ajjaj and al-Ba'nah—brother Jawad al-Misri, a prominent farmer and financier, told us:

"We cultivated this year more than 800 dunums at a cost of nearly 200 dinars per dunum. This cost is for pesticides, plastic, gas, seeds and seedlings. As a financier of the farmers who till my lands, I provide all that they demand and all that pertains to farmers and farming. I also provide the farmers with housing which consists of 'tin and zinc' shacks and mud huts.

He added: The farmer is more important than the land. Farming relies on the farmer as an individual and as a brain. The active farmer produces if he is supplied with the required means and necessities."

Frost's Impact

"Our area was not, God be thanked, afflicted with frost. If some seedlings were affected, the farmer overcame the problem by replanting immediately.

"I expect the profit per dunum in our area to amount to more than 200 dinars. This is due to several reasons.

"The main reason is that unlike our brothers in Tubas Valley, our crop was not hit by frost. Another reason is that all farming requirements have been supplied to the farmers."

As for selling to the EEC, al-Misri said: "We have marketed our eggplants in France where they were sold for \$500 per ton. We exported to France this year nearly 120 tons of eggplants in 2 consignments. This year and in the coming years, we will export to it eggplants and other varieties.

"Neither France nor the other European countries want zucchinis or cucumbers.

"Last year, we exported through (Jersco), an Israeli company, getting a price of 35-60 piasters per cardboard box whereas we got [this year] 138 piasters for the same cardboard box when we exported directly. The price will rise next year, according to what the French have told us."

He cited a damaging incident which occurred this year when exports were shipped to France, saying: "In the first shipment we exported to France this year, the Israeli maritime company reduced the temperature in the freight ship from 11 degrees centigrade, which is the temperature needed, to 5 degrees.

"Moreover, unloading the shipment was delayed for 3 days. Whether intentional or not, this incident affected our exports, destroying 52 percent of the eggplants exported to France."

Al-Misri added: "The farmer is vigilant and mature. As I have said, what is important is the farmer—his farming [method], the service he gives his crop, his management, his packaging and his crop sorting." We asked brother Jawad why the EEC has stopped its imports and he

answered: "It has not stopped importing. The European crop begins reaching the markets as of 10 June every year. Therefore, the EEC imports what we produce from November to the beginning of May. This is good."

He added that the current low prices are due to several factors:

The numerous curfews and closures imposed on several parts of the West Bank.

The closure of the Arab and Israeli markets to Palestinian produce and goods.

The abundant production and the low demand, meaning that the citizens cannot absorb the production.

Warning, he added: "If we don't find markets for our products, the land will be left fallow and will not find people to cultivate it. We urge everybody concerned to find markets for our products and we appeal to the world to open its markets to us. Our produce is of a higher quality and loyalty is deeply rooted in us. We are not asking for material aid. Those who want to help us should buy our production."

Tour in Nablus

We toured the markets of Nablus and met with several citizens.

One citizen, a woman, spoke of produce prices, saying:

"Today, I bought the kilogram of tomatoes, of eggplants, of corn and of zucchini for a shekel each.

"A 15-kg box of tomatoes was sold [wholesale] at the market for 3 shekels. This is the ugliest form of exploitation.

"I appeal to all the retailers to have the fear of God and to be content with a little profit. Are they the ones who planted and harvested the crops? May God give the farmers succor."

The retailer responds: "It is true that I bought the box for 3 shekels. But I do not sell the entire box because only the best part of the box's contents, not all of them, can be sold for a shekel [a kilogram]."

As to the number of boxes he sells daily, the retailer said:

"From morning till noon, I sell nearly 20 boxes. My profit is about 60 shekels daily, and God be thanked."

In Tall al-Za'tar Street in Nablus where the voices of vendors abound, a vendor was heard hawking his cucumbers for 10 shekels a box and zucchinis for 7 shekels a box.

We asked him: "Isn't this too much, considering that the price is one shekel a box?"

He answered: "I don't sell more than 20 boxes a day."

Commenting, a citizen said: "Have mercy on those who inhabit the earth so that He Who inhabits the heavens may have mercy on you."

Citizen Umm Sa'id Tuqan was touring the market. As to her reason for coming, she said:

"I often come here to shop for my family. The prices are good and cheap. Instead of buying a kilogram of tomatoes for a shekel, I buy for 3 shekels a box which lasts us a week."

She added: "Exploitation is sinful and the citizen must realize this. I advise people with big families to come to the vegetable market to purchase the produce they need. The circumstances are difficult and we must economize in everything."

Concluding, Umm Sa'id said: "May God give the farmers succor and compensate them generously."

Nablus Municipality's Responsibility

At the conclusion of our tour, we visited Nablus Municipality and interviewed Agricultural Engineer Zafir al-Najjar, the director of Nablus' general central market, who spoke to us about the market and the municipality's role, saying:

This market is the general central market of the northern part of the West Bank. Sanitarily, organizationally and administratively, it is fully supervised by Nablus Municipality.

The municipality offers all facilities to all merchants and importers of fruits and vegetables. Selling and buying are conducted on the basis of supply and demand in the markets and of commercial competition. The market includes 25 [subsidiary] markets and wholesalers.

The sources from which the fruits and vegetables come are:

From November to May: Fruits and vegetables from the valleys, al-Jiftilik, Tubas and Jericho.

From December to April: From Gaza Strip.

From June till October: Summer crops from Janin and Tulkarm. We also get apples from the Syrian Golan Heights.

Regarding the municipality's role, he added:

"The municipality regulates the sale transactions, determines sites and areas [for] auctioneering activity, regulates the entry and exit of vehicles, maintains law and order and keeps statistics on what arrives in the market for merchants and farmers. It also keeps track of prices, i.e. the general level of prices, it settles any disputes that may develop within the market and protects the farmers' rights vis-a-vis the merchants.

"In return, the municipality collects four percent of the price of goods sold in the market. The municipality has also set a five-percent commission charged by the market for the fruits and vegetables it sells."

As for setting prices for the retailers, he said:

"Under the current conditions, it is difficult to set prices. Moreover, the prices depend on the quality of the fruits and vegetables. This is insofar as the role of the Nablus central vegetable market is concerned."

Before concluding, Engineer al-Najjar urged the circles concerned with agriculture to form a department or a committee to tend and care for the farmers' affairs. He also urged the brother farmers not to package their crops in the customary manner, putting the best produce at the top of the boxes and the rest underneath, but to sort the crops according to quality—high quality, medium quality, low quality—so that they may get good prices for their production.

Editorial Claims Real Settlement With U.S., Not Israel

44040434A Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH*
in Arabic 7 May 89 pp 4-5

[Article by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman]

[Text] Many of us Palestinians and Arabs make the common mistake of thinking that Israel and the PLO, or Israel and the Arab confrontation states, are the parties to the political settlement proposed by the PLO and the Arab states, which is based on internationally-sanctioned resolutions in the framework of an international peace conference on the Middle East. Despite our profound immersion in news and details of the American-Israeli relationship pertaining to the political and military support provided by the United States to Israel, Israeli clamor practically obscures from Arab and Palestinian perceptions the correct view required to manage the conflict with the party having decision-making power, be it America or Israel, to serve our national, patriotic goals.

As a matter of fact, many are currently taking a confused or confusing position. They see Israeli inflexibility increasing sharply and ferociously, while the PLO is putting forth a program for a political settlement in Palestine based on internationally-sanctioned resolutions. These brothers of ours are saying to their listening

and non-listening public, that the PLO is offering concessions and displaying growing flexibility, while the Israeli enemy is maintaining its political inflexibility in opposition to all of international society, so that it seems that the Israeli enemy has unprecedented power to impose on the states of the world boundaries which cannot be crossed in pursuing a settlement in the Middle East.

Standing on the fringes of the Israeli situation and examining its non-factual, non-objective, temporary, false data, do not permit any of us to make a correct, sound evaluation of what must be done or what political steps must be taken. Consequently, we often become wavering and hesitant, which is exactly what the Israeli enemy is striving for through its futile din and clamor. Is it true that matters of war and peace in Palestine and the Middle East are Israel's province and always the product of decisions made by the Israeli government in all circumstances?

Does the experience of the past 40 years of war and settlement tell us that the decision to make war and the decision to make peace were always an Israeli decision?

Immersion in the everyday events and details of the conflict—despite their outstanding importance to managing the struggle on the ground and directing field forces and energies effectively in battle against the occupation—might be erroneous and disadvantageous if such events and details become a guide for knowing the political position of the enemy occupying the land, and not that of the enemy which created this military base, whose tool is Israeli, and whose role and path to the future are American.

We will never hear Shamir discuss the interactions and results of the conflict on the ground. Rather, we hear such matters being discussed by George Schultz and Ronald Reagan. And now we must hear them from President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and numerous members of congress, who are inundated up to their ears in money showered upon them by the Zionist lobby in the United States.

We need not return to the experiences of the recent past to prove the validity of the law which we currently believe must be reclaimed and upheld, more than anything else, in order to manage the conflict correctly. This law states that the battle on the ground against the Israeli occupation is indeed being led by the Israeli government; however, the latter is no more than a field command, whereas the strategic command of this battle is the American command. Thus, the final decision in matters of war, peace, settlement, withdrawal or non-withdrawal, and recognition or non-recognition of Palestinian national rights, is an American decision, not an Israeli decision.

Let us judge matters on the basis of recent historical experience by asking ourselves about the fate of the French colonialists in Algeria, who, at one time, had a half million French soldiers at their disposal.

As soon as General Charles de Gaulle declared the end of French colonialism in Algeria, the claims frequently made by French settlers, which alleged that Algeria was French territory, collapsed. Even if the correspondence between Algeria and Palestine is not exact due to a difference in circumstances, this clear, perceptible difference does not mean the substitution of theory for practice. Some of us believe that if the Palestinians and Arabs want peace and want to obtain their land through negotiations in accordance with internationally-sanctioned resolutions, then they must continue to demonstrate good intentions toward Israel and the Jews of the world, and must present convincing responses—regarding their recognition of Israel, their renunciation of terrorism, the right of return, national independence, and Jerusalem—to the point where some Zionist agencies would impudently demand the deletion of verses in the noble Koran which discuss the Jews and their mistreatment of the noble prophet in Medina.

The Palestinian side cannot, and will not—as part of a political settlement—provide answers to questions that all of human history has so far been unable to answer. Even the church made only a diffident attempt to exculpate the Jews for the blood of Jesus. Regardless of whether the Jews have been subject to historical oppression, the issue facing us is not one of convincing the Jews of Israel and the world that we are conciliatory and not thinking at all about reclaiming all of historical Palestine. Rather, the central issue facing us is actually the creation of a new reality on the ground which forces the originator of the Israeli scheme, namely the United States, to undertake a radical re-examination of its Middle East strategy. In 1956, President Eisenhower ordered Israel's prime minister at the time, David Ben-Gurion, to withdraw Israeli forces from Sinai, and even Gaza. There was no discussion at the time of the fears of Israeli Jews after the withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza. They yielded and withdrew, even after Ben-Gurion stated that Sinai was the land of their forefathers and ancestors.

The major question currently facing us pertains to the position of the United States. Has the intifadah [Palestinian uprising] created a new reality which imposes itself on American decision-making? Should we not waste much time reading and analyzing what is said by Shamir, Rabin, Peres or Sharon, who are no more than settlers incapable of making a decision in their own interest? As the worldly-wise American diplomat, George Ball says: "The U.S. must save Israel from itself, because Israel is completely incapable of making this kind of decision."

The United States stated, through George Schultz, that "the current situation in Palestine has no future," and that "the Israeli occupation is not guaranteeing, and will

not guarantee security for Israel." George Schultz himself announced the U.S. decision to open a dialogue with the PLO, after having been behind the denial of a visa for PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat to address the UN.

Yes, there is a limited change in the position of the American administration. We must not base much on this change. Rather, we must find out how to develop it and advance it in the light of President Bush's statement that a solution lies in placing a limit on the Israeli occupation and rejecting Israeli sovereignty over occupied Palestinian lands, and also in the light of his lack of support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Naturally, it must be understood that the moment Washington declares the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own destiny and to establish an independent state, everything will have been settled in our favor, and "Israel" will no longer have any alternative but to yield to the American decision. For Israel is not a major state. It is the fabricated lie of a major state. Israel is not a sovereign state. It is not independent in its decisionmaking. It is ostracized internationally and completely subordinate to the United States. Hence, the American-Palestinian dialogue is the dialogue which will lead to peace or war in the Middle East. Talk of Israel's inflexibility and obstinacy and of the need for the Palestinians to offer solutions or answers to questions posed by the Jews of Israel and the world, so that they will support the Palestinian peace initiative, reflects a naive view of the conflict, its parties, and its dimensions in the Middle East.

Our main concern and persistently pursued task must be to judge the logic of the American position, not the logic of the Israeli position. The Palestinian and Arab perception must not deviate from a scientific, objective analysis of the existence of Israel as a colonialist phenomenon existing and surviving to the extent that the United States can pay for and protect it. No moral or human law allows Israel or the United States to usurp the Palestinian fatherland. Rather, it is force, and the balances of power prevalent since WWII in this part of the world.

As Arabs and Palestinians, we have decided to re-examine our policy in the light of these regional and international considerations. Be it national political needs or the intifadah which has made it possible, objectively, to dislodge Israeli occupation from Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip and to establish an independent Palestinian state, we have been able to mobilize weighty, influential, international forces to support our political program. There is no greater indication of this, among more recent achievements and political developments, than the historical visit to Paris made by Yasir 'Arafat, the president of the state of Palestine, at the invitation of French President Francois Mitterrand.

The United States is everything in this conflict, and "Israel" is nothing; it is a tool in American hands; it has no decisionmaking power regarding war and peace. Such decisions are made by Washington.

ALGERIA

Demand Grows for Stronger Price Control

High Cost of Food Protested

45190078 Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITE
in French 27 Apr-3 May 89 pp 6-7

[Article by Fatiha Akeb]

[Text] One could almost say that it is in the nature of things for strawberries to snub us and for bananas to take themselves for a work of art, but when tomatoes and peas start looking down their noses at us, there is no longer any order to anything. Having waited in vain for the state to come rescue the food basket of the average citizen, who has been caught in a trap and handed over to the lunacy of prices, the consumer, affected by his inability to acquire the basic and vital essentials—unable to eat his fill—is undertaking to rescue himself. At least that was the purpose of the boycott of a few vegetables and meat by the inhabitants of Bab El Oued. Oran was the forerunner and had given the idea to other regions: at a table set up on a street corner, young members of the UNJA [National Union of Algerian Youth] were gathering signatures on a petition calling for a boycott. They collected 24,000 signatures on Thursday alone. "We are going to put the petition in a market basket and take it to the government," they exclaimed. One citizen asked: "Do you think the government is going to see you?" "Why not?" was the answer. There were crowds and anger around the table, while a little further down the street, the almost empty market was having an unusual weekend.

There was confusion about the word of command: people thought it was a strike, whereas it was only a matter of not buying peppers, tomatoes, meat, and peas. Being certain that there was going to be a strike, people had literally invaded the market the day before and stocked up on supplies. The result was that the retailers had sold everything the day before, while the wholesalers and the many phantom hands involved in that chain of marketing were keeping their merchandise in the freezer until the storm passed. In the end, the boycott's impact was more psychological than real. It was the first time that the citizens had taken the initiative in defending themselves. They do not yet have the weapons they need, but they refuse to submit in silence. While signing the petition, Bab El Oued's inhabitants discussed the matter. They were severe in their judgment of "El Houkouma" [the government]: "They know very well that with our wages, we can't live with prices like that."

They have a grudge against all those "robbers." "The government has given them everything—land and the deregulation of marketing—and they show their gratitude by eating us up." But where is the hitch? They discussed the matter in the middle of the street. "It's the system of loans. I have a buddy who got a loan to cultivate his land—25 million dinars, imagine!—and he

paid the loan back within a year—thanks to us, of course.” Nor were they any more happy with Moroccan tomatoes—as though the word “imports” should apply only to high technology and importing tomatoes even to force prices down were a sign of weakness. And anyway, to tell the truth, those tomatoes have not exactly flooded the market to the extent of forcing prices down—after all, 20 dinars for tomatoes with or without those from Morocco! What bothered the grumblers most was the state’s admitted powerlessness. “A member of the government said on TV that nothing can be done about it. But it is up to the state to take the first step toward getting us out of this.” They considered the demand simple and legitimate: “We want a lower cost of living.” They “want the average citizen earning the interoccupational guaranteed minimum wage to be able to live not in luxury but in dignity.” The young people who started the movement said: “We want the state to intervene in the marketing system. That is the only way to ensure a reasonable profit margin.” Not everyone agreed: “We can’t always be waiting for the state to intervene; if we do, we’ll be crushed. What can we do to fight back? The citizen must learn the normal reflex, which is to refuse to buy a fruit or vegetable that is exorbitantly high in price. People have done it in Tunisia, Egypt, and even in the United States: they boycott expensive products to bring the price down. We must react—for example, by setting up neighborhood committees or something like that.” Some people brought up examples from long ago: “Bastos cigarettes were boycotted during the war for liberation,” which only shows that the patriotism of the “guilty ones” is not worth a nickel. Or their moral standards, either. “I saw an inspector order a retailer to sell his dates for 28 dinars. But no sooner had the inspector turned his back than the seller put the price back up to 32 dinars. And the worst of it is that I see him at the mosque in the evenings.” Straightening out the morals of the market is the least that people expect. Because it is clear that we already know that we live in an underfed region where meals serve much more to appease hunger than to balance out calories. But it is only a step from that to falling squarely into malnutrition because of anarchy in the market, and it is a step that unscrupulous go-getters, who must be wallowing in money without paying any taxes, will make us take without the slightest qualm.

There was a reference to the dominant rhetoric of the day: “They tell us that such and such a party has been formed and that such and such another party is going to be formed; what I want is a party that will give us normal prices... That’s democracy.” The solution? Go back to the market: “to the central food markets and the market price list.”

To top it all off, there is the Aid to remind us that prices are crazy everywhere.

Finding a pullover, dress, or blouse for 100 dinars is a dream. But it should be possible, considering wage levels and the quality being offered. How is it that any old rag

can be treated as though it carried a famous label? How is it that a shoe in a cardboard box—and produced with no respect for any manufacturing standards—is too good for just any foot and that we will soon be standing helplessly by in the middle of Didouche Mourad Street, unable even to buy locally produced goods, while elegance is turned into beggary?

How long will it be before we get back to those happy and normal times when it will be a treat to spend our mad money on a kilogram of strawberries instead of a kilogram of peas?

Trade Minister on Speculation

45190078 Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITE
in French 27 Apr-3 May 89 p 8

[Interview with Minister of Commerce Mourad Medelci by Fatiha Akeb and Abdelkrim Debbih, on 24 April 1989; place not given]

[Text] [ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] To govern is to foresee, Mr Minister. Did you foresee all the disturbances now rocking the market? The citizens feel that the state is powerless. Are they right?

[Medelci] When you say “now,” perhaps we should qualify that, because this is 24 April, and as far as I know, the price of fruits and vegetables today is the same as or even in some cases below what it was before the increase just before Ramadan.

Now, would you perhaps like to go back to the reasons, or the analysis of the reasons, for the explosion in prices just before Ramadan? I had occasion to explain that, and I said that the price rise was exclusively speculative in nature. The speculator is, of course, a well-informed man. I know that social preferences for a certain number of products appear at the consumer level during Ramadan, examples being tomatoes and zucchini, which are highly prized products. And the speculator knows that the supply of those products is inadequate. He anticipates demand and sets a “balanced” price—a price which he himself considers “balanced.” He knows that he can raise the price of tomatoes as much as 50 percent, for example, and that he can go as high as X percent on some other product. That phenomenon is due to exploitation of the special desire to consume the product in question during Ramadan. Under other conditions—if it were theoretically possible to flood the market with tomatoes or peppers—there would be no speculation. The tendency toward an increase in the demand for certain products is a structural tendency. People need to realize that our only counterargument is to restrain that demand, and it is not a coincidence that what has been called the market basket strike is concerned precisely with those products.

If speculators realize that the demand is no longer growing—because it is a self-imposed demand—the price level may move in the right direction. But it will

not move in the right direction for that reason alone. People say that the state is absent from the scene, but between the 1st and 15th of Ramadan, the price and quality control departments carried out 20,000 inspections. So saying that the state is absent today does not strike me as true to reality. That being said, it is obvious that the inspectors cannot check up on everything.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] When the citizen says that the state is absent, it is because the state steps in only at the end of the chain—that is, it only checks prices. And by then it is too late. What can an inspector do?

[Medelci] Exactly. Here it is not entirely fair to say that the state is absent. In the case of fruits and vegetables, where the situation is the worst, the state is present because it imports the agricultural factors of production; the state is present because it grants loans to agriculture and so on. The state is present everywhere.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] It is present everywhere, and it facilitates the work of people who, when all is said and done, charge unbearable prices.

[Medelci] Then the problem is to identify those people. Because they are talked about in the aggregate and in a general way in the national press. The press talks about speculators, but nobody knows who it means. Sometimes it is the producer, sometimes the collector and delivery agent, and other times it is the sales agent. It is not very clear, and that is why I am hoping for an in-depth study. A newspaper like yours is capable of carrying one out. Choose a product and follow it from start to finish. When you do that, you yourself will see how the inflationary process works.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Outside the sphere of production, where the state is not only present but excessively present, there is the sphere of distribution, where the profits are made and where the state is no longer present. I will take the example of tomatoes: you have mentioned production costs totaling from 5 to 6 dinars per kilogram. But tomatoes sell for between 30 and 35 dinars per kilogram in the market, and the state is apparently not present at that level.

[Medelci] The gap between 5 dinars and 35 dinars is caused purely by speculation because there are no tomatoes—there are not sufficient quantities of tomatoes. There have been delays in maturation of the product—a 1-month delay—and there is an exaggerated demand for fresh tomatoes during Ramadan. A speculative price has been established. Who benefits from that unearned speculative income? There is no doubt that a little bit goes to the producer. And a little bit to all the others—to the one who is the link between the producer and the wholesale market and, within the wholesale market, all those involved in the various stages, and some retailers as well.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] But Mr Minister, if there were only two or three products selling at a high price, one could in fact say that tomatoes are high because the demand is greater than the supply. But this is a general problem. This talk about supply and demand is something that the citizen no longer responds to.

[Medelci] No, but the facts are proving the truth of it in the case of the products we have just mentioned: peppers, tomatoes, peas, and so on—it's all the law of supply and demand. I will tell you something: Moroccan tomatoes are sold on the European wholesale market for from 6 to 12 French francs, and within a week, those same tomatoes are sold to the European consumer for from 8 or 9 French francs to 18 French francs. It is the law of supply and demand which has been at work here. Now when you say that it has affected all products, you are right, but in the case of some products, the increase has amounted to only 50 centimes or 1 dinar. The price of other products has risen by 10 or 15 dinars. The price of potatoes, carrots, turnips, chard, and lettuce is up by only 50 centimes or 1 dinar, but nobody talks about that. People have fallen into the trap of speculation and talk about products that are in heavy demand this Ramadan: tomatoes and peppers.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Tomatoes and peppers are products with extremely high prices. But in general, all products are high priced. It is true that artichokes went up by only 1 dinar, but they were expensive to begin with.

[Medelci] I agree with you. But the question is whether we are talking about speculation or the health of the country's economy. One has to choose one's subject.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Let us turn the question around, Mr Minister. Do speculators have the power to charge high prices even for products that are not in demand?

[Medelci] That's possible. It's up to us to know how to react.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] It is when they get that power, Mr Minister, that the citizen feels that the state is absent.

[Medelci] The problem is that power is possessed by the one who possesses the product. The one who has the product is the producer. It is necessary to know the motivation behind the behavior of the producer who has the product. He can sell spontaneously and freely to someone who is going to speculate on the product, and at that point he needs to figure things out. When he sells a standing crop, for example, he figures things out and realizes that the peppers he sold in the field at 15 dinars are selling on the wholesale market for 35 dinars, and then it is up to him to figure things out. We want to do everything possible to encourage the producer to avoid selling a standing crop and instead to sell his product

directly on the wholesale market or through his cooperatives. How do we encourage him? By increasing the number of wholesale markets and bringing them closer to the consumer. We encourage him by giving him means of transportation. There are currently 3,000 vehicles that will be distributed. There is no program for importing vehicles into the country, but there is a plan for distributing 3,000 Mazdas to the farmers, and it is not the first one. This is the umpteenth in a series, as you know.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Mr Minister, seeing that producers are supported by the state, couldn't producer prices be imposed as a means of controlling prices at the market level?

[Medelci] I believe that in the case of staple items, that is an obligation. To protect the producer's interests in the case of strategic products such as potatoes, garlic, onions, and tomatoes, the government has decided to establish a support fund that will enable enterprises in the public sector to purchase production at a minimum price. That minimum price is to be posted before the season starts. At present, our demand for products is somewhat selective. There are the major products, and there are the others. In the case of major products, our demand is aimed at strengthening the farmer's position so as to give him access to the factors of production on the best possible economic terms and to guarantee that producer a minimum price for recovering his costs. But we realized that if we did no more than that, we would have only to post a minimum price of 3 dinars for potatoes to find the speculative private sector posting 4 dinars, with spiraling prices as the result. That is why, in addition to guaranteeing a price, we are also seriously considering the establishment of a minimum producer price and a binding maximum consumer price in the case of certain strategic products.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] The debate over the price of fruits and vegetables is actually just the tree concealing the forest. Other products besides fruits and vegetables are being affected by the price rise.

[Medelci] That brings us to the closing of a few stores. During Ramadan, we focused our inspection efforts basically on fruits, vegetables, and clothing, and we are going to continue this. It happens that in our inspection operations, we may have indirectly come across people who are having problems. At present, a number of garment makers are forced to import their basic materials—that is, fabrics. They import those inputs by paying a tremendous price for foreign exchange that is expensive in terms of the dinar. It happens that neither the tax rules nor price regulations are adapted to such cases. We are supposed to look into the matter. The facts are there. I have met with a delegation of merchants on this subject and on the subject of taxes, which for some time now have taken into account the real costs borne by producers. It is also up to the departments in charge of approving prices to take proven real costs into account. As a result, there is no longer any reason why the producer should not sell by invoice.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] The citizens feel that the best solution would be to go back to the system of central food markets, the way it was before, with invoices.

[Medelci] The press feels that we talk a little too much about these markets and that nothing is happening. But the wholesale market is not something you improvise. Actually, 35 markets are being set up right now.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Don't you believe that this operation is coming a little late? It has been promised for years.

[Medelci] Who promised it?

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Not you, the Ministry of Commerce.

[Medelci] It is obvious that there are delays in all development projects. Of the 35 wholesale markets, we will take delivery of 20 in 1989, and the ministry is following up on the progress with the most important of those 20—so directly, in fact, that it is even worrying about their cement requirements. Not to mention about 15 markets already in operation.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Aren't the inadequate regulations to the advantage of speculators?

[Medelci] Are we supposed to regulate everything?

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Should we deregulate by making the citizens pay top price?

[Medelci] I will tell you something: 80 percent of our cereals are currently being imported. That is what excessive regulation, among other things, has brought us to.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Is closing our eyes to speculation the price that must be paid for that?

[Medelci] There are 1,000 people working every day, and penalties and closings are ordered daily. It is not the intention of anyone to close his eyes to speculation. By saying such a thing, you are not doing justice to those inspectors, who go to a lot of effort. The state is determined to encourage them. It is necessary to go to the wholesale markets to see that the inspectors really do check up at that level and that they do so continuously.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] One often hears it said that the speculators are not known. If that is true, how can you claim to be checking up on them?

[Medelci] The first step is to keep them from getting into the wholesale marketing business, so the trade needs to be professionalized. The new markets that are being set up will be operated by statutory sales agents, producers' cooperatives, or regulatory agencies such as ENAFLA [expansion unknown] to be chosen by bid. There will no longer be any possibility of making transactions except

through those people, who will be chosen on the basis of criteria: transportation capacity, packaging capacity, and so on. A statute for sales agents is being prepared, and licensees operating in the wholesale market will have to be selected in accordance with that statute. Those people will be known and their profit margins fixed. The first step consists, therefore, of getting all the middlemen out of the wholesale market. But to do that, we must have a wholesale market that means something.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] Have Moroccan tomatoes been imported to force prices down or because of insufficient local production?

[Medelci] Primarily because of insufficient local production; forcing prices down is a consequence of that. In Morocco before Ramadan, tomatoes were selling for 3 dirhams, but during Ramadan, the price went up to 7 dirhams.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] What would you like to say in conclusion?

[Medelci] The state is determined to combat speculation. It is doing so with the means available to it, and it is in the process of supplementing those means to improve the effectiveness of its controls. That is the objective. The state hopes that consumers' associations will also play a role. The latest law on consumers enables them to go to court. And it is the state's will that the consumer be better supported and protected. Today, you and I have more or less engaged in small talk concerning a very serious subject that truly deserves national attention.

BAHRAIN

Government Investment in Industry Discussed
44000533 *Dubayy GULF NEWS in English*
6 May 89 p 11

[Article by S. V. Venkatraman, Bahrain Bureau Chief]

[Text] Manama—As part of its efforts to diversify the economy, the Government of Bahrain has proposed to launch an ambitious plan of industrialisation envisaging a number of projects. Estimated to cost about \$3 billion, these are stated to be taken up over the next ten years.

The comprehensive plan is believed to pronounce the need for 'import substitution and industrialisation' which have become the key words in government thinking today. While the limited financial resources and the commitment of the state towards the expansion and maintenance of public utility services may be constraining factors, the government is believed to be encouraging schemes to permit foreign entrepreneurs and industrialists to establish joint ventures. In the long term perspective, the move is perceived as an important development in the country's economic and industrial growth.

According to Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi, Minister of Development and Industry, expansion of industry and evolution of support services will receive priority in the government schemes to ensure maximum benefits to the economy. While the experience gathered over the past 15 years in establishing industry has encouraged officials to move further in the direction, the ambitious programme of diversification launched several years ago is believed to have created more than 10,000 jobs. Representing about 25 percent of the working male population of the country. The objective of the programme was to reduce dependence on oil and provide employment opportunities for the local population.

The government's plans are being pronounced in terms of establishing 200 industrial projects during the ensuing decade as an effective step towards the implementation of the schemes related to import substitution and creating fresh avenues for foreign investment. Emphasising a need based approach, the areas of growth will concentrate on industrial expansion and promotion of support services to accrue substantial benefits to the economy.

With the strong belief in the theory that the individual and corporate investors and industrialists in the private sector should pool their financial, material and human resources to foster economic and industrial development of the country, the government has been offering a series of incentives to them. In addition, initial assistance is also being provided for identification of projects and feasibility studies.

In addition to these efforts, a major project launched by the Ministry in March last year to promote the proficiency of Bahraini nationals to own and manage manufacturing units is regarded as a significant milestone in the industrial development process. Called "The Task Force Programme for Industrial Development," the project envisages an extensive training programme over a two year period with provision for periodic review and assessment.

Based on studies relating to the availability of the human, material and financial resources, experts are of the view that the manufacturing sector has the greatest potential in Bahrain for economic growth. They have recommended that the policy objective should be to double the size of the manufacturing sector by 1991.

Industrial activities should be established so as to maximise advantage for the country.

These activities should be spread between large, medium and small industries. While the share of the manufacturing sector in the gross domestic product (GDP) is currently about 14 percent doubling of the percentage is an ambitious but achievable target," they said.

The seriousness with which Bahrain views its programme of industrialisation is manifest in the country's annual budgets which provide substantial amounts to

this sector. The five-year period covering 1982 to 1986 witnessed an allotment of almost 72 percent of the total financial resources for construction of infrastructure projects.

While these have provided the necessary environment, the stress now is on building a strong industrial base with the co-operation of investors and industrialists in the private sector.

Island Warned of Water Crisis
44000540b Manama GULF DAILY NEWS
in English 6 Apr 89 p 14

[Text] Bahrain faces a major water shortage if consumption continues at present levels.

This was the stark government warning issued yesterday—with hints at possible rationing.

The central region is especially threatened during the coming summer months if urgent precautions are not taken, said Sayf al-Binali, Water Directorate chief.

He revealed that consumption had reached 26 million gallons per day and was expected to rise to 27 million gallons, reports Akhbar al-Khalij newspaper.

Only 24.9 million gallons of sweet water is available for central Bahrain.

Rationing

Mr Binali said the Directorate might start rationing water if work on al-Dur desalination plant is delayed. The complex will add an extra nine million gallons to supplies.

A comprehensive report on the situation is being drafted by the directorate, which will be submitted to concerned authorities for immediate action, said Mr Binali.

Petrochemical Expansion Project Completed
44000540a Manama GULF DAILY NEWS
in English 19 Apr 89 p 1

[Text] Manama: Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (GPIC) has completed an expansion project, which will boost production of ammonia and methanol by 20 percent.

GPIC's Sitrah complex was totally shut down for 35 days to allow work on a "debottlenecking" scheme to be carried out.

The expansion increases the plant's production capacity from 1,000 tonnes each of ammonia and methanol per day to 1,200 tonnes.

General manager Mustafa Sayyid said the project would help to improve the company's productivity and profitability.

EGYPT

USSR Relationship With Muslims Criticized

Soviet, Arab 'Political Heathenism'
45040312 Cairo MUKHTAR AL-ISLAM
in Arabic Apr 89 pp 44-47

[Article by Fahmi al-Shinawi]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

While we hold 50 percent workers and peasants as a sign of progressiveness and social, socialist justice, the Russians themselves are straightening out their matters through their scholars. They have now even made leaders and chiefs of poets and writers whom they had previously labelled dissidents and imprisoned in Siberia or psychiatric hospitals.

Russia and China are freeing themselves from political heathenism while we are clothing ourselves in it even more than in pre-Islamic paganism.

I do not doubt that the Afghanistan war was the turning point against political heathenism in Russia. This war taught them that belief, not heathenism, perseveres, and that only what is right is ultimately valid. For the people of Afghanistan were not armed with awesome weapons, nor with magical technology or the amazing modern industry of the Russians, the second superpower in the world. Nonetheless, religious faith was able to be victorious, even if half the people of Afghanistan perished defending their creed.

This same defense of one's creed was displayed by the non-Muslim people of Vietnam against America, creating a psychological complex in America that exists to this day.

There is no doubt that America and Russia have more respect for anyone with a creed—even if he is barefoot, hungry and naked—than they do for gold and oil barons with accumulated wealth, who summon their fleets for protection and then they help Israel in spite of them on any occasion.

America officially hosted the late King Faysal, one of the greatest Arab rulers. Nonetheless, the mayor of New York refused to receive him!

Could this happen to a Vietnamese peasant? Could Russia repeat the same scene with an Afghan resistance fighter?

There are examples which are more painful than the example of what happened to King Faysal, may God grant him mercy and charity. However, we do not mention them so as not to arouse pain and resurrect buried grief.

Will the west, or even Vietnam or Afghanistan, respect us after this?

There are political leaders who have submitted to a well-known world crusader. Nonetheless, they describe themselves as that group of believers which the Koran had in mind. After this derision of us, Islam, and the Koran, [will they respect us?]

The gist of the matter is that we are not seeking to learn a lesson from Vietnam, nor even from Afghanistan. This is a farfetched dream. However, we do seek to learn a lesson from Russia and China. They have criticized themselves, their leaders, their communism and their laws. Can we do what they have done? Or are we only imitating heathenism rather than belief.

Explanation of the Phenomenon

We are facing a phenomenon which requires an explanation: Why are the Arabs drowning in political heathenism? The hidden cause of this malady is nationalism. Contemporary Arabs have held fast to Arab nationalism, from the revolt against Turkey by al-Sharif Husayn to the Arab nationalism of 'Abd-al-Nasir.

The Islamicists view this nationalism as a clearly prohibited matter: "Only through piety is the Arab superior to the non-Arab." [quote unattributed]

The situation in Russia is different. Communist Russia is based on a federation of over 100 nationalities. These nationalities co-exist together within the framework of a strong, modern state. Such co-existence has required the complete elimination of nationalistic chauvinism. Russians constitute no more than 23 percent of the population of Russia.

It is noteworthy that the Muslims of Russia constituted 11 percent of the population in 1927 and 20 percent in 1977. Moreover, this percentage is expected to increase to 28 percent by 2000, i.e., there will be more Muslims than Russians.

It is known, of course, that Islam unites the Muslims of Russia despite their numerous nationalities (Turkestan of the easterners, Turkestan of the westerners), the Slavs, etc.

A change in the position of these Russian Muslims following the victory of the Muslims of Afghanistan is inevitable. Henceforth, containment of the Russian Muslims before they join forces with Afghanistan is also inevitable. It is well-known that Azerbaijan has a definite, defined position regarding the Armenians.

The moral courage of the representatives of Azerbaijan has been able to capture the respect of their adversaries. I think that this has become clear in their dispute with Armenia, which is a people blindly hateful toward Islam. Here, the political bureau stood with the Azerbaijanis against the Armenians. This position and the Russians' forced position on the Iranian revolution are no more than attempts to contain the Russian Muslims, because a clash with the Muslims of Russia inside the Soviet entity might cause a repeat of the Afghan episode inside the borders of Russia itself.

Commensurate with its capabilities, Russia will attempt to weaken any strong Islamic regime—any Islamic entity—on its southern borders.

However, the important thing is that Russia itself has absorbed the main lesson, namely the need to abandon political heathenism and to inoculate its policy with faith and the elements of faith, which relate to not worshipping a ruler. At the same time, Russia itself is cultivating racism inside Arab society, for it is well aware that Arab chauvinistic nationalism is what gave birth to Israel within its boundaries when the Balfour promise was issued in the first years of Arab nationalism. Subsequently, Israel seized the territory surrounding it in the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir's Arab nationalism. Thus, fanatical nationalism is harming the people, spilling their blood, squandering their wealth, adding to their poverty and indebtedness, and depriving them of their land and holy places.

Russia has fought the theory of nationalism among its numerous peoples in the name of the theory of communism. It now finds that it is a wholly inadequate, man-made theory. It has also discovered that it must resort to a dose of faith and that it must fight heathenism internally before it makes faith incumbent on its peoples.

Do we want some Arab leaders to allow us what the Russians have allowed their people? Can these leaders concede some political heathenism?

MB Advice to Gorbachev

45040312 Cairo *LIWA' AL-ISLAM in Arabic*
6 Apr 89 pp 4-5

[Article by Muhammad Hamid Abu-al-Nasr, Grand Master of the Muslim Brotherhood]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Just as the face of the Islamic nation is expressed by the Islamic awakening that is striving to revive the Islamic nation and restore its former role and mission, the face of the Islamic awakening is expressed by the Muslim Brotherhood [MB]. The MB—through its understanding of Islam and its view of recent changes in the world which have left their mark everywhere—has an objective awareness of what is happening inside the Soviet Union, especially since you, [President Gorbachev], assumed

power and responsibility. With Muslim impartiality, the MB is assessing any step or steps which provide your peoples with a measure of freedom, a measure of their right to exercise or share authority and responsibilities, or a portion of the soul's need for spiritual values and sustenance.

Important Role

Therefore, based on this point of departure, the MB believes that the Soviet Union can play an important, substantive role regarding human problems. By means of this role, it can emphasize the application of numerous slogans contained in the plan which you presented under the title of correction and reform, and can consequently win the appreciation and trust of millions. This doubtlessly requires the following:

- Rectification of the Soviet position on Arab and Muslim problems. The right of the Arabs to Palestine, their fatherland and dwelling place, is not effaced by the unjust Jewish occupation by force of arms or by support from any external powers. The signs of this occupation are not concealed by the false Jewish claims of a historical or divine right. Nor is the right of the Arabs diminished by the recognition given to the government of the usurper Jewish entity by all the governments of the earth. The historical opportunity facing the Soviet Union under your leadership requires partiality toward the Arab right and the cessation of all support of the Jews, be it human support by opening the doors to Jewish immigration, or commercial, economic or political support, such as proclaiming the so-called right of the Jews to land which they occupied in 1948 or 1967.
- While the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan obtained a measure of appreciation, to obtain the full appreciation of the Muslims it must be expanded and extended to include the withdrawal of all soldiers and the entire Soviet presence. It must also eliminate and discontinue support of the regime of the alien government that caused Muslim Afghanistan to be afflicted by ruin and destruction. In order for the Soviet Union to trust its neighbor, the Muslim Afghan people, Afghanistan will not permit a foreign power to use its territory as a base to attack others. As a free, independent state, Afghanistan will carry only torches of good and light to every neighbor.
- Regarding full Soviet support, in the form of weapons, soldiers and advisers, of the Ethiopian Mengistu regime in its aggression against Eritrea and its Arab Muslim people, and in its violation of all conventions and taboos, Russia must wisely decide that it has been unable to justly treat the oppressed legal claimants, and that it is within its power to stop supporting the oppressive aggressors. This must be done for the sake of constructive Soviet foreign relations in general and Soviet-Arab relations in particular.
- Russian support of India is tantamount to western support of India from the Islamic standpoint, inasmuch as this support is directed against Muslim

Pakistan and the Muslim people of Bangladesh. From an Islamic outlook, it is seen as support of aggression by non-Muslims against Muslims, and confirms what was said and is being said about the meeting of the two superpowers on the field of aggression against Islam and Muslims.

The strength of Russia's influence and presence in eastern Europe, especially Bulgaria, is indisputable. Abuses of the rights of Muslim minorities by the Bulgarian regime have reached an extent which has made them stand alone in broad areas of the world media.

The reform or correction plans will remain an object of scrutiny, and moreover, of doubts, if these plans are not linked in practice to the establishment of the right of our Muslim brothers in the states of eastern Europe to practice their religious observances, ceremonies and rights in peace and security.

- As for the Muslims in the Soviet Union, in the republics of Central Asia and Crimea, their history is rich and illustrious. Their noble descent and identity occupy a place deep in the heart of the Muslim world. We reckon that it is logical that Muslims at least be put on a par with Christians, whose churches were opened, so that barricades are removed from their mosques, all restrictions on their schools are lifted, and they are not obstructed in matters pertaining to their religion and the education of their children according to the way of Islam.

A Final Word

The Muslims will never be Marxists, capitalists or followers of anyone, especially since every human system has confirmed its own impotence and failure. The message of the Muslims is one of goodness for every human being. They extend their hands to all who work for the good of mankind. They accept appreciatively every role which pursues the establishment of true peace in the world, and exert every effort to facilitate development and progress. They believe that the field is currently open for different powers to affirm the extent of the sincerity and earnestness of their orientations and slogans.

Trade Federation Head on Egyptian-Libyan Agreements

NC1006071389 Cairo MENA in English
2220 GMT 9 Jun 89

[Text] Ahmad al-Amawi, chairman of the Egyptian Trade Unions Federation, said tonight in statements to Egyptian television that an agreement has been reached with Libya to cash payments due to the Egyptians who were working in Libya through a joint technical committee.

Al-'Amawi further said that any worker in possession of any authorized documents proving his rights should proceed with these papers to the Trade Union Federation, the Ministry of Manpower or the governorates' manpower departments.

Al-'Amawi reported "brothers of the Libyan Producers Federation" as having been extremely willing to compensate Egyptians for their rights.

Egypt and Libya are about to turn a new page in joint cooperation, which will provide real job openings for Egyptian labor, he said. Al-'Amawi expressed his hope that the agreement between Egypt and Libya, which was drafted a few years back, would be signed to secure Egyptian labor in Libya, as those workers meet with fierce foreign and European competition.

He pointed out that Libyan authorities preferred Egyptian manpower in the fields of agriculture, building and construction.

Agreement has been reached with the Libyan Producers Federation to exchange visits, he said, adding that a Libyan labor delegation is due to arrive here in July to discuss prospects of boosting union cooperation between the two countries.

Faculty Conference Calls for 'Civil Insurrection'
45040308B Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Apr 89 p 3

[Article by 'Abd al-Rahman Abu al-'Aynayn: "Student Associations Invited to Participate in Faculty Club Conference"]

[Text] Faculty clubs reiterated denunciation of Zaki Badr's policy and called for an act of civil disobedience at all Egyptian universities in order to protest violence and terror perpetrated by the security apparatus.

They declared support for the Cairo University club and for general assembly resolutions to hold onto its land. They also favored issuing a public statement asserting that the issue is not factional, but deals with an irresponsible minister's violation of legitimacy and the supremacy of law.

The clubs rejected a presidential decree offering a substitute plot and announced plans for a peaceful march to be held 19 April within the sanctity of the Cairo University campus unless the club's property is returned to it.

The resolutions were adopted at a conference of Egyptian faculty clubs held last Wednesday at al-Mansurah University club and attended by representatives from various Egyptian universities.

Dr al-Shafi'i Bashir began by denouncing the minister of interior's stance. He called for a more earnest and decisive response that would act as a volcano to shake the regime's foundation and cut a passageway for freedom-hungry groups, organizations, and factions.

He said that civil disobedience becomes the only solution when the People's Assembly sides with Zaki Badr rather than with fairness, and when sanctities are violated, dignities trampled, and court rulings ignored.

He advocated that the act of civil disobedience take place prior to the 19 April Cairo University conference and suggested that it take place 9 April at all Egyptian universities and institutions simultaneously.

How to go about civil disobedience? Dr Al-Shaf'i Bashir proposed that professors go to their offices at the university, stay in them, and boycott work in laboratories and amphitheatres. The administration of exams would be excepted in the interest of students.

He was indignant as he asserted that the Egyptian people have the worst lifestyle and are surrounded by famine and victimized by lines for wheat, flour, and bread as a result of the imposition of flawed policies and unfair laws.

He concluded with the assertion that the Cairo University property is not the focus of narrow self-interest but represents a common cause upholding legitimacy and protecting the honor of the Egyptian people. Therefore, the strike is merely a means because, contrary to allegations by Musa Sabri, the ultimate objective transcends mere land.

Dr Muhammad Habib exploded a bombshell that shook the entire conference when he announced that a letter dated 5 February 1989 and sent by the secretary general of the supreme council of universities to university vice chancellors asking that approval for adding ethics to graduation requirements—that letter expressly stated that the Assiut University council had agreed to the decree and its implementation.

He wondered: What does the secretary general of the council of universities say to the fact that Assiut University did not have a council meeting until 9 February, two weeks after the decree was issued and approved? That would indicate that the decree had the prior approval of either the minister of education, the Assiut University chancellor, or some other unknown person or authority. How would the university council permit the usurpation of its rights and abrogation of its authority?

Dr Yusif 'Abd-al-Rahman discussed the various dimensions of the proposed university strike and asserted that several attempts to halt it or frustrate it were made by several authorities, including the minister of education, who made press statements denouncing the strike and claiming that the problem had been resolved. When it

learned that the strike was about to be approved, the ministry of social affairs attempted to cloud the issue and obstruct the general assembly. When its falsehoods failed, the ministry objected to the presence of university club presidents and their representatives on the pretext that they were not members.

He wondered: Why did these so-called reasons of security not come up before? The property has been there since 1984!

Dr Nabil Hashim, president of the University of Alexandria faculty club, emotionally asserted that the president of the republic's desire for unity and solidarity in the interest of constructiveness can only take root in a suitable climate where facts are revealed untainted by deception, duplicity, and chicanery.

He said that the Nasir regime has not fallen but still exists and continues to maul the Egyptian people. Freedoms are being undermined and court rulings ignored. Violations of the constitution are the symptomatic of the regime.

Dr Sa'id Salamah, president of the Suez Canal University faculty club, discussed another aspect of provincial universities' management by saying that the Suez Canal University has been turned into luxury rest-houses and high fashion boutiques. Exits to the city boast dozens of welcoming signs but the university itself is nothing more than a wreck. Buildings are rundown, facilities are non-existent, and laboratories are poor. Education is deteriorating from bad to worse and therefore the students have scant potential.

He urged that Dr Ahmad al-Labban be speedily granted a 1-year membership in the conference in order that he may be eligible to attend its sessions.

He concluded by calling for a vote of no confidence in the Suez Canal University chancellor and for not renewing his term because he governs the university in an unacceptable and demeaning fashion that would surely subvert the system of education.

Dr Ahmad al-Labban also addressed the gathering and gave an account of his battles with the college of medicine administration and of rejection of U.S. AID projects that laid 16 million pounds to waste with nary a benefit to the students.

He said he took these problems up with the college administration and with the university chancellor to no avail and was left with no alternative but to appear before the conference to explain this farce in which several administrations played a role and which has caused the deterioration of educational standards.

Dr Muhammad Tawfiq 'Awidah, president of al-Azhar university club, brought up an important issue when he asked the clubs to adopt a resolution for a vote of no

confidence—as a measure of public condemnation—in any chancellor who deviates from properly discharging his duties. He said that the al-Azhar club set a precedent when it voted no confidence in the entire university council, as they lost legitimacy by forfeiting confidence and respect.

He said the question of adding ethics to the curriculum was one of the most profound issues to be applied to students today, to the faculty tomorrow, and to the all the people of Egypt after that.

Dr Ahmad 'Assi, representing al-Zaqaziq University club, criticized the national press and accused it of misleading the public by manufacturing events and inventing stories. He suggested that the faculty march be extended beyond Cairo University to take place at all university campuses simultaneously as a measure to forge solidarity between student and faculty since the problems that confront them both are similar.

Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Sa'd of the Qina faculty called for a series of meetings with trade union to discuss issues of freedom and human rights violations. He also called for faculty solidarity in taking a strong stand against the contingency act.

The clubs from 'Ayn Shams and Hilwan universities were absent from the conference because both had previously been suspended for failure over the past several years to convene their general assemblies and elect rather than appoint directors.

Dr Maghawri Diyyab called upon all faculties to establish "buddy funds" to pay the salaries of members railroaded or indicted for crimes of opinion. Payment would continue if they were proven innocent but would stop if they were pronounced guilty. He cited the case of a department chairman at al-Minufiyah University who was suspended without cause.

The conference also resolved to create a committee of members to be present with faculty members when called for questioning. The committee is to include Dr al-Shaf'i Bashir for the universities of Lower Egypt, Dr 'Atif al-Bannah for the universities of Greater Cairo, and Dr Muhammad Zaki al-'Ashmawi for those of Alexandria and its environs.

Shaykh Kishk Interviewed on Religion, Extremism

Youth, Religious Role

45040311 Cairo LIWA' AL-ISLAM in Arabic
6 Apr 89 pp 34-35

[Interview by Ahmad Sha'ban; place and date unspecified]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[LIWA' AL-ISLAM] What are the most recent developments regarding the prohibition against your preaching?

[Kishk] With great sorrow and regret, nothing is new. You know that I was permitted to return to my mosque on 22 February 1985. Actually, on the evening of 24 February, I went to the mosque, where we had set up a public address system in preparation for the Friday sermon. However, I was surprised on 25 February by a senior official from the ministry of awqaf, who came to my house to inform me that the decision allowing my return had been cancelled. I asked him whether anything prevented me from sermonizing on that Friday alone, so that the situation could be settled peacefully, especially since several newspapers had reported that I would return on Friday, 1 March. His only response was: I am only following orders! I responded: God is suffices me and is truly a wonderful counselor!

Therefore, it was not that I refrained from sermonizing. Rather, I was prohibited. This reminds me of the situation of the prophet of God, God bless him and grant him salvation, as he was immigrating to Medina: On his way to Medina, he began to call out to Mecca, his heart ablaze with longing for it, saying "I swear to God that you are the land dearest to God. If your inhabitants had not expelled me from you, I would not have left."

The status quo continues despite many attempts being made by sincerely concerned officials in the ministry of awqaf. However, these attempts have met with no response, oddly enough!

[LIWA' AL-ISLAM] However, how do you practice your role as a caller to Islam under these circumstances?

[Kishk] My work in the service of God has not ceased for one moment. Rather, it has increased two-fold. My door is open to all Muslims. They ask questions and seek formal legal opinions. They present their daily problems, and I clarify the view of the canonical law of Islam regarding their problems so as to please God.

In addition, I write books and am writing an interpretation of the Koran, "Fi Rihab al-Tafsir [In the Sacred Precinct of Interpretation]." [passage omitted]

[LIWA' AL-ISLAM] Which are the priorities on which the caller to Islam must focus?

[Kishk] Concern with doctrine is the first foundation in the edifice; if the doctrine is shaken, all is shaken. This is followed by concern for Islamic education in an open, peaceful manner, which is neither forced nor secretive. This education is based on five lines: Modelling, narrative, religious exhortation, understanding ritual impurity, and explaining the threat against misconduct. The caller is then concerned with the problems of the public. In this role, he is a son to the elderly, a father to the young, and a brother to the common people. When the Muslim is summoned by the caller of God on Friday, the

day of gathering, he goes to the mosque, where he finds a solution to his problems. Likewise, by frequenting the mosque five times daily, he experiences an uninterrupted succession of meetings and reunions, which is doubtlessly a great success for the call.

[LIWA' AL-ISLAM] What are the causes and treatment of the disunity and estrangement between numerous Islamic countries that sometimes develop into war?

[Kishk] This dangerous predicament was isolated by three factors. The first is world colonialism, which has transformed the Islamic nation into regions of influence. The second factor is the fall of the Islamic caliphate, which was tantamount to a necklace on which the Muslims' states were strung. When it was severed, its beads fell off, leaving behind only a thin thread of memory.

The third factor is the poisonous dagger called Israel, which was placed in our backs.

As for colonialism, God, may he be praised and exalted, forbade us from following it, be it western or eastern. Regarding western imperialism, God said: "O believers, if you follow a group of those who were given the holy writ, they will cause you to regress from belief to disbelief." Then, the praised and exalted continues disapprovingly: "How can you disbelieve when you recite aloud to yourselves the verses of God and there is a prophet among you; whoever clings to God is led on the straight path." Then he explains the treatment, saying "cling to the rope of God, all of you, and be not disunited." God warns us about eastern colonialism, saying: "O believers, if you follow those who disbelieve, they will drive you back to where you came from and you will become turned around and lost." He then explains the treatment, saying "but God is your protector and the best succor."

[LIWA' AL-ISLAM] His eminence emphasized that we must be wary lest dealings and relations linking us with colonialists come at the expense of our unity and creed.

He adjured the peoples and governments in the Islamic countries to strive to re-establish the Islamic caliphate because it represents an urgent need, inasmuch as we are currently living in an era of large entities and not an era of petty states and appendices.

[Kishk] If the Islamic countries act selflessly, cooperate in their many areas of mutual agreement, and forgive one another their very few differences, we will achieve our desire. In this respect, callers have an important and significant role.

As for the usurper Jewish entity created by the mother of the world Zionist scourge, we will not be safe from its cunning unless all of Palestine is liberated by jihad, and

not by calls for a submissive peace, for Andalusia, the Mediterranean islands and the land of Palestine would not have been lost had it not been for the call to defeat and a submissive peace.

A people does not abandon the jihad unless it is submissive. The jihad of Afghanistan serves as an example and an instructive lesson. God crowned their efforts and their jihad with victory and power.

The Islamic Awakening

[LIWA' AL-ISLAM] Amid the predicament being experienced by the Islamic nation, a blessed Islamic awakening is vigorously emerging on the surface. What are the most salient aspects of this awakening? How should we concern ourselves?

[Kishk] The most striking aspect of this awakening is the fiery spirit of the youth, which we have not seen for quite a while. Visitors to mosques, be they shaykhs or others, have had no place in which to spend their free time, [because the mosques are so crowded with youth]. It is amazing to see our youth packed into Islamic seminars and mosques, busily engaged in reading the Koran, studying Islam, and seriously pursuing its application by combining understanding with action. We must make these youth our concern, as the prophet of God said: "Make the youth your concern, for they have delicate minds. God sent me with the merciful truth; the elders opposed me and the youth agreed with me."

The youth of the awakening are seeking truth with pure hearts. Therefore, it is necessary to exploit their energies. This can be achieved only through a knowledgeable, experienced and sincere leadership, so that the youth neither stumble nor err. This should come as no surprise, inasmuch as both communism and secularism also have their leaders.

Extremism

[LIWA' AL-ISLAM] However, youth are frequently accused of extremism. What are the reasons for this and how can it be treated?

[Kishk] We must banish this term from the lexicon of Islam. Our religion is a religion of moderation that accepts neither excess nor slackness, neither immoderation nor laxness, neither exaggeration nor neglect.

If you find extremism, it can be attributed to a lack of knowledge of the spirit of Islam. This spirit pervades God's exalted statement, "religion was not placed upon you as an impediment," and "God desires for you easement, not predicament." The disappearance of Islam from the Islamic arena, through its slander and the removal of its sincere callers, so that this arena becomes as a ship at sea being driven back by the wind, opens the

door to numerous maladies, because knowledge is obtained only through a teacher and guidance comes only through a guide.

Let the fetters on Islamic activity be released. Let its leaders return to the arena. Let its callers return to their pulpits. Let al-Azhar return to its mission. Let its shaykh be elected freely. Let his headquarters be the al-Azhar Mosque, and not the al-Azhar administration. Let its funds come from the endowments of Muslims. When matters are in order, the way will be clear and problems will find solutions.

Government

45040311 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Apr 89 p 7

[Interview by Hani 'Ammarah; place and date unspecified]

[Text] I admit that I was in a state of longing and anticipation as I was on my way to the house of Shaykh Kishk, for this would be the first time I would be sitting face to face with this caller known throughout all the Arab and Islamic countries.

I brought a number of issues to Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid Kishk that perhaps epitomize the difference of opinion between those responsible for authority and those opposed to it.

What did his eminence say about the morality of having a difference of opinion, the relationship of Islam to politics, and the extent of the human need for a spiritual connection, and its effect on the progress of the nation?

[LIWA AL-ISLAM] Islam has established controls and rules of conduct regarding differences of opinion over public issues. Does the practice of the sovereign power regarding those who differ with its opinion represent Islamic ethics regarding differences of opinion?

[Kishk] Dialogue in Islam is based on upright morality. Therefore, according to legally valid principles, "a difference of opinion must not be perverted out of devotion to an issue." Caliph 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab spent an entire night in an intense dispute with a Muslim youth 'Abdallah Ibn-'Abbas, such that the companions of the Prophet thought that the two would not meet during the day. Suddenly they were engaged in the morning prayer and shaking hands out of love and noblemindedness, as if nothing had happened.

Also, there is a golden rule which maintains that "we work on what is agreed between us, and forgive one another our differences."

A woman criticized Caliph 'Umar when he was dealing with the subject of the high cost of dowries.

Nonetheless, 'Umar did not order that she be confined to her residence nor that she be arrested, imprisoned,

punished, hung or flogged. 'Umar merely said, with the logic of truth, "the woman is right and 'Umar is wrong." In doing so, he was supported by a Koranic revelation, namely: "This is morality and these are ethics; God created us with minds with which to understand each other and to reason.

However, if dialogue is based on violence, the derision of others' opinions, and the distortion of their statements, we will not reach the truth, which will continue to vacillate between us. If we do not engage in dialogue with our tongues and minds, matters will become extremely dangerous.

We emphasize that errors in calculation always bring the worse consequences.

The Government Does Not Participate in Dialogue

[LIWA AL-ISLAM] I told his eminence that the government in no way engages in dialogue or discussion, and that it believes that mere disagreements with its view will pass.

[Kishk] The task of dialogue with the rulers is the responsibility of the ulema. The ulema are the primary people answerable to God for all that happens. Moreover, they are legally accountable for what befalls the call to Islam, and what lies in wait to ambush it. The ulema must fear no one except God.

There Is No Extremism in Islam

[LIWA AL-ISLAM] Do you believe that there is religious extremism in Egypt?

[Kishk] There is no so-called extremism in Islam. Rather, this term is meant to denote abnormality and deviation. Islam is a moderate, middle-of-the-road religion. If this word has been used to designate a Muslim, know that such a term is a non-indigenous plant in the land of Islam. World Zionism has spread and circulated this term, by which it means to say that every pious person is abnormal.

Purity, morality and adherence to the truth of God's commandments do not constitute extremism. If they call this extremism, we have the honor of being extremists.

Politics and Religion

[LIWA AL-ISLAM] We are currently occupied with the Islamic cultural program, which, of course, requires comprehensive reform of the Islamic outlook. However, there are those who oppose this based on the argument that politics have no place in religion. What is your opinion?

[Kishk] This is a secular or lay view. Whoever said politics has no place in religion is as one who says that a head has no place on a body or that a body has no

business having a head. Whoever said that contests the prophecy of the prophet of God, God bless him and grant him salvation, to whom God, may he be exalted, said "I reveal to you the Koran, which contains the truth, so that you may render judgement among the people based on what God has shown you."

[LIWA AL-ISLAM] Has the time come to apply the Islamic shari'ah?

[Kishk] What has befallen the Islamic nation can be attributed to the shelving of the Koran and the Sunna of the Prophet.

The shari'ah requires no preparation. On the contrary, it is prepared and ready. I say to the rulers, you have tried every system from capitalism and communism to secularism. Try the path of God. If you apply the shari'ah, God will bless our land, country and economy. Once, 'Umar Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz collected alms and wanted to distribute them. Not finding one needy person, he ordered that the youth of the treasury be married off.

Ramadan Riddles

[LIWA AL-ISLAM] The month of Ramadan is almost upon us. What would you like to say to those responsible for communications work?

[Kishk] The soul is filled with bitterness and the heart with sorrow and sadness because the month of Ramadan is connected with riddles. God linked Ramadan with the Koran, saying "the month of Ramadan in which the Koran was revealed!"

It is strange, when I was arrested in 1981 and sat before the investigator, the first question which he asked me was "why do you attack Nellie's [a TV actress] riddles?" I said, praise the Lord, do we want to make the people forget the meaning of Ramadan by linking it with riddles. You must know about Ramadan. It is a fast. Fasting on Ramadan is virtuous. It is an undertaking. Undertaking it is virtuous. It stands for victory, namely the famous victories of the Muslims at Badr, Andulusia, 'Ayn Jalut and Fath; Mecca was conquered during Ramadan. It is almsgiving at the end of Ramadan. It is the Koran. The Koran suffices as a gift and bringer of good tidings. Ramadan is not films broadcast after the afternoon prayer for enjoyment.

[LIWA AL-ISLAM] What does your eminence say regarding those who openly violate the fast during Ramadan?

[Kishk] It is the utmost duty of the government to restrain those who openly violate the fast during Ramadan and to impose preemptory deterrent punishments in order to preserve the sanctity of this month, because if the government does not prevent them, who will?

Public Sector Tests Employee Stock Ownership Plans

45040308C Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI
in Arabic 3 Apr 89 p 3

[Article: "We Are Still Unable to Satisfy International Credit Agencies"]

[Text] This article discusses certain reforms currently being introduced by the ministry of industry in order to correct flaws in certain public sector industrial companies. The ministry is now in the process of creating the Alexandria Tire Company, a new company being structured financially and administratively along the lines of American Employee Stock Option Plans [ESOPs]. There are corporations bought by their employees via ESOPs. Most American ESOPs used to be private sector firms on the verge of bankruptcy because of serious financial problems and managerial challenges. Their owners transferred their assets to employees by selling stock. Frequently, those firms took out loans in the name of their employees in order to reimburse the owner for the assets transferred and to help him divest without substantial losses.

There are two types of employee-owned firms in the United States. The first, as explained above, is created by borrowing funds to pay for the transfer of assets to employees. The second guarantees employees a degree of capital ownership under conditions of increased profitability. In other words, the two main kinds of ESOPs are based either on borrowing or on increased profitability. The two types operate on the same basic premise of instituting a system of incentives to encourage workers and managers in any one firm to work harder to improve performance and increase profits. In other words, the return to owners increases whenever profitability improves. Managers and employees are the owners under that system.

That system proved very successful in the United States for corporations that, as mentioned before, suffered serious financial and managerial problems. It was also successful in other economically developed countries such as Britain. The two most famous ESOPs in the world are British Airways and Oregon Iron and Steel of the U.S.

The ESOP concept was tremendously successful in turning firms of low profitability and serious managerial flaws into financially and economically successful corporations. Its proven success in improving worker performance prompted world organizations, as we said in a previous article, to apply it in certain developing nations to reform public sector companies with fiscal or worker incentive flaws. The World Bank extended loans to more than one country in order to turn certain public sector companies into employee-owned companies - ESOPs.

The ministry of industry embarked on a similar experiment in Egypt by creating a private sector ESOP called

Alexandria Tire Company and supplying it with a loan of some \$42 million for equipment and construction. The loan will ensure substantial ownership of the new firm by workers and managers. The company will recruit workers from the public sector, since it was originally planned as a public sector company before the ministry of industry opted to structure it into an ESOP as an experiment where employees and managers would work under a system of incentives diametric to those at other public sector corporations. As an ESOP, the new corporation is an experiment unique in Africa and the Middle East. We must, as advocated in a previous article, publicize this experiment throughout the world and especially to organizations that know little about it, such as the World Bank. I am sure that current tensions between the government and the World Bank would greatly diminish were we to inform that institution that Egypt is implementing such a policy.

This new concept offers many advantages by transforming public sector corporations with serious fiscal and performance problems into private sector companies where higher individual income is clearly a function of increased company profitability.

I realize that there are many who oppose the sale of certain public sector firms and we support their view in certain cases. I still believe, however, that there is no sense in allowing the manufacture of chocolate, chewing gum, or yogurt, for instance, to accrue heavy losses for the government. Selling a facility to its workers could be acceptable to all parties and would allow the government to leave fields it should not have entered in the first place. Workers would also be quite pleased because the system would guarantee them higher incomes.

It is also feasible to turn certain state-owned companies into successful private sector commercial enterprises by tying worker income to higher company profitability. We could also ensure against dilution of employee ownership by prohibiting the transfer of stock to outsiders. Certain U.S. corporations follow this rule and limit stock ownership to company employees. A worker wishing to sell his shares can only do so to another employee of the company. I believe that this kind of system would be acceptable to capitalists and to socialists who believe that Egypt should have a strong public sector as well as a strong private sector.

My colleague Dr Munir al-Siyyagh relates, as an illustration, the case of Misr Food and Dairy, which is capitalized at only 17 million pounds, yet has debts of more than 102 million pounds and had a shortfall of some 15 million pounds in 1987/88. My colleague described this company as faltering and in need of being set on a sound economic course. We are in favor of that, of course, but wonder how it could be accomplished. We believe that this is a company where the ESOP concept could be effectively and successfully implemented. Would the ministry of industry be willing to introduce the ESOP concept not only to a new entity but also to an older

public sector company with an established administrative and fiscal structure? Introducing ESOP to a public sector company such as Misr Food and Dairy would put it to the real test as an effective way to improve our company performance.

I believe that world organizations would agree. Let me make it clear that I am in no way selling the Alexandria Tire project short. To be serious, we have to recognize that reforms must be introduced to faltering companies as well to those being newly created in the public sector.

Article Criticizes U.S. Treatment of Libya, Al-Qadhdhafi

45040313A Cairo MUKHTAR AL-ISLAM
in Arabic April 89 pp 71-72

[Text] The controversy generated by America regarding the allegation that Libya is building a factory to produce poison gases used in chemical warfare clearly bears the stamp of the degeneracy, narrowmindedness, overt stupidity, hypocrisy and hostility toward Islam which characterize the policy of a state said to be a superpower. America itself used poisonous gases and defoliants in its war against Vietnam. When the Soviets, in turn, made brutal use of poisonous gases in their war against the Afghan people, as did their Vietnamese friends against the people of Cambodia, American reactions were weak, conventional and intended to merely prove a point.

Then there is the famous case of Egypt's use of chemical weapons against the Yemeni people during al-Nasir's era. Although relations between Egypt and America and Israel were strained at the time, no threats were made to blow up Egyptian plants, and Israel sent letter-bombs only to the German scientists involved in the manufacture of missiles, and not in chemical warfare. What change has caused America to be concerned with the Libyan plant to such a sick, disgusting degree? Is it not incredible that a superpower should be entirely preoccupied with a small state, as is the case with America's preoccupation with Nicaragua, for example?

Actually, American foreign policy is passing through a stage of trivial pursuits, which causes it to focus on small states and to declare itself their enemy on the pretext that they are a source of terrorism and aggression against others. This focus on small states excuses America from confronting larger states. However, the matter is not so simple. In the case of Libya, there is a secret desire to focus the spotlight on the regime of al-Qadhdhafi and to bestow bravery on him after he had fallen into the abyss of oblivion again following the famous raid against Tripoli. It seems that the price paid by America to make al-Qadhdhafi's star shine and to bestow bravery and martyrdom on him with the light of the media has now become the shooting down of two Libyan aircraft and the waging of an intense propaganda campaign against the Libyan president every several years. But why does America wish to cause al-Qadhdhafi's star to shine when he is the guardian of Arab nationalism and the heir to

Nasserism? American objectives are manifold. al-Qadhdhafi still bears the brunt of the banner of propaganda opposed to Islam or to Arab unity in any of its forms. To the western media, he is an acceptable sacrificial lamb who distorts the image of the Arabs and makes it easy to accuse them of terrorism so as to conceal the true terrorism represented by Israel's oppression of the Islamic uprising in Palestine. America's attack against al-Qadhdhafi after his media transformation into an international danger also represents an opportunity for America to unify western ranks behind it regarding specific issues and to bolster its credibility in matters pertaining to international terrorism, which frightens America more than anything because it is actually the vanguard of a world revolution against American imperialism. Engaging in a media war against al-Qadhdhafi also provides an opportunity to America's friends in the region to stand alone, compelled to defend him in the media and thereby appear independent from America, thus bolstering their shaken political reputation in the eyes of the public. As for al-Qadhdhafi, despite the threats and promises, he remains undamaged. Moreover, his political stock has risen. The American media offensive also provides him with an opportunity to undertake initiatives to appease America and develop a dialogue with it, as he did by turning over the body of the American pilot whose aircraft was downed in the raid on Tripoli. In the latter instance, al-Qadhdhafi's finessing of matters in order to pacify the American media offensive came at the right time and bore fruit from the standpoint of the cessation of propagandizing by him and his friends against the American-Palestinian dialogue.

ISRAEL

IDF Chief Discusses Security Issues, Training Methods

44230085 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Apr 89 p 14

[DAVAR interview with Chief of Staff Dan Shomron]

[Text] [DAVAR] Since it is the eve of Passover, let us begin with a question touching on the exodus from Egypt—the exodus from the Sinai, more precisely—in our generation. After a decade, how would you define the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] balance of peace?

[Shomron] There is nothing more secure than peace, even in the IDF's view. The fact is that since the signing of the treaty with Egypt, not a single Israeli soldier has been wounded in a confrontation or gunfire from Egypt's forces. Of course, there are those who fear the possibility of a revolution in Egypt. The Egyptian army is amassing updated American equipment and improving its capabilities. I remember the period of the debates: is peace a calculated risk or a wager. I was then Regional Commander of the south, and 'Ezer Weizman asked me a number of times: tell me, Dan, do you feel that it is possible to continue the process? I said to him: In my opinion, we are strong enough. It is a calculated risk, not a wager.

[DAVAR] You once said that you told Weizman that even for 10 years it is worthwhile.

[Shomron] True. And I hope that it will hold much longer than that. Today, at the end of a decade, we see first of all that Egypt, which was isolated after the Camp David agreements, has succeeded in returning to the Arab world. And I estimate that Egypt has a true interest in a state of nonfighting. Regarding peace, perhaps it is easier for Egypt that it remain in cold parameters, as it has taken care to do, but a state in which there is no war with Israel is, in my opinion, a strategic Egyptian interest. As long as the situation doesn't change, there is a good chance that we will enjoy these fruits of peace.

[DAVAR] In strategic or economical terms, how much have we saved by not having to equip the army to confront the Egyptian army as well?

[Shomron] First of all, we don't have to retain as large an army in the Sinai at as high a state of preparedness. We have, today, the northern border and the security of the northern settlements, the Jordanian border, which must be guarded, and the current security, including the activity in the territories. And we must also be in a state of preparedness against the Syrian army. Now, picture to yourselves that, in addition to all of these tasks, we had, today, the additional task against the Egyptian army, an army that is not small that confronted us, and I will not count exactly how many groups and how much money and how much of an investment in fortifications and all that is connected with a military formation that confronts such a large military formation as the Egyptian army.

[DAVAR] When you say that there is nothing more secure than peace, does this fall also on the Syrian sector, as well as on the Jordanian sector and the territories?

[Shomron] I say this in principle. There are two elementary things that we must ensure, in general: security for the State of Israel and stability in the Middle East. And to be more concrete: if, tomorrow morning a Palestinian state suddenly arises in the territories, I estimate that there would be something similar to Lebanon—armed organizations fighting among themselves for the position of power. Each organization is supported by some outside country. This is the situation that we have in Lebanon, and as a result of this, terrorist activities. There isn't even general agreement among the PLO, nor is there leadership over all of them. There would certainly be terrorist activities against Israel and, of course, against Jordan. Such a thing is insufferable, because it does not respond to the two main components: the security of the State of Israel and stability in the Middle East.

[DAVAR] When Israel was established, there were also the separate organizations, and the moment that a government was prepared, it eliminated them.

[Shomron] The difference is in the fact that, here, each organization has someone in charge outside of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza—countries that uphold vehemence in accordance with their interests and not in accordance with the interest of the residents of the territories.

[DAVAR] That is, the problem is not one of territory, but rather, of who shall rule in this territory?

[Shomron] I wouldn't want to get into that, because that is basically the political realm. I simply present the components without which it is impossible to reach a state of peace. Our security problems go around in two circles, between which there are mutual ties. In the inner circle, Zionism fights against the Palestinians on the same plot of land. Both we and they have debates regarding the size of the land. The Palestinian covenant speaks of all of it. There are those who are also willing to have less than all of it. The outer circle is the armed struggle with the Arab states, with regular armies. It will be possible to arrive, in both circles, at points of agreement only when it will become clear that it is impossible to dictate terms by force to the State of Israel and that a way must be sought for negotiation. It is clear that in this process, which is painful and lengthy, everyone tries to identify the limits of his ability. Egypt is a good example.

If Egypt were prepared at the end of the War of Independence, after the cease-fire agreements, it would have been possible to reach a better agreement from its point of view, as well. Thirty years passed, four wars, thousands of slain, vast expenditures for the army, the war—and in the end, it reached the same place. When did it reach the same place? When the leadership understood that there is no possibility of attaining greater achievements in war.

[DAVAR] Regarding the Intifadah, there is a claim that the IDF is, essentially, a sacrifice of a political failure. Do you not feel that you have become easy prey for the politicians in the context of the Intifadah? For example: Yehoshu'a Shagi's attack on you and the treatment of some of the politicians toward the Intelligence Branch's report.

[Shomron] I do not wish to speak of a specific politician or politicians. Regarding the question of failure or non-failure of the army on the subject of what is called the Intifadah, it is very important, in my opinion, to clarify this subject. There are those who say that the Intifadah can be terminated: the order must be given to the army to terminate it. There are those who say that, perhaps, in the beginning of the Intifadah, if they had brought great force and had taken some very drastic courses, it would have been possible to prevent its continuation. Beyond the fact that whoever speaks in the language of "what ifs" can enjoy satisfaction, it is clear that in order to prove this assumption we would have had to pay a very heavy price. But, even without paying the price, I say that Israel is a country of the law, and the law is a code of behavior. Let's assume that the army received

approval to act according to other laws and to implement its power—the weapons in its possession—and shoots to wound, the use of means that are in opposition to the basic code of behavior would cause a breach in society. And a breach in society is a breach in the army, because thus is our army structured. It reflects the moods in Israeli society, and a breach in society would be a grave danger to the army's wholeness.

A second thing that would happen is that the same countries that have a code of behavior similar to ours would not be able to accept this either, and at the top of the list is the United States. Such pressure that would certainly be implemented, with such heavy strength, would bring us to a state in which conditions would be dictated to us that are in opposition to our interests. The role of the army, within the limitations in which we are operating, is to cause the existing violence to be of such strength that it not obligate the political ranks to accept dictates that are in opposition to Israel's vital interests. The remainder is the responsibility of the political ranks. In my opinion, the army has been successful, in these givens, in executing its duty. Whoever promises the termination of the Intifadah or of a situation in which not a single stone would be thrown anywhere on the streets of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is deceiving the public. Such a thing cannot be.

[DAVAR] With this policy of the army, aren't you actually determining that the Intifadah will continue for a long while and, in the end, won't it dictate the form of the political solution as well?

[Shomron] I have already stated that there is a process in which each side identifies the maximum that it can reach, as well as its limitations of force. In the Intifadah, as well, we see such a process. They, too, have disillusionment. Note that 'Arafat did not go and agree with the conditions of the United States out of his good will. Why didn't he do this 13 or 14 years earlier? He knew which debates he would have internally and what confrontations he would withstand with the other organizations. Why, then, did he do this now? Because from the region they are pressuring him to seek a solution. Why are they pressuring him? Because they realize that the achievements of the Intifadah are not engraved in stone and that a Palestinian state will not arise tomorrow. Their suffering is great and solutions must be found that are, perhaps, not within the realm of the Palestinian covenant.

[DAVAR] There is a question of the capability of our position and of how we are perceived today from the alarmist view. The army's argument for the cancellation of the submarine project was, in fact, that there is no money because of the Intifadah. How much have we been pounded because of it? Will we weaken in strength to reply to the over-all threat?

[Shomron] Let me actually start from the side that is easy for me to answer precisely. I know what the Syrians are

thinking. They well understand that if there is a war with Syria, we will not shoot plastic bullets or rubber bullets. They know the differences exactly. I am not saying that Syria, from its own considerations, will not attempt to bet on this or that potential course. I hope not. But the alarm decidedly exists. The struggle in the territories is costing us monetary and other resources. In some places they have to forgo training somewhat—not in the air force and not in the navy, and less in the armour, but more in the infantry. We are knowingly harming other sections temporarily. Regarding the submarines, the government decided this year not to finance the additional IDF operations beyond guarding the northern settlements, guarding the borders, and preparedness against the Syrians. It is clear that if there is a defined budgetary framework, we must operate in accordance with it and to make a new decision within the order of preferences. I see a possibility of deferring the submarine project by a number of years and not to come out with submarines and satellites together. By the way, regarding the satellites, we have already signed the deal.

[DAVAR] Isn't this really because of the loss of Israel's underwater capability until the mid-'90s?

[Shomron] It could be, in the worst case, that there will be a delay of a year or two. Afterwards, we will have submarines in any case. It could be that we will lengthen the service time of the existing submarines within certain operational limitations. In any case, we will continue with submarines. But, we will not combine them with the satellite order of battle. For a long time the decision was not accepted for the submarines or the satellites. Now, indeed, the submarine project has been delayed, but the satellite deal has been signed.

[DAVAR] If a dramatic change does not occur in the territory, and the Intifadah, from the viewpoint of the Palestinians, continues as it is, do you see the IDF confronting it without dramatic changes occurring within it, without it reaching certain pressures, without complicating it more than in the first year?

[Shomron] The IDF must and will stand up to this course as much as is required of it. If the government decides that, for the sake of the security of Israel, it will increase the security budget—and on this question we have, meanwhile, not received a reply, although it was agreed that the Security Ministry would present additional requests in May—and we receive at least the IDF's expenses for the Intifadah, we will not have to impair what is known as multi-year program for equipment.

[DAVAR] A return of the Intifadah expenditures will give you all the security that you need?

[Shomron] No. If I were to present the Israeli government with the worst threat to Israel and I would calculate, in accordance with the accepted indexes in the world, which forces are needed against such a threat, I assume that the government of Israel would not be able

to pay, even if it so desired. Therefore, within this spectrum of threatening situations, from the least to the most severe, we have determined the threat of reference. The IDF's multi-year program has been structured as a response to this theoretical threat. The main dilemma is between the immediate preparedness and the current duties and the section in which you invest for the future, and there is a connection between them. This is the same budgetary framework. When you invest in the northern settlements, in training of the forces, and preparedness, you have less money to invest in the future. This dilemma obligates us to arrive at the formula for a small and smart army. Smart—that is selection. Small—that is compulsion. An army costs money for its training and upkeep. It is expensive. If you wish to retain the full size of the army, certainly part of the army's preparation for the '90s and the 21st century will be more reduced. But, in any case, we want to invest in the future, since according to the estimation, we do not foresee an immediate war. This does not mean that this possibility does not exist, but it does not appear thus that it is justifiable to subordinate the future and retain a larger army today. This is definitely a risk, and I also know who pays for risks. After Yom Kippur, I saw exactly who pays, and I have no doubt that the risk is mine. Advisors are very good to have, but I have never seen an adviser who flew, nor executives in the Security Ministry. In the end, it is my responsibility. And I, with open eyes, take risks now. Some of the things that I want will be in the year 2000, and not in my time. But this will remain my country with my army. Based on a realistic estimation, with a drop of optimism, we have built a framework that has certain weak points. If the threat were more serious than that which we anticipated in the threat of reference, perhaps some of the degrees of freedom would be closed to diplomats. This is the price. I am prepared to accept a larger budget and to give them complete answers to everything that is on their minds, but that has its price.

[DAVAR] And this does not deviate from the cost of the Intifadah?

[Shomron] In a basic assumption, I expect that we will receive the expenses for the army in the territories for the Intifadah.

[DAVAR] Which is?

[Shomron] This year, expenses were 250 million shekels. Last year, for the entire year, expenses reached a little more than 400 million shekels. We received a refund of 100 million. This year they took off 20 million shekels—you do the arithmetic yourself. I believe it comes out to 580 million shekels.

[DAVAR] Why did they reduce the expenses this year?

[Shomron] First of all, in some of the foundations that we established during the first year it is unnecessary to invest again. Secondly, we equipped ourselves with more effective equipment, we are retaining fewer troops in the

territories, and, as a result, we need fewer reserve troops. This also enables us to train more.

[DAVAR] Why don't you remove the IDF from the cities? Why should you care that they have a sort of Intifadah autonomy there? In the end, that's what we'll do, but, until then, we pay the price.

[Shomron] An Intifadah that does not inflict violence on anyone, what sort of Intifadah is that? Whom does it serve? An Intifadah must inflict violence in order to provide that appropriate background music for whom-ever is outside. This is clear. And therefore, if we leave a certain area, a popular army will become organized, and an independent government, and everything. And then, they will take to the roads, to other places where the army is. Otherwise, this Intifadah will have no effect. They would sit quietly in an autonomous village? Or an autonomous casbah? What would they gain from this? Whom does it interest? Which media would come to see this?

[DAVAR] In any case, you wouldn't be signing any agreement. You leave the cities. You get poor results? So, return.

[Shomron] Believe me, I really don't like to be in the midst of the population, inside the cities. The question that is asked is if, after such an exit, will I have to return there with forces, and this time, in real battle. This time, it would not be an entrance of a regular patrol. They would have to enter with great force and many wounded. If this is the alternative, I prefer to remain in the current situation until we arrive at something better.

[DAVAR] Is the current level of violence in the territories appropriate, in your opinion, for the existence of the election process there?

[Shomron] The election problem does not result from the level of violent activities in the territories, but from the fact that they see the idea of elections as an attempt to create a screen between the PLO leadership outside and the residents in the territories. Nevertheless, I think that more than just a few residents support the elections, because it gives them a fair chance to really advance beyond a pragmatic origin. At the moment, there is opposition without any connection to violence.

[DAVAR] Who is commanding them? Does a chief of staff or, at least, a local general staff stand opposite you, or is everything through spontaneous organization and listening to the radio?

[Shomron] With this type of popular uprising, even if you were to search you wouldn't find a system of any hierarchy with clear commands. There are proclamations and direction from outside through radio broadcasts or other means. Beyond that, there is what is called "headquarters," and it is composed of alternating people. Some of them are occasionally caught. Others flee.

They attempt to find some sort of balance between the different organizations. They don't succeed? They issue different proclamations. In the field, the popular committees exist. Sometimes, the committee is composed of one person who gives the command and, who, himself, takes the bottle and goes to throw it. This is roughly the committee's significance.

[DAVAR] Does it also debate itself?

[Shomron] Perhaps they also debate a little. In the end they agree, and this is what it does. This is the system that works. We are not speaking of an army with an orderly struggle. Therefore, we also see a very large gap between the proclamations and the execution in the field. Since there is no body giving commands to all of the places, we sometimes see regions that are, at the same time, even with the same proclamation, totally quiet, while in another region the level of activity is higher. In my opinion, we are speaking of a local system.

[DAVAR] A year after the debate over the influence of the violence on the soldiers, how do you summarize today, looking back, the influence of the Intifadah in this area?

[Shomron] There were exceptions, especially in the months of January through April. The soldiers stood for the first time in this situation. Afterwards, a clear process of change began. We began to use more efficient means, and a much deeper understanding of the commanders and soldiers crystallized regarding the form of activity and the type of activity. There was a psychologist's report that detailed what would happen in the army and many more hard prophecies. These things did not occur, but not by chance. Good work was done by commanders in the field on all levels and all ranks, in order to explain what is happening. In the final analysis, I do not see long-term damage or scars. The type of activity, itself, they certainly do not like. No soldier likes it, perhaps except for those to whom I do not wish to relate. I would say that soldiers, in total, do not care for this type of activity.

[DAVAR] In the past year, we have witnessed the effort made by the Soviet Union to improve and to soften international disputes. We also hear direct expressions toward the Middle East. The estimation is that the Arab countries, especially Syria, would not run toward war without the Soviet Union behind them. While here, in recent months or weeks, they have been speaking more of the potential danger of an eastern war—Syria and now Iraq, too. How does this fit together?

[Shomron] After the peace treaty that Egypt signed with Israel, Syria built itself up according to declarations of authority toward a strategic balance. Syria built a military strength for a situation in which it would be isolated. What does that mean, isolated? That political processes—it sees Egypt and Jordan, from its aspect, leaning on a broken reed—will, perhaps, begin to move in the

direction of peace in the Middle East, while Syria remains with the problem of the Golan Heights and with additional desires without support. This country invests 30 percent of its gross domestic product in the military. They are investing everything in it because from the moment that the situation is created for whose benefit they are building this strength, they will be prepared at least in the military process, and not just partially, on the assumption that the Syrian army will be strong enough to resist our attack for a certain amount of time and will not collapse to the extent of intervention of the powers. This, too, from Asad's aspect, is the way to give impetus to the political process, that which comes immediately following the military process. We are decidedly standing with a finger on the pulse in the Syrian direction.

[DAVAR] A question regarding the connection with the political ranks: in the framework of the exercises that the army is conducting, we have not seen a representation of the political ranks. That is, is there a top officer whose role is to represent the leaders?

[Shomron] General Brill, usually.

[DAVAR] Don't you lack a cabinet exercise in order to better sense the work of the committee of ministers for security matters in war?

[Shomron] We perform exercises today at a simulation level that is much closer to reality in the ranks that actually, in the past, were drilled less. I, as chief of staff, am drilled in all of these exercises together with my entire staff. In the past, it was customary that the chief of staff observed from the side as a judge.

[DAVAR] Who drills you?

[Shomron] There is an exercise team headed by Moshe Brill. Of course, I determine the subjects of the exercises in accordance with the subjects that I wish to examine. Afterward, there is a team that presents data and follows the exercise, and everything that it judges I accept. Afterward, we learn lessons from these exercises. The experience gained has helped us to pinpoint the problems in a realistic fashion. We pinpointed sensitivities and understanding of the different situations that are liable to develop, and from them we crystallized the optimal responses to these situations. In a natural manner, the political ranks do not like to participate in exercises and give hypothetical answers to such situations, because it entails, to a certain extent, taking a stand that they wouldn't want to be tied to in the continuation. Such an exercise is presented to the minister of security: the situations that were, the solutions that were given, our evaluation, and the lessons. My summary with the minister is that, in the continuation, the matters will be presented to the cabinet and, in such a manner, we will pass the dilemma and our possible solutions to them.

[DAVAR] A question that is connected in another manner to the political ranks. Do you sense that they have abandoned Aviy'am Sela'?

[Shomron] The IDF cares very much about Sela'. I don't wish to say what we are doing, but believe me that we care very much. I did not correctly estimate how much sensitivity still remains in the United States, until he began to work for a private company and was fired because they felt that, because of him, they would lose orders in the United States. We are seeking other ways to help Sela' and to get organized so that he might find his niche in work and Israeli society.

[DAVAR] After two years in your position, would you have been glad for the job had you known that most of the time you would be occupied with the Intifadah?

[Shomron] I don't know why we always have to have a birthday, but I want to say a number of things that I said we would do upon my entering the position, and we have accomplished them. I said that in our condition, with the resources at our disposal, we will have to reduce the order of battle in order to ensure its quality. I repeat this, because many times they distort things by saying: a small and smart army, when small is the goal. I have never said this. I said that under our conditions, there must be the proper balance that will enable us to build a good and high-quality army for both the '90s and the 21st century. In this direction, we have taken very serious steps and, as I said, with a risk that is unpreventable alongside of it. Also, the closing of the Lavi project is an inseparable part of our ability to act appropriately within the framework of existing resources.

We are succeeding in equipping the army, despite the continuing Intifadah, albeit at a slower rate than we would have liked, and an example of this is the submarine project. But, in other areas we are succeeding in equipping the army with good fighting means that will be appropriate for the near and distant future. I would be happy if we had more resources and we were less occupied with the Intifadah. Together with this, it is worthwhile to remember one more thing: to keep this army in the Intifadah as a disciplined army, in which the incidents of refusal are isolated, and it functions and exercises and performs all of its duties—I believe this is an honorable mission. I am not alone in the army. I have generals with me and, under them, groups, and squadrons, and wings. All of us are together. So, it could be that the media must seek out the bad things, but when all of these petty cruelties disappear with time, and things are examined in perspective, it is also possible to see all of the more important things that the army is doing.

[DAVAR] Thank you very much. We wish you luck that you'll be able to also say this next year.

Ties Between Palestinian Prisoners and External Leaders Assessed

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[Article by Nathan Ro'y]

[Text] It all began before the outbreak of the uprising in the territories. The security prisoners learned that a new director of prisons was about to be appointed. They reacted to the change by threatening strikes. Some even proffered threats against the new director. For a while they waited to test the style of the new governor, Levy Sha'ul. On 21 December 1987 the Prisons Authority decided to introduce some improvements before January 1st (FATAH day), so that the improvements should not be interpreted as a reaction to the events and strikes expected on that day.

Several improvements were agreed upon under the new amendments: prisoners will be allowed to keep their television sets on until the end of broadcasts at midnight; closed circuit movies will be shown; the medical department of the Prisons Authority will expand the list of specialists permitted to enter the prisons for individual consultations; the governor will reconsider the printed material allowed into the prisons. The governor also decided that prisoners were allowed to receive printed matter that was not a security risk. He added that "Prisoners may be transferred from one cell to another or from one wing to another. Prisoners may change cells, wings, or prisons on the basis of well founded requests. Prisoners' transfers require authorization from the prison management in accordance with the circumstances of each request and with humanitarian considerations."

The above improvements were accompanied by a decision to recognize the leaders and spokesmen of jailed terrorists. Prison wardens were instructed to talk to the leaders of the detainees openly. At the same time, the prisoners were told that wardens will continue to summon prisoners for private interviews. The wardens were instructed to treat the prisoners on the basis of mutual respect and reciprocity and to refrain from gratuitous violence. Another decision—which had been repealed under the outgoing governor of the Prisons Authority, Commander David Maymon—was to permit contact between young prisoners and older prisoners. However, should it emerge that the older prisoners are training the younger ones for terrorism and violence, the meetings would be canceled.

One of the major problems of security prisoners in Israel is overcrowded cells. As soon as Levy Sha'ul took office the prisoners were told that there are plans to improve jail conditions. Political prisoners do not have their meals in dining halls, but in their cells. The Prisons Authority promised to try to allocate them mess halls. It was also decided to allot the prisoners more walking time, to permit them to purchase blue down jackets from

the prison commissary, and to allow them to use exercise bicycles, provided the Red Cross finances the purchase.

At about the time that the prisons governor took office, a parallel instruction was issued against communal prayer for the prisoners. The governor also announced that he will definitely not comply with the request to remove the screens used on family visits.

The new security rules were established after lengthy debates with the participation of the wardens of security prisons. The Prisons Authority governor summarized the discussions saying: "We all agree that the terrorists have their leadership and that this leadership, and not the wardens, dictates attitudes in prison. Where we disagree is whether to recognize the leadership and go along with the conditions binding the prisoners, or to continue to ignore the leadership, in which case the improvements granted do not obligate the prisoners to respond accordingly. We all agree that we do not have the means to eliminate the prisoners' leadership. Where security is concerned everyone is against compromise, but opinions vary as to the definition of security problems. For example, concerning education, they want to study and we don't allow them, although we are aware of the revolutionary indoctrination that goes on anyway."

Levy Sha'ul has not changed his views since coming into office. So far the security prisoners have not dared to disrupt the relationship that has been created between them and the new governor, although they are a party to their brothers' struggle in the territories. Here and there some said that Levy used the improvements to "bribe" them into curbing their revolutionary spirit.

Levy Sha'ul: "Terrorists voiced all sorts of threats against me when I was appointed. I came to the Prisons Authority to the accompaniment of threats of a pretty hot reception. They had heard that a police officer had been appointed to head the Prisons Authority, and by definition a police officer is a bad guy (he puts people in prison). That is why they promised some of the contact people working with them that they would stage hunger strikes and riots just by way of an introductory lesson. Similar information was received from branches of the defense forces. When I came I sent everyone a personal message. The disturbances were scheduled to begin toward the middle of December 1987 (I came at the middle of November 1987). In the message I told them that I had heard that they intended to stage disturbances and that if that happened I will not have the time to listen to and deal with their problems. Consequently, in my first public announcement (issued in Arabic) I stated that during December I intended to learn about their problems. They sat tight. By the end of December 1987 I was familiar with the situation. I came to the conclusion that the problems of the past were not inescapable."

[Ro'y] You did not see the report of the commission of investigation of "security prisoners" written by Deputy Commander Yisra'el Haran? That was a very important report.

[Sha'ul] "I did not get Yisra'el Haran's report. However, I soon realized that it was not absolutely necessary not to recognize their spokesmen. My predecessor's practice not to recognize their representatives was wrong. As a result of our position, the terrorists decided not to talk at all. They elected a representative, and all attempts by representatives of the authorities to get through to them remained unanswered. They refused to talk to them. There was a short circuit in communication. We did not know what they wanted and they did not know what we wanted. I thought that such an approach was a mistake and I decided to recognize their elected representatives. No new element was created, except for the fact that the sides began to talk to each other. They presented their requests. Since the first talk the guideline has been: the terrorists have no input in matters of security, that is our concern, but as far as humanitarian questions are concerned, such as food and reasonable living conditions in jail, they have the right to have their say."

[Ro'y] On my visits to security prisoners in Judaea and Samaria I saw that their food rations consisted of pita bread, beans, and chickpea balls. Have you put additional items on their menu?

[Sha'ul] "The terrorists' diet reflects their requests. They want beans for breakfast, and beans are cheaper than the eggs that jailed criminals get. They eat rice, which is cheaper than pasta. Their upkeep is less expensive than that of penal prisoners because of the nature of their diet. They came to me and asked for beans—give a terrorist beans for breakfast and he's as happy as a jaybird. So I should argue against it? If they ask for spicy dishes why should I not give it to them? They used to get bread from the 'Angel' bakery, but they threw away the middle and ate only the crust. They wanted pita, I gave them pita. They had transistor radios and televisions that stayed on until 9 in the evening. As far as I'm concerned, let them watch until midnight. Whose business is it?"

[Ro'y] They requested that the Red Cross interpreter should be one of their people.

[Sha'ul] "I don't care who interprets at their talks with the Red Cross. The Red Cross can talk to whomever they like, naturally in our presence. Who cares. The Red Cross is entitled to come in and hear their claims, and I don't care who does the interpreting."

[Ro'y] What things do affect you?

[Sha'ul] "Security. We put shades on the windows so that they cannot watch the guards' movements. I had no other way, and I will not have them removed even if they complain about poor lighting in the rooms. But there are things to which we do respond. At some prisons they had to take their walks in a small, crowded square. After making certain that there was no security problem we expanded the walking space."

[Ro'y] And your predecessors did not see that?

[Sha'ul] "I don't want to talk about my predecessors."

[Ro'y] Has your good attitude changed their actions?

[Sha'ul] "I speak to them in Arabic and they understand me very well. But you cannot turn prisoners into Zionists or clarify our ways to them."

[Ro'y] Who are their leaders?

[Sha'ul] "Leaders are elected according to the various terrorist organizations."

[Ro'y] Terrorists belonging to the Samir 'Ussah group are more dangerous than the Fatah.

[Sha'ul] They are more dangerous, but they also have more to lose. They are realistic. They know that they are prisoners. I take every opportunity to remind them that this is a two-way street. If I should feel that they make a mockery of me I will do an about face and turn off some taps. For example, I will not talk to them. The fact that I talk to them is of enormous importance to them. They know that we are the guards and they the prisoners. They felt the lack of communication and the use of gas."

[Ro'y] They were given gas?

[Sha'ul] "Of course—at the Ashmurot and Nafha' prisons. They are quite familiar with the Jacobson balloons (gas containers). They know very well when I am angry. So, they are realistic. They tell me they want to live, and they want to serve their terms with as many privileges as possible.

"You see, I don't have to grant them anything. We had a request from an Arab beekeeper from the territories. I told them they could receive the donation of honey only after I checked it. The honey goes through my office. I don't have to give it to them. They know that I will not allow the honey through if they act against us.

"At the same time, I don't delude myself. If they should receive instructions to go on strike or to riot, they will do it. They won't obey my smiles, but their orders. However, outside, too, the fact that status quo is convenient to them is taken into consideration. None of the Intifadah proclamations encouraged them to riot. That is why the Israeli prisons have been quiet and free of disturbances."

[Ro'y] In the past it was suggested that released security prisoners should be banished from the country. Are you considering reviving this idea and implementing it?

[Sha'ul] "I am not dealing with this. It's not a serious idea."

[Ro'y] The director general of the Police Ministry thought it was.

[Sha'ul] "I do not think it is a serious and feasible idea. An idea that is not feasible is not serious."

[Ro'y] Have you recently averted any major attack inside the prisons?

[Sha'ul] "We had information that the Islamic Jihad had knives made out of metal beds. We knew about seven knives. We found them. They said it was for self-defense. OK, so we seized the knives.

"The FATAH have orders from outside not to hurt and not to kill inside prisons, and they obey them. Some of the prisoners need to be protected, and others are brutally interrogated by their fellow prisoners, particularly members of the Islamic Jihad and the Rejection Front. That is why we do not treat all prison wings equally. Wings that work against us are treated differently from prisoners whose attitude toward us is respectful. The wings and their leaders are aware of the reasons for the different treatment."

[Ro'y] What did you learn from the escapes from the Nafha' and Gaza prisons?

[Sha'ul] "They said that the pressure they were under left them no alternative but to escape from hell. Now they know that escape will only jeopardize the coexistence relations. It is clear to them that if there are escapes we will go back to the initial line of no communication."

[Ro'y] How much do you know about their contacts with the outside?

[Sha'ul] "We intercepted some messages intended for the outside. Recently a dangerous outside team was seized after we caught such a message and passed it on to General Security."

[Ro'y] What is your position on the death penalty for security prisoners who committed murder?

[Sha'ul] "I think that the death penalty is effective. Death sentence is a deterrent to individuals. However, the death penalty involves other aspects that make it difficult for us to implement it. But when all is said and done, if you consider the ramifications of executions, they would be indicated in this country."

[Ro'y] According to our information, security prisoners are scoring gains by using the salami effect. They defeat us inch by inch and foot by foot. They are winning the long term struggle. Do you not think so?

[Sha'ul] "Every prisoner tries to get the maximum privileges he can. There is no limit, there are always additional possibilities, and security prisoners are no different. They are smarter and they never stop making requests. I can concede in the area of rights, but I will definitely turn down any request apt to hurt security.

They have 24 hours a day to think up new demands. They can ask and I can think about it. There is no erosion of our positions."

[Ro'y] What about conclusions concerning the death of Mahmud al-Misri in the General Security installation at Gaza prison?

[Sha'ul] "The Voice of Israel said that I had passed sentence on the prison guards. I tell you that there was no verdict. In the meantime we will not draw any conclusions—not before the prosecution does. The case must be dealt with by an investigative judge. We will not decide on any disciplinary verdicts before the legal system has finished its work. One of the morning newspapers wrote that 'we are whitewashing,' as if anyone could really do that. This is a matter for an investigative judge, not for us. We can whitewash? Nonsense."

[box on page 16] Female Security Prisoners

Aside from male security prisoners there are a good number of female security prisoners. Some of them are in administrative detention; others were sentenced to imprisonment for terrorist and hostile activities against the State of Israel. They are mainly kept at the Hasharon and Neve Tirtza prisons. On one visiting day I went to have a close look at them. They are removed from the criminal environment, observe internal rules dictated from the inside, and have close ties to Palestinian or Israeli factors outside.

Attorney Yosefah Piq closely follows the situation of the female security prisoners and once a month makes a report on her visits. Here, too, improvements have recently been introduced in the treatment of prisoners. In January 1989 Attorney Piq wrote that female security prisoners are not allowed to see newspapers, except for the JERUSALEM POST on the weekend, nothing else. On rare occasions they get YEDI'OT AHARONOT, and although AL-QUDS was willing to send them 15 copies to Hasharon prison, the warden turned down the offer. Only paperbacks are allowed into the prison. The choice of books at the Hasharon prison library is 20 percent smaller than at Neve Tirtza. The prisoners are allowed to wear only blue, black, and white. Attorney Piq said there was no question of employment.

Prisoners claimed, through the attorney, that their cells are not fit for humans. They do not have hot water regularly. There are no blankets. But there are what they call "small abuses:" when a female guard calls a prisoner to her, the prisoner must come running. Refusal to comply is punished.

Miraculously, however, the attorney's report for February 1989, 1 month after the above report, stated that food quality had improved. The International Red Cross promised to transfer the library from Neve Tirtza so that the female prisoners could use it. Arab newspapers are allowed in. The rooms are warmer since the windows

have been blocked. The Jewish female guard who had treated the prisoners sternly had left the Hasharon prison. The clothes now supplied by the prison management are better than in the past.

[box on page 17] Security Prisoners or Prisoners of War?

The new security regulations were established after lengthy debates with the participation of the wardens of security prisons. Some of the things said at those discussions are indicative of the considerations governing the rulings of the Prisons Authority management.

Deputy Commander B. Hakimi: "There are two approaches. According to the one, the Prisons Authority is responsible for security, but without interfering in the private lives of the prisoners. The other approach is that in addition to ensuring secure installations, we may also interfere in prisoners' lives."

Ashqelon prison warden: "There exist clearly defined objectives for security prisoners that bear no relation to changes of Prisons Authority commanders. The Prisons Authority must formulate objectives, which the various prisons must follow. There is no doubt that responding to prisoners' requests will not stop the requests. The attitude must be positive and must be aimed at increasing the control of the Authority over the prisoners, something that does not rule out recognition of their leaders."

Judaea and Samaria prison warden: "Most of the privileges requested at present are harmful to security. Any positive response to prisoners' demands contains elements opposed to management's standing and gives prisoners the power to run their own affairs, for example, in the matter of jobs allotment in prisons.

"I think that we must absolutely continue to make searches, including body searches. Searches are very important considering how many important messages have been found on incoming or outgoing prisoners. Nationalist singing and inflammatory speeches must be suppressed and silenced."

Nablus prison warden: "Every security prisoner belongs to some organization. By maintaining contacts with the leaders we can ensure cooperation and obligations. I do not see any security impairment in that. On the other hand, it was suggested that the Prisons Authority governor not meet with prisoners whose leadership is dictated by terrorist leaders."

Janin prison warden: "The existence of prisoner leadership is a fact and cannot be ignored. We have not been able to break it, and all the pertinent instructions ignored the reality.

Security Unit (ABAM) commander: "The previous governor, too, talked to prisoners in their cells, drank coffee

with them, and answered their questions. At the same time, he issued regulations they did not like. In principle, the approach to security prisoners is that there must be no compromise where security is concerned. On matters not involving security one can meet them halfway. I suggest that the status quo be preserved for a few months, during which time the prisoners' behavior can be evaluated. Under Governor Suisa there was goodwill, but there was also disorder in the field. Maimon adopted the reverse policy. I suggest that at this point we allow ourselves to be guided by the situation in the field, so as not to make rash decisions. Later we will be able to find the golden mean between the two approaches, which is what is desirable."

General Security Service representative: "I am against prisoners' spokesmen, because their recognition paves the way for increasing demands."

Southern prison warden: "Security prisoners are treated like prisoners of war, although we are careful not to refer to them as such. They see themselves as POW's, and that is the policy that engenders all their demands. The Prisons Authority must establish a clear policy capable of breaking through the security prisoners' organization and void the rules that they are trying to impose on us. Such a policy, if adopted, must have the support of the political branch."

Prisons Authority representative Me'ir: "The political sector intervenes only when there are very serious problems. As long as things go along smoothly, the forum present here is the one that decides on the right policy."

Ashmurot prison warden: "Security prisoners have been used to receiving privileges without having to do anything in exchange. The Prisons Authority never requested anything from them. That is what caused their disdainful attitude toward us. They run their own affairs and we improve their conditions. Now they are trying to find means of getting even more. This trend must be stopped."

SHAS Party Mentor's Attack on Lubavitch Rebbe Described

44230083 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 6 Apr 89 p 32

[Article by David Golan: "It's All Because of the Messiah"]

[Text] It's only a matter of time, according to Haredi sources, before the quarrel on the Haredi street, in the wake of remarks by the president of the council of Torah scholars about the rabbi from Lubavitch, becomes violent. In the quarrel between the Litvaks and the Hasidim, on the eve of elections for the Knesset and for local bodies, there has already been a precedent for it.

It all began with Rabbi Ovadya Yosef's remarks last Wednesday during the weekly lesson in the Borokhov

synagogue in the Bukhara district of Jerusalem about groundless hatred and the destruction of the Temple. Rabbi Yosef, who speaks out regularly against some of Israel's greatest rabbis out of a sense of superior knowledge of Jewish law, this time attacked the Lubavitcher Rebbe, the leader of the HABAD [Wisdom, Understanding, Knowledge] sect of Hasidim.

"I was in New York," Rabbi Yosef said, "and right away some Sephardi rabbis told me that in his court they don't consider him simply the Messiah but the deity Himself, God forbid. The Admor [Master and Teacher] from Lubavitch said those things himself, and thereby led the people astray. These are terrible things, real atheism. Idolatry."

Those sharp words might have been said without anyone knowing about them except that the Litvaks' religious daily YATED NE'MAN made sure to publish them Friday on its front page. On Saturday night a spokesman for the Degel Hatora made an announcement to the press, quoting Rabbi Yosef's remarks. The Litvak camp was having a happy time of it. Now it was not only Eli'ezer Shakh, their spiritual leader, who was attacking the Lubavitcher Rebbe. Cassette recordings of Rabbi Yosef's last lesson were being sold in the Fonevezh Yeshiva and by the Yohay family in Bney Braq for 10 shekels.

The remarks published in Rabbi Yosef's name took on double weight because of his standing as one of the great legal scholars, a famous Torah sage. His sources told him, "if it comes out that this is an attack against the Lubavitcher Rebbe, this will mean that these things are of a general nature."

This was enough to cause a split and dissension in the Haredi ranks. YATED NE'MAN published that dozens of supportive telegrams and appeals from all parts of the globe were streaming to the leader of the council of Torah sages. HAMODIA', the Hasidic newsletter, published declarations of support for the Lubavitcher Rebbe in the name of the Chief Sephardi Rabbi, Mordekhay Eliyahu and the head of the Cabalists, Rabbi Yitzhaq Kaduri.

Rabbi Yosef's remarks not only started a new war between the Sephardim and HABAD but also deepened the rift between the Sephardi rabbis themselves. Some of the rabbis of the Sephardi towns began signing letters of support for the Lubavitcher Rebbe, thereby expressing veiled protest against Rabbi Yosef. It is no secret that there is no love lost between Rabbi Eliyahu and Rabbi Yosef.

Sunday of this week the rabbi of Kfar HABAD, Rabbi Menahem Ashkenazi, contacted the home of Rabbi Yosef and asked that he apologize for what he said. There are two versions of how the conversation went:

According to Rabbi Yosef's confidants, "Rabbi Yosef replied that he had nothing to apologize for. The rabbi has nothing against the Lubavitcher or his followers, only against his views. If the Lubavitcher Rebbe would clarify his position, explaining that he said no such thing, then Rabbi Yosef's remarks would have no weight."

According to HABAD, "Rabbi Yosef said that his remarks were misunderstood. They were made in a closed circle of acquaintances, were not for publication and had to do only with a rumor he had heard about certain pronouncements by HABAD's Hasidim about their rabbi."

The next day already an article was published in HAMODIA' under the headline "From Rabbi Yosef's House It Is Reported That..." The article was unsigned; no one knows who wrote it. The Haredi daily agreed to certify only that Rabbi Yosef did not pay for it.

HABAD was very hurt by the remarks. Rabbi Shakh, who has come out many times against them, can still be called "insane." But can that also be said of Rabbi Yosef?

In HABAD circles there was disbelief as to what was said. "Rabbi Yosef's opinion of HABAD is known from various pronouncements he has made over the years," said HABAD spokesman Baraqa Wolf, "expressions of admiration and enthusiasm. Rabbi Yosef has written the Rebbe many letters. He would send him his books with words of appreciation. He participated in various celebrations held by the Rebbe. More than once he has been received by the Rebbe for talks."

In the Haredi camp no one has a clear explanation of why right now it was that Rabbi Yosef launched his attack on HABAD. Some said that the Lubavitcher Rebbe had refused to receive Rabbi Yosef for talks on his last visit to Brooklyn. Others said that HABAD supporters refused to contribute to Yosef because of his "going into the elections with the Litvaks."

Rabbi Yosef's associates explain that recently information had been received by Rabbi Yosef about remarks by the Lubavitcher Rebbe that purported to say he was God or the Messiah. "The fact that Rabbi Shakh attacked HABAD so sharply," his associates claim, "forced Rabbi Yosef to investigate the matter. He sent Sephardi pupils and rabbis in the United States to check it out, and was alarmed."

That same day, before the lesson, his confidants say, he was asked why he doesn't either attack Rabbi Shakh for his remarks or come in his defense. The topic of "groundless hatred" was the perfect platform for him to say his peace on the matter.

Academics and scholars of Hasidism recall that since Rabbis Goren and Yosef removed Rabbis Unterman and Nissim from their jobs in "Temple Shlomo," the

Lubavitcher Rebbe has broken off contact and refused to meet with them. "Maybe now," they say, "the injured party has found a way to get even."

Rabbi Yosef himself is not giving any explanations. He sits in his office in Jerusalem and refuses to talk with reporters, as is the custom among Torah sages. His children, too, who generally serve as his outlet to the media, have little to say on the subject. In the final analysis, one of them, former Knesset member Ya'akov Yosef, is close to HABAD.

On the other hand HABAD is at pains to deny the matter. They speak of meetings by rabbis with Rabbi Yosef, in which he said that his remarks had been distorted. Later, they say, Rabbi Yosef said he had only quoted Rabbi Shakh's remarks and had not expressed his own opinion about them.

Haredi members of the Knesset are also getting into it. In the SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim] faction, of which Rabbi Yosef is the patron, they would rather not respond to the remarks, and even say that Interior Minister Arye Dar'i is trying to persuade Rabbi Yosef to publish a statement moderating his remarks. Rabbi Yosef's associates: "The ball is now in the Lubavitcher Rebbe's court; he has to apologize. He is not God or Messiah. Until he makes an unequivocal clarification, Rabbi Yosef will not retract what he said."

Degel Hatorah is at work behind the curtains. From now on Rabbi Shakh, their patron, is no longer in the minority. He has support. Baraqa Wolf: Degel Hatora is continuing on its path to destroy Haredi Judaism and to speak, as it were, in the name of Ovadia Yosef, who does not represent them. They are again making war among the Haredi. They continue in their lowly ways to incite hatred among Jews and to destroy every good holding in Haredi Judaism. After they started a war between the Hasidim and the Litvaks, they are trying to start one between Sephardim and Ashkenazim. They apparently derive special pleasure from that."

The reaction of a Degel Hatora spokesman was: "The party workers and others are too small to affect the opinion of the great Torah sages, especially on subjects as significant and principled as HABAD."

In HABAD they talk about a Jewish-American millionaire who is offering a prize of a million dollars to anyone who can prove that the Lubavitcher Rebbe ever said he was the Messiah or God. Rabbi Yosef: "He not only said it, but the remarks were published black on white, and he said it many years ago already when he ruled his court and was made Admor. The battle, it seems, is not over; it is just beginning."

KUWAIT

Stock Exchange Reopened

44000537 Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English
11 May 89 p 1

[Text] Kuwait, 10 May (Agencies): Kuwait will reopen a parallel stock exchange alongside its official market on 3 June to attract new companies and pep up share trading, Commerce and Industry Minister Faysal 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Khalid said today.

He told reporters the exchange would list companies with capital of at least one million Kuwait dinars (\$3.5 million). Trade would be restricted to the afternoon.

A parallel exchange was originally set up to deal with firms listed on the unofficial Suq al-Manakh market after it crashed in 1982 following a wild spree of speculative buying.

The crash left about \$90 billion in debt and helped to plunge Kuwait into recession.

The parallel market was closed last December after most of its companies had either been liquidated or had transferred to the official exchange when their financial positions improved.

Al-Khalid said about a dozen remaining firms would be allowed to re-register in the new parallel exchange if their financial health was good enough.

Companies on the parallel exchange would eventually be able to transfer to the official market as they grew in size and met its conditions, he said. Likewise, weak firms on the official exchange would be moved to the parallel market.

One share analyst estimated that the financial positions of about 40 per cent of the 44 companies on the official exchange were unsound.

He also said that as many as 300 private companies listed with the Commerce Ministry would theoretically be able to meet the requirements to go public and get quotations on the new exchange.

The new market's opening will coincide with new regulations allowing banks and other financial institutions to issue unit trusts.

The unit trusts, which will be listed on the stock market, will pool together funds from many small investors to invest in securities.

A large portion of the trust funds will have to be invested locally. The government hopes their managers will encourage new companies to float their shares and gain stock market listings.

Al-Khalid expressed hope that the base of dealers will be broadened, particularly after the GCC [Gulf Corporation Council] citizens have been permitted to own Kuwaiti shares in compliance with the new regulations.

Gulf companies, which were removed from the market for not completing their financial statements, can be subject to the new regulations of the parallel market.

A large number of such companies that were able to ameliorate their financial status will rejoin the market, he said, stressing that such plans are aimed at serving long-term strategies.

LIBYA

Renewed Economic Cooperation With Libya

34190219z Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
15 Mar 89 p 11

[Article by Djib Diedhiou: "Bilateral Cooperation Off to a New Start"]

[Text] The official working visit to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was successful and President Abdou Diouf returned with the instruments needed to revive cooperation between the two countries in all fields. The Senegalese chief of state expressed his satisfaction to the Jamahiriya Arab National Agency (JANA), saying he had been impressed by Libyan achievements and that he was happy with the agreement he had reached with Colonel al-Qadhafi on African and international policy. The essential issue for him, above and beyond their friendship, is the mutual commitment to ensure continuity for the results of this visit through ministers, the joint high commission, and ambassadors.

In the cultural field, the 1976 accord is to be renewed. While awaiting the first session of the joint commission planned for the latter half of this year, Senegal and Libya intend to have youth exchanges and organize cultural weeks in both countries. Our country also proposed that its partner participate in furthering the mission of the Islamic Institute in Dakar in connection with the literacy center and Arabic language training. Libya promised to send a delegation of experts to Senegal and expressed a desire to open an Arab cultural center in your [sic] capital to spread Arab culture and bring our two peoples closer together. Regarding the problem of the equivalency of high school and university diplomas, raised during the discussions, the solution will be left up to the next meeting of the joint commission.

Cooperation between Senegal and Libya will be developed in the field of communications, particularly through exchanges of reporters, documentaries on Islam and other subjects, and radio and television broadcasts.

Dissemination of a special media program on the occasion of the independence celebration of either country is also included in the agreement. Libya also wishes to set

up a relay station for radiobroadcasting in Senegal. This point will be studied by Senegalese authorities.

Exchanges and information will also involve the field of education, specifically educational systems used, programs, and textbooks. Dakar brought up the possibility of sending teachers to be trained in Libya. On this point, Tripoli agreed to begin hosting trainees as soon as possible. Through their respective official institutions, the two countries are determined to strengthen cooperation in technical and professional training. Youth exchanges, bilateral sports relations involving respective experiences, and the role of women in the process of social development and industrial and handicrafts advancement will henceforth be included in the program of cooperation between the two countries.

Libya intends to propose the creation of a Libyan and Senegalese company (an investment holding) and a Senegalese-Libyan bank. For its part, Senegal informed Libya of the process of reorganizing its banking system now underway. Regarding commercial trade, each country will have to draw up a list of potential products and exchange information and experiences in the field. In addition, both countries must participate in fairs and expositions organized by the other partner.

It is the Senegalese-Libyan joint high commission that will be responsible for ensuring the application of all conventional provisions. An agreement setting it up was signed yesterday in Benghazi. For the purpose of "promoting and developing cooperation in the economic, scientific, commercial, cultural, and social fields and thereby strengthen friendship and solidarity between the two peoples and speed up their economic development, the commission will meet every 2 years, alternating between Senegal and Libya. A special meeting may be called by either party deeming it necessary.

OMAN

Industrial Standardization Discussed

44040401A Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic
21 Mar 89 pp 3-12

[Article by 'Abd Allah Hassan]

[Excerpts] The fourth training session on metrology was inaugurated at the 'Uman Sheraton yesterday morning under the auspices of His Excellency Salim ibn 'Abd Allah Al-Ghazali, minister of commerce and industry. The conference was sponsored by the Standards and Measures Organization of Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] States in cooperation with the ministry of commerce and industry and the 'Uman Chamber of Commerce & Industry representing the Federation of Arab Gulf Chambers.

The week-long session is attended by 93 delegates from GCC countries as well as by several officials of the

ministry of commerce and industry and of the General Directorate For Standards and Measures. [passage omitted]

Minister al-Ghazali said that the sultanate, which believes in cooperation and the exchange of expertise in this important and vital field has, since the onset of its blessed regime of renaissance, expeditiously joined several organizations and institutions. Among them are the International Metrological Association, the International Association for Legal Metrology, the Arab Organization for Standards and Measures, the Standards and Measures Organization of GCC States, etc. The sultanate enjoys close relations with many national agencies for weights and measures all over the world and exchanges with them information and expertise in all fields of metrology. Because of that and because of its keen desire to catch up with scientific and technological advances, the Sultanate became interested in metrology in the mid-seventies. The Department of Industry's testing laboratory was a modest beginning in 1973. When the ministry of commerce and industry was created, His Majesty the Sultan, may God keep him, issued two royal decrees creating the ministry's Department of Standards and Measures and defining its competence as the national agency responsible for all metrological matters in the sultanate.

Since then, the department's continual development and progress has been considerable. It is now capable of dealing with all aspects of metrology and has issued 76 Omani standards and specifications for all kinds of commodities and goods. Uniform Gulf standards are also recognized and observed. The department, in observance of the annual plan, inspects domestic plants and culls production samples for testing at the central government laboratory to assure conformity to standards. The department's laboratories have advanced noticeably and are now capable of the various tests and analyses required to ensure compliance. Two new facilities for testing household appliances and construction material are being added under the third, and current, stage.

The minister of commerce and industry said in conclusion that the Standards and Measures Organization for GCC States, by sponsoring the training session for the fourth time, has underscored the emphasis it places on all aspects of the metrological training necessary to create Arab and Gulf cadres qualified in this field. Holding the session for the fourth time is definite proof of the success and accomplishments of the three preceding sessions whose positive impact is manifested in the knowledge and expertise, scientific as well as empirical, acquired in various fields of metrology.

Dr Khalid Ibn-Yusif al-Khalaf, secretary general of the Standards and Measures Organization for GCC States, said in his remarks: "It is my pleasure at the opening of the fourth training session on metrology to welcome all of you. My appreciation and thanks to the minister of commerce and industry in the Sultanate of Oman for

extending his auspices to this session and providing the facilities necessary for its success. My thanks also to officials of the ministry of commerce and industry, the Department of Standards and Measures, the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and other Omani institutions that participate in the work and activities of the Organization. I must, at this time, state for the record that the sultanate has completed all metrological projects assigned to it under the Organization's three plans. It is also classifying and translating them into English. It is always responsive with constructive suggestions and feedback on projected standards initiated by the organization.

"By holding the session in Oman, the organization accomplishes the goal of regularly holding training sessions in one of the GCC states. Sessions have been held in four states so far—the first in Saudi Arabia, the second in Bahrain, the third in Kuwait, and now the fourth in Oman. This is in addition to specialized sessions in which GCC states also participate. This way we can reach a number of goals as well as raise performance levels, improve execution, and increase metrological awareness. The sessions also help metrologists in various GCC states get better acquainted, thereby fostering links, exchanging experiences, and standardizing methods. This makes it possible to utilize the capabilities of GCC states in integrated ways and in harmony with the GCC goal of complementarity and integration in all fields."

Dr Khalid al-Khalaf added: "The organization has, since its inception, endeavored by all possible means to work towards integration. Luckily, its field of work gives it a lot of opportunity. Metrology, as you know, is basically an effective tool for integration. Domestically, it helps coordinate national industries by removing conflicts and establishing uniform foundations. It also serves as a framework for coordinating imports with domestic industry. Generally, it subjects the national economy as a whole to the principles of integration. We can confidently say that metrology can, on the regional level, translate the supreme desire for regional cooperation into actual fact by providing a foundation on which to take empirical measures to bring about integration and coordination in various sectors.

"With that in mind, the organization has operated on several levels. It has focused on creating uniform measures and standards. Its responsibilities quickly got it involved in the operational aspects of resolving problems common to GCC states. It adopted a compliance certification system for imported automobiles and is currently working to link test laboratories and to establish uniform standards for quality control. It devised a system for the exchange of data on non-complying goods, especially ones exposed to radioactivity, utilizing a state-of-the-art data center based on an advanced computer. Moreover, this center is gradually developing into a regional reference center that provides GCC countries with the latest on metrology and related sciences. All

interested organizations in GCC countries, whether in private or public sectors, may tap the center's services for a nominal fee.

"I could enumerate many more examples of the organization's accomplishments in fostering the spirit of cooperation among concerned agencies, but nothing is more indicative of that than the cooperation needed to organize a session such as this. It is obvious from the agenda that the organization received appreciated assistance from various concerned agencies, even with fiscal and administrative burdens as well as facilities.

"In this regard, I would like to extend special thanks to the Oman ministry of commerce and industry, to the Oman chamber of commerce and industry, and all other Omani agencies and institutions that helped with this session in one way or another.

His Excellency Maqbul Ibn 'Ali Sultan, president of the Oman chamber of commerce and industry, also spoke to welcome the attendees at the week-long fourth training session on metrology, held at the Oman chamber of commerce and industry headquarters and sponsored by the Standards and Measures Organization of GCC States in cooperation with the ministry of commerce and industry and the chamber.

He said: "It is my pleasure, on behalf of the chamber's directors, to welcome this select group of metrological experts and specialists from Oman and its sister GCC countries. We are convinced that this training session will accomplish its stated purposes in the field of metrology and in fostering the ties of friendship, cooperation, and exchange of expertise among the brethren sons of the Gulf fatherland during this important stage as we seek complementarity in all its economic and social aspects."

The president of the chamber added: "In this modern Omani renaissance led by His Majesty Sultan Qabus Ibn-Sa'id, may God protect him and his benign government, our country is attentive to the issue of industrial standards and measures that must be observed by industrial producers. It created for that purpose an agency for Omani measures and standards to assure quality and protect both producer and consumer. The agency's services are available to development sectors.

"The Oman chamber of commerce and industry is diligent in safeguarding the national economy, in ensuring compliance with metrological standards by institutions and factories of the private sector, and in assuring the efficiency, quality, and high standards that give production a strong competitive position in the marketplace. Participation by the chamber and the Omani private sector in this session is proof of that."

He said that holding a training session in this vital field in Muscat is in line with the importance placed by the chamber on training and qualifying national cadres to

play a role in production, take responsibility for development goals, and confidently and ably safeguard the great accomplishments already attained.

Session coordinator Nabil al-Mullah then surveyed the session's objectives and its agenda which included a program of lectures and discussions as well as field visits to select factories and historical sites in the sultanate.

After a brief break, the session began with a lecture on metrology, principles and objectives by Kamal Hasan-ayn Shihatah of the ministry of commerce. 'Abd-al-Muhsin Muhammad Al-Yusif gave another lecture on the various levels of metrology and the role of Arab, regional, and international organizations concerned with metrology. Session coordinator Nabil Ibn Amin Al-Mallah, of the Standards and Measures Organization of GCC States, also lectured on that institution.

The fourth training session on metrology will resume this evening at chamber of commerce headquarters. 'Abd Allah Ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Hammudi, of the Standards and Measures Organization of GCC States, is scheduled to lecture on metrological terms. Dr. 'Ata Muhammad al-Baz of the ministry of commerce and industry will also lecture on the role of test laboratories in defining standards and measures. A number of participants will then submit papers on metrology in each of the organization's member states.

SAUDI ARABIA

France Offers Telecommunications Cooperation

44000532 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English
30 May 89 p 2

[Article by Javid Hassan]

[Text] Riyadh, May 29—Crown Prince 'Abdullah, deputy premier and commander of the National Guard, received in Jeddah today French External Trade Minister M. Jean-Marie Rausch. Commerce Minister Dr. Sulayman al-Sulayyim and French Ambassador Jacques Berniere were present on the occasion. Rausch arrived in Jeddah from Riyadh today, according to SPA.

Meanwhile, Rausch said telecommunications is one of the areas where France and the Kingdom could cooperate on a mutually beneficial basis.

He was speaking at a news conference here last night organized during a reception held in his honor at the residence [of] Ambassador Berniere. Minister of Industry and Electricity 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Zamil, Dr. Sulayyim, Governor of SAMA Hamad al-Sayyar and a large number of invites from the public and private sector as well as from the French Embassy were among those present.

Dwelling on the scope for joint venture in telecommunications, the minister said: "There is a lot of potential

in the field of telephones, not from a qualitative point of view, since the Saudi telephone network is very good, but from a quantitative point of view. There is a large market here. The number of phone lines is set for expansion in the years to come. This field of communication is very bouyant and I wish we could do something together," the minister said.

Elaborating on the theme, Rausch referred to the French firm Alcatel's plan to set up a plant for E 10 digital switching in the Kingdom. This plant, when in operation, will not only supply the Saudi market but also the neighboring nine Islamic states, where the E 10 is already present.

Answering a question on the prospects of a trade agreement between the EEC and the GCC [Gulf Corporation Council] countries, the minister said: "We should take advantage of the French presidency of the EEC starting next July to give the EEC Commission the task of negotiating a large exchange zone."

On bilateral trade, the minister said the volume of trade has shrunk, though the balance was still in favor of the Kingdom. "Since the crude oil prices have bounced back to a more reasonable level and the Kingdom will be able to undertake big investments in future, we hope to participate in any such venture.

Al-Zamil said this morning that France is the sixth biggest supplier of the Kingdom and that it should endeavor to overtake others. I hope we should do something in this regard," the minister pointed out.

The determination to do better was also the dominant theme at the two-day conference of French commercial attaches and economic advisers from the GCC states which concluded at the Riyadh Intercontinental today. The commercial attaches took stock of the situation which has seen French exports to the Kingdom stabilize at \$1.2 billion during the last two years, making France the sixth biggest trading partner of the Kingdom after Japan, the United States, West Germany, Britain and Italy.

Summing up the discussions at the conference, Philippe Duchemin and Claude Loreau, the participants, told ARAB NEWS that one of the decisions was to activate the Saudi-French joint committee consisting of the businessmen on both sides. They said the future thrust of the trade promotion drive will concentrate on organizing more trade missions to the Gulf states, inviting businessmen from the Gulf to visit France, as well as participation in trade fairs.

The delegates expressed concern that the benefits of France's excellent relations with the Kingdom and other Gulf states had not percolated to the level of its trade with those countries and called for an aggressive strategy to reverse the trend. Exploring the possibility of joint ventures, especially in technology transfer, industry,

pharmaceuticals, water treatment and glass manufacture, was also mooted at the conference, whose recommendations will be passed on to the French Government.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Cultural Agreement To Be Signed With China
44000530 *Dubayy GULF NEWS in English*
17 May 89 p 3

[Article by Muhammad 'Uthman]

[Text] Abu Dhabi—The first steps towards formulating a cultural cooperation agreement between the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and the Peoples Republic of China were taken yesterday following the submission of draft agreement to be studied by both parties. The agreement is expected to be signed during the visit of the UAE Minister of Information and Culture to China.

Liu Deyou, the Chinese deputy minister of culture, said that his talks with Information and Culture Minister Shaykh Ahmad Ibn-Hamid dealt comprehensively with the issue and that he has extended an invitation to Shaykh Ahmad from the Chinese Minister of Culture to visit China.

He said that Shaykh Ahmad accepted the invitation and the date will be fixed later. The Minister is expected to sign the agreement when he visits China.

The Chinese official, speaking exclusively to GULF NEWS said that this agreement would further strengthen and enhance the already established relations between the two countries, as both nations are willing to further develop bilateral relations.

He said that both the UAE and China are of an ancient civilisation and history and that relations could be traced back to centuries-old contacts in various fields.

"The bilateral exchange was there before the establishment of diplomatic ties, and this agreement, which completely conforms with the interests of both nations' people, will boost ties between the UAE and China.

The Chinese official hailed the role of the President, His Highness Skaykh Zayid Ibn-Sultan Al Nuhayyan and the achievements under his leadership which have made the UAE one of the top countries in the world in terms of individual income.

He also praised the country's internal and foreign policies. "We have great respect for Shaykh Zayid's policies for the protection of international peace and his support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people and his advocacy of peaceful solutions to the Middle East problem," he said.

Referring to the current visit of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Russian leader, to China, he said that he believed the visit is important for normalising relations between the two countries and that the exchange of visits would lead to this goal.

"The normalisation of relations is far better than the use of guns," he added.

He said that the normalisation of relations is something common between the two people of the two countries and conformed with international trends at present.

However, he commented that to whatever extent the normalisation goes, the relation would never be the same as it was in the '50s because the world is changing.

Asked about the student movements' protests in China, he said he agreed on starting a dialogue between the students and officials as it will lead to a deepened understanding.

He explained that at present, China is working for building the country, that internal stability is very important.

Statistics Show Increase in Abu Dhabi Trade
44000531 *Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English*
2 May 89 p 15

[Text] The Abu Dhabi emirate's trade rebounded last year with increases in imports, exports and re-exports.

While imports rose by 19 percent, non-oil exports were up 26.7 percent and re-exports by a sharper 50.3 percent, says the Abu Dhabi chamber in its annual report for 1988.

Imports stood at Dh6.7 billion, Dh1.1 billion above the 1987 level of Dh5.6 billion.... Imports have been steady since 1985.

Imports by sea rose half a billion dirhams to Dh3.7 billion. A similar income was noticed in overland trade to Dh1.6 billion. The figure includes imports by air which rose 21 percent to Dh1.4 billion.

Machinery and transport equipment accounted almost half the imports with a bill of Dh3.3 billion, due to a 47.2 percent increase in trade. The second group was manufactured goods. Food and livestock came third.

In exports, locally-manufactured goods' share in the overall increase was less than one percent. Total exports stood at Dh636.4 million, up Dh134 million over 1987. This increase came from surface exports which stood at Dh626.9 million while exports by sea dropped further to Dh8.2 million.

Manufactured goods classified as material topped exports at Dh241.2 million or 40 percent of the total. Chemicals' share was 17.6 percent bigger at Dh112 million.

Re-exports improved both in terms of weight and value. The former rose by 22 percent to 395,000 tonnes with trade by land rising to 365,400 tonnes from 264,000 tonnes.

In value terms, the expansion was sharper. Re-exports rose 50.3 percent taking the total to Dh2.1 billion. This increase has also occurred in surface exports.

If oil export is excluded, the emirate's trade witnessed a new boom after the trade began to fall from the peak of early eighties during the past recessionary years.

The emirate had trade with more than 100 countries and exchanged some 2.1 million tonnes of goods worth Dh9.1 billion. This was an increase of 25 percent over the previous year.

The UK topped the exporters to Abu Dhabi (Dh985 million, up from Dh811 million), followed by the US (Dh908 million against Dh529 million) and Japan (Dh828 million), West Germany (Dh721 million), Saudi Arabia (DhDh441 million).

The other important trade partners were Italy, France, Holland, Lebanon and Qatar.

Japan was the top buyer of oil followed by France, Holland, Italy, Pakistan, India, Kenya, Singapore and Portugal.

The chamber noted that the emirate will reap rich dividends from Gulf peace. "All indicators suggest that 1988 represented the beginning of new era for the emirate's economy after many years of recession," it said.

"In spite of the fact that the crude oil sector is considered pivotal of the economy of the Abu Dhabi emirate, it is noticeable that the non-petroleum sector witnessed tangible expansion in the past few years," the chamber said.

BHUTAN

Nation Said Moving Toward Self-Reliance
46000146 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
17 May 89 p 7

[Text] Thimphu, 16 May—The ancient Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan is quietly easing its way out of the shadow of its giant neighbour India.

As it moves increasingly but cautiously into the modern world, Bhutan's aim is self-reliance and the highest standard of living in South Asia.

Bhutanese officials and foreign residents said in recent interviews that Bhutan was pursuing its goals with a combination of strong measures to preserve traditional culture and a gradual expansion of foreign ties.

It is also reducing significantly the number of Indians working in the country.

Under a 1949 treaty with India, which replaced a similar agreement with Britain, New Delhi undertook not to interfere in Bhutan's internal administration while Bhutan agreed to be guided by India in its external relations.

Bhutan, under 33-year-old King Jigme Singye Wangchuk, is treading carefully as it watches similarly landlocked Nepal embroiled in a trade and transit dispute with New Delhi.

India remains the Kingdom's biggest trade partner and aid donor but Bhutan has steadily diversified to other sources and uses teachers from European and Japanese volunteer organisations.

Hindi, India's main language, was replaced in the 1960s by English as Bhutan's language of education.

Once 99 percent of Bhutan's civil servants were expatriates, mainly Indians, according to Dasho Sonam Topgye, Secretary of the Royal Civil Service Commission. Today 77 percent are Bhutanese.

In order to meet an acute shortage and to replace expatriates, the commission is giving priority to training Bhutanese engineers, teachers and doctors, he said.

A satellite earth station under construction with Japanese assistance will allow Bhutan to bypass India in its international telecommunications links for the first time.

Bhutan does not trade with China, its neighbour to the north, but holds annual discussions with Beijing on the unresolved demarcation of their mountain border.

There is another sign of emerging Bhutanese independence in its foreign affairs—Indian officials do not attend the meetings, as they could under the treaty.

"The demarcation could be solved in half an hour, but the talks with Beijing are a convenient opportunity to discuss other subjects," a western resident said.

"Bhutan is being very careful to remain on good terms with India and to preserve correct relations with China, and is taking measures to strengthen its national unity," he said.

The other strand of Bhutan's development is the preservation of its culture, in which the state religion, a branch of Mahayana Buddhism, plays a central role.

To protect the traditional way of life, the government has imposed restrictions to prevent what officials see as the ravages tourism has inflicted on Nepal.

Under a new decree, all 1.3 million Bhutanese must wear national dress in public or risk a fine or one week in jail.

Since most Bhutanese men always wear the Kho, a robe hitched up by a sash at the waist, and women the ankle length Kira, the decree is hardly noticed, but its symbolism is strong.

The doubling to 250 dollars of the daily minimum charge for each tourist has reduced the flow of overseas visitors to 2,000 a year, but more could be on the way.

And the means are more evidence of Bhutan's decreasing dependence on India.

The national airline Druk-Air has opened a route to Bangkok with its new and only jet aircraft. All other tourists arrive via India.

Managing Director Ugyen Namgye said he was discussing with Thai and Nepali airlines plans to introduce a "three Kingdoms" package that could increase the number of tourists to Bhutan to 4,000-5,000 a year.

With a per capita gross national product of 160 dollars a year, Bhutan, which is about the size of Switzerland and has a population estimated at 1.3 million, is classified by the United Nations as one of the world's poorest countries.

The figure is misleading because Bhutan's predominantly agricultural economy is largely unmonetised. Virtually every Bhutanese family owns land and produce is bartered. No beggars are to be seen.

"Gross national happiness is more important to us than GNP [gross national product]," said Finance Ministry official Chambula Dorji.—Reuter

IRAN

Khorasan Company To Trade With USSR *46000143a Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL* *in English 1 May 89 p 6*

[Article: "Khorasan Group To Trade With USSR"]

[Text] Mashhad, April 30 (IRNA)—Industrial and agricultural products from Khorasan Province will be displayed at the Baku Trade Fair, Soviet Azerbaijan, in the next two months.

An official from the Khorasan Exports Company, a member of the Irano-Soviet Joint Chamber of Commerce, also said today the company was expecting a trade visit by a Soviet delegation from Tadzhikistan on border trade exchanges. The official said talks had been held with Soviet officials to prepare the ground for an agreement with several commercial firms in Soviet Turkmenia.

Iran exports foodstuffs, dried fruits, medical herbs, shoes, textiles and clothes to the Soviet Union in return for wood, industrial and agricultural machinery, motor-cycle parts, chemical fertilizer, insecticide, sugar, electric motor and iron plates.

Khorasan Exports Company was founded two years ago with a capital of rials 100 million (\$1.4m), which has grown to rials 300 million (\$4.2m).

It is now busy in export-import activities with European and Persian Gulf countries.

Financial Agreement Signed With Romania *46000143b Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL* *in English 14 May 89 p 6*

[Article: "Iran-Romania Sign Agreement"]

[Text] Tehran, May 13 (IRNA)—A note of understanding on financial and banking cooperation between Iran and Romania was signed in Bucharest Friday. The agreement was reached at the end of a five-day visit to Romania by Iran's Central Bank Governor Majid Qassemi, reports reaching here said.

Meanwhile, Qassemi met with the Romanian Prime Minister Constantin Dascalescu Thursday and delivered Prime Minister Hussein Musavi's message to him. During the meeting, the Romanian premier informed Qassemi that he has accepted Musavi's invitation to visit the Islamic Republic.

Foreign Exchange Budget of Government Offices Approved

46400077 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Mar 89 p 8

[Text] On 27 Esfand 1367 [18 Mar 1989] the open session of Majles was held under the chairmanship of Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

In these sessions articles of the bill for the 1368 [21 Mar 1988-20 Mar 1989] budget year and sub-articles attached to these articles were studied and discussed. Some deputies offered corrective suggestions for these articles and sub-articles. After pro and con speeches and explanations offered by the reporter of the Planning and Budget Commission and ministers of Petroleum, Energy and Construction Jihad they were passed.

The studied sub-articles attached to Article 29 and Articles 33 through 39 are as follows:

14. In order to expedite the completion of the country's fundamental investments and to restore the missing industrial links and for the implementation of the said plans per table number 6 by appropriate executive organizations—at the most until the end of 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992]—Bank-e Markazi [Central Bank] of the Islamic Republic is given permission to institute commitments in the framework of the determined ceiling and act in a way that, in addition to completion of the plan within the agreed time table, the repayment of the financial commitment shall begin at least one year after inauguration of the unit and in five-year installments. Bank-e Markazi of the Islamic Republic is duty bound to provide necessary guarantees to ensure the conclusion of agreements between the beneficent organs and sellers. Also, in preparation of financial agreements for repayment installments, the bank shall act so that the annual payments towards the initiated commitments do not exceed two hundred million dollars. The cost of these liabilities shall be provided from savings or foreign exchange earnings of the said projects which shall be included in the annual budgets.

Executive guidelines for this article shall be prepared by Bank-e Markazi of the Islamic Republic within two months and shall be approved by the Foreign Exchange Allocation Commission.

15. All companies and governmental associations, including companies and governmental organizations that applicability of laws and public regulations warrants mentioning of their names and also all importers who take advantage of government exchange [rates] and all exporters are obligated to conduct all their foreign exchange receiving and paying transactions solely through Bank-e Markazi of the Islamic Republic or one of the authorized banks recognized by the said bank. Lack of compliance with the letter of this article constitutes unlawful possession of governmental funds and assets.

16. The Ministry of Petroleum is duty bound to submit—by the fifth day of each month—monthly reports on the sale of oil and the resulting earned income and monthly, bimonthly and quarterly forecasts for the sale of oil to the Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee and Petroleum, Planning and Budget, Trade, Economic Affairs and Treasury commissions of Majles.

17. The Self-Sacrificers Foundation [formerly Foundation of the Oppressed] of the Islamic Republic is permitted to allocate 40 million dollars earned from the export activities of this foundation for completion and reinstatement of incomplete investment plans.

18. In order to strengthen and equip the country's universities, research centers and institutes for higher education, the sum of 80 million dollars has been allocated for Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Education. Two-thirds of the said amount shall be allocated to the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and the remaining one-third shall be put at the disposal of the Ministry of Health Treatment and Medical Education.

19. The sum of 10 million dollars from other foreign exchange allocations shall be marked for the purchase of pipes, equipment and basic material for safe drinking water pipe-laying for villages across the country. This money shall be put at the disposal of Ministry of Health Treatment and Medical Education.

20. The sum of 10 million dollars from other foreign exchange allocations shall be marked for the purchase of basic polyethylene material and other necessities for water distribution for villages across the country. This money shall be put at the disposal of the Construction Jihad.

21. Bank-e Markazi of the Islamic Republic is duty bound to prepare and present quarterly reports to the Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee and Planning and Budget Commission of the Majles on the use and application of this article as separated per above mentioned sub-articles of tables regarding subjects in section nine.

22. Executive guidelines for various sub-articles of this article shall be prepared by Bank-e Markazi of the Islamic Republic. After approval by the Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee, they shall be announced for implementation. At 12:20 p.m. the open session of the Majles went into recess.

Report Of The Afternoon Session

The open session of Majles chaired by Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani was held yesterday afternoon.

At the beginning of this session the foreign exchange allocation tables of article 29 were put forth for discussion. Some deputies recommended corrective suggestions and additions to these foreign exchange credit tables of governmental organization. After the speeches of the reporter of Planning and Budget Commission and government's representative and pro and con speeches, tables of article 29 and also articles 33 through 39 of the budget bill were passed as follows:

1. The Foundation of Self-Sacrificers of the Islamic Republic is permitted to allocate 40 million dollars from its export activities to be spent on completion and initiation of its incomplete investment plans.

2. The sum of 20 million dollars shall be appropriated to provide basic polyethylene material, to purchase other necessities and to purchase pipes, equipment and basic material for pipe-laying for safe drinking water and water distribution for villages across the country.

3. Permission is granted so that all phases of agreements for transfer of technology shall be conducted solely by and under the jurisdiction of responsible specialized ministries and without the need for studies by centers of appropriation and distribution. The said centers are duty bound to uphold all points in signed agreements.

4. The Communication Company of Iran is permitted to spend its foreign exchange earnings from export of manufactured goods and offering communication services on necessary communication equipment needed by this company.

5. The sum of 50 million dollars shall be deducted from the foreign exchange allocated for services. Twenty-five million dollars shall be spent on the purchase of spare parts and another 25 million dollars shall be allocated for the purchase of road construction and maintenance equipment for roads of the deprived sectors.

6. The sum of 10 million dollars from the ceiling of production plans and 10 million dollars from other reconstruction plans shall be deducted and 20 million dollars shall be added to the foreign exchange ceiling of article 3

7. The sum of 29 million dollars from the sale of oil credits shall be put at the disposal of the ministry of Energy for electric power and agricultural wells in the villages.

8. The sum of 5 million dollars shall be allocated for the drinking water plan for the villages of Zabol. The sum of 2.5 million dollars shall be allocated for drinking water for the city of Zabol and the sum of 2.5 million dollars shall be allocated for the sewage plan for the city of Zabol.

9. The sum of 100 million dollars shall be collected from all plans, services and essential goods and shall be put at the disposal of the Prime Ministry.

10. The required foreign exchange for reconstruction of communication plans shall increase from 21 million dollars to a minimum of 40 million dollars.

11. The sum of 150 million dollars shall be allocated for hygienic, clinical and hospital plans and shall be put at the disposal of the Ministry of Health Treatment and Medical Education.

12. The name of the iron ore mine at Chogart shall be added to the list of Ahvaz steel, Navard-Kavian and smelting plant of the Steel Mill.

13. Cutting equipment 60 million dollars, wood and paper of Mazandaran 120 million dollars, paper manufacturing from agricultural waste 45 million dollars, compressor 50 million dollars, transformer 50 million dollars, construction of the float in Babolsar 10 million dollars, digital telephone 40 million dollars, Gamma Ray, 6 million dollars, Melamine [plastic] crystal 20 million dollars.

14. Increases to any one of the contents of table number 2 of the section 9 of this bill may be allowed, per suggestion of the Foreign Exchange Allocation Committee and approval of the cabinet, up to 10 percent and provided from reductions in the sum of other contents of this table.

Review of Budget Articles Continued

The Majles, then, continued the review of other articles of the 1368 [21 Mar 1989-20 Mar 1990] budget bill and suggestions of omissions and corrections in certain articles were presented. After pro and con speeches and explanations by the reporter of planning and budget commission and government representative, the following articles were reviewed and amended.

Sub-article 33- From the beginning of the year 1368;

A. Sub-article 86 of 1362 [21 Mar 1983-20 Mar 1984] the budget law shall be corrected as follows:

The Communication Company of Iran must deposit 11 billion rials—from the earned income from subscription of automatic telephones and cost of international communication services (overseas calls, telex services, overseas telegrams and special non-governmental circuits)—as additional taxes to the general earnings account of the country, item number 151100 of the third part of this law. At least one-twelfth of this amount shall be deposited by the end of each month.

Taxes on the earned income of the said company will be calculated in accordance with appropriate regulations and after the deductions according to the letter of this article.

B. In article 87 of the 1362 [21 Mar 1983-20 Mar 1984] budget law, the phrase "14 rials per liter" shall change to "70 rials per liter" and the phrase "4 rials per bottle" shall change to "20 rials per bottle."

C. All industrially manufactured fruit juices, per ministry of industry's certification, are exempted from 50 percent of the taxes as mentioned in sub-article B of this article.

D. Ministry of Commerce is duty bound to charge real or legal persons to issue a new or annual renewal of trading license per the following table and deposit the amount in the general earnings account of the country under article number 419938, the third section of this law.

1. To issue new trading license: 500 thousand rials

2. For annual renewal of trading license: 800 thousand rials

3. To issue temporary cards: 100 thousand rials

E. The government is duty bound to charge all passengers with regular passports wishing to travel abroad (except those traveling by air) a sum of 50,000 rials and deposit it in the general earnings account of the country under article number 593000, the third section of this law.

F. Estimates mentioned in sub-article "A" of article 90 of the 1362 budget law, the subject of "tariffs for registration of documents," for the year 1368 shall change from 15 per thousand to 30 per thousand and from 20 per thousand to 50 per thousand.

G. All sums for "registration" under the subject of articles A, B, C, D and E of article 77 of the 1363 [21 Mar 1984-20 Mar 1985] budget law shall be changed for 1368 by 25 percent.

The Records and Land Registration Organization of the country is duty bound to charge, in addition to 15 per thousand mentioned in section 3 of the line item correction and deletion law of the document and property registration law passed in 1310 [21 Mar 1931-20 Mar 1932] and its subsequent correction—passed 1365/4/31 [22 Jun 1986] by the Majles—the equivalent of 35 per thousand shall also be charged to the applicants on the basis of the aforesaid article and deposited in the general earnings account of the country, item number 410102 of the third section of the said law.

Sub-article 34- Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Training, Construction Jihad, Energy, Petroleum, Trade,

Defense and Revolution Guards and companies, organizations and units attached to the aforesaid ministries and also seven-member land delegations are duty bound to provide the Iran Center for Statistics with all the required personnel and facilities to conduct the general agricultural census for the year 1368 [21 Mar 1989-20 Mar 1990] the cost of which shall be covered by the aforesaid ministries and organizations.

Sub-article 35-1. Public Prosecutor's Office of the country, all executive organs and judicial sources are duty bound:

a. All domestic currency and foreign exchange and also gold coins and bullion and jewels which are discovered and confiscated as smuggled items, until definite decision is made, shall be transferred by judicial authorities—without any change in their state—along with appropriate reports which will be signed by representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the minister of Treasury and Economic Affairs to the Bank-e Markazi of the Islamic Republic and, in provinces, to the Bank Melli Iran. Currencies aforementioned in this article shall be deposited in special accounts opened or to be opened specifically for this purpose by the treasury in the Bank-e Markazi of the Islamic Republic.

b. Money gained from the sale of abandoned goods belonging to the government, confiscated goods which are proven to be smuggled by the private sector, smuggled goods of unknown ownership or owned by fugitives and, also, goods and properties that are confiscated as a result of verdicts and definite orders by appropriate judicial authorities or any decision of authoritative officials and guild union sources resulting in confiscation, repossession, extradition, fines for smuggled goods, speculation, swindling, donation, peace and all other reasons; and also the sums that are the subject of article 82 of the 1362 budget law of the country shall be deposited, without delay and change in state, in a special account opened or to be opened for this purpose by the treasury in Bank-e Markazi of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These sums are to be accounted for in the general earnings of the country subject numbers 410108 and 410111 of the third section of this law.

Also, the aforementioned organizations and authorities are duty bound to transfer all gold coins, bullions, jewels and properties subject of this sub-article and also all possessions and properties that have been possessed or will be possessed by the government for the aforementioned reasons to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance with all pertinent documents signed by the responsible prosecutor and the head of the local office of Economic Affairs and Finance.

c. All sums and possessions of unknown ownership, abandoned, estates without inheritors and all sums and properties under the authority of the Jurisprudent (magistrate) obtained from religious taxes, clearance of obligation and gained as a result of implementation of

principle 49 of the Constitution and other laws—in case general permission is granted—shall be put, separately, at the disposal of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance to be maintained, managed or sold. Cash sums and other incomes resulting from the sale, management or maintenance of the properties subject of this article shall be put at the disposal of the Imam Relief Committee, the Martyr Rajai'i Plan of the Organization for Better Living (including provincial offices,) Foundation for Self-sacrificers and all other organizations authorized by the Jurisprudent.

2. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance is duty bound to sell, in earliest possible time, all goods and properties subject to this sub-article which have been or will be confiscated by the government and also all abandoned goods and photo, recording and transmission equipment and their attachments placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance in accordance with the general guidelines. Earned sums from this—in accordance with the letter of sub-articles 1, 2 and 4 of the law for correction of article 19 of the Smugglers' Law and its subsequent corrections passed 1363/11/19 [8 Jan, 1984]—shall be deposited in the general earnings account of the country subject numbers 410108 and 410111, the third section of this law.

3. Delay or failure to implement the orders aforementioned in this sub-article shall be considered unlawful possession of government funds and property and the public prosecutor shall be responsible to investigate, indict and prosecute through judicial channels.

4. The Public Prosecutor of the country is responsible for proper implementation of this sub-article. The Public Prosecutor of the country and the Minister of Economic Affairs are duty bound to present quarterly reports on the implementation of this sub-article to the commissions of Planning and Budget, Judicial and Economic Affairs and Finance of Majles.

5. Executive guidelines of this sub-article shall be presented by the joint proposal of the Public Prosecutor of the country and the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance within one month after passing of this law and approval by the cabinet.

Sub-article 36- Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance is granted permission, in order to clear some of the government's debts to the National Retirement Fund subject of sub-articles 1 and 2 under article 70 of National Employment Law and in consideration of properties and belongings transferred in implementation of sub-article 23 of the budget laws for the years 1366 [21 Mar 87-20 Mar 88] and 1367 [21 Mar 88-20 Mar 89], to transfer, to the said law, up to a total of 50 billion rials from the properties and belongings subject to article B sub-article 35 of this law.

Executive guidelines of this sub-article in regards to the method of evaluation, transfer of properties and belongings and the way of management and exploitation of those shall be suggested by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and the National Organization for Administrative Affairs and Employment and shall be approved by the cabinet.

Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance shall be responsible for the proper implementation of this sub-article and is duty bound to submit operational reports every four months to the planning and budget commission and employment commission of the Majles.

Sub-article 37- In order to rehabilitate the facilities and common oil platforms of the Persian Gulf in the oil fields of Resalat, Reshadat, Dorud, Foruzan, Hendijan, Siri, Nosrat and reconstruction of crude oil loading platforms in Khark, the Ministry of Petroleum has granted permission to allocate the foreign exchange earnings from the sale of 50,000 barrels of crude oil per day, resulting from the reconstruction of the aforementioned fields, in addition to the average daily production of the year 1367 and, for securing the expenses for rehabilitation of the said fields, act per agreement for the description of exchange services with the Ministry of Planning and Budget.

The Ministry of Petroleum is duty bound to submit operational reports of this sub-article to the Planning and Budget and Oil Commissions of the Majles.

Sub-article 38-1. The Aviation Organization is duty bound to charge each passenger wishing to travel abroad by plane—with tickets purchased with rials inside the country—200,000 rials and deposit this in the the general earnings account item number 592900 of the third section of this law.

Equivalent of the above sum shall be allocated from the credit of plan number 40909209 included in appendix 1 of this law and numbers 148505 and 281005 of the fourth section of this law and after exchange of agreement with the Ministry of Planning and Budget shall be utilized as follows:

A. Twenty five percent shall be put at the disposal of the appropriate executive organ for research and implementation of the "Seventh of Tir" International Airport.

B. Five percent shall be put at the disposal of the National Aviation Organization to equip present airports of the country.

C. Seventy percent shall be put at the disposal of the Islamic Republic Aviation Company for the purchase of airplanes and purchase of preferred foreign exchange from Bank-e Markazi of the Islamic Republic.

Executive guidelines and cases where passengers are exempted from paying the sums subject to article 1 of this

sub-article, per joint recommendation of Ministries of Road and Transport, Planning and Budget and Economic Affairs and Finance, shall be approved by the cabinet.

2. The Islamic Republic Aviation Company and Aseman Company are duty bound to charge passengers wishing to travel inside the country the sum of 1,250 rials and deposit this amount in the general earnings account of the country item number 421900 of the third section of this law.

Sub-article 39- Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and the Urban Land Organization are duty bound to deposit all sums—related to the preparation of presale and transfer of public, residential and commercial properties and plans subject to the Urban Land Law—which has been or will be obtained by them directly, has been or will be earned by companies attached to the said ministry, to the general earnings account of the country item number 419941 of the third section of this law. The credit for number 503090, equivalent to the deposited amounts shall be allocated in the earnings account of the aforementioned number and shall be put at the disposal of the aforesaid ministry to be spent solely on establishing public, profit making, residential and commercial areas in accordance with governing laws and regulations.

The Ministry of Planning and Budget is duty bound to allocate the remaining and unused portion of the credit, subject to this sub-article, which shall be deposited in the general earnings account of the country, to the credit of the year 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991] of the aforesaid item in the budget law of the following year.

At 11:10 am the open session of Majles adjourned and the next session was scheduled for Sunday morning.

PAKISTAN

PPP Seen To Have Tough Times Ahead
46000145a Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
21 May 89 p 4

[Article by Khalid Akhtar: "Will PPP Pass the Test It Faces?"]

[Text] Hard times appear to be ahead for the People's Party and its supporters. The opposing political forces are arraying themselves against the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]. Gradually the stage is being set for the next round of the political battle, the outcome of which, if not decisive, will indeed be crucial for the combatants.

Discontentment

Some sort of hoodoo appears to be hanging over the PPP. It has found itself in the corridors of power when things have been really bad for the country. How Z.A. Bhutto piloted Pakistan to safety through the turbulent

and stormy waters of the early seventies is now a matter of history. Benazir is facing an equally difficult situation. The economic collapse and the constitutional confusion—an offshoot of the Eighth Amendment—restrict her efforts to serve the masses. And that is the one drawback which is hampering her progress badly.

The simmering discontent in the masses due to soaring prices has created an ideal situation for the opposition to exploit. Benazir Bhutto herself said that the next budget will be a tough one. She has been frank and truthful but her warning to the people to be prepared for 'the worst' could cost her some political support—a price too high to pay.

The measures outlined by the Centre to bring some discipline in financial management were long overdue. But they will invite strong reaction from certain quarters. The Federal Government's refusal to meet the deficits incurred by the provinces (again a legitimate, correct and inevitable step) will be considered by Punjab a move against it. Punjab has been incurring huge deficits and this has been partly attributed to its practice of allocating huge sums to the ruling party MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly]s for development work. How far the Centre's refusal to meet the Punjab's recurring deficits will affect the development work in the province remains a matter of conjecture. However, this 'financial squeeze' will limit the Punjab Government's scope of 'appeasing the host of legislators who are not bound together by either strong party affiliations or ideological commitment. Punjab had remained the recipient of 'special treatment' by the late Gen Zia when he ruled the Centre. Nawaz Sharif is finding it a bit difficult to adjust 'his style of rule' to the changed situation.

There is no doubt that the Punjab Government will fix the responsibility for the 'approaching hard economic times' on the Centre and will particularly bring in question the cuts in financial assistance to the provinces. And it remains a possibility that a segment of public opinion, particularly in Punjab, may be carried over by the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] campaign.

There is a view that if the PPP could weather the coming storm and survive the deepening economic crisis it would have overcome its worst phase and could look to the future with a greater degree of confidence and assurance. The opposition realises this and hence its massive preparations for the next encounter with the PPP.

Nawaz Sharif, the IJI Chief, who epitomises both energy and will power, is again on one of his hectic missions to give substance to the opposition campaign. His parleys with Mohammad Khan Junejo, the PML [Pakistan Muslim League] President, have gone reasonably well and the two have been able to effect a 'limited reconciliation,' courtesy the efforts of a 'friend.' There have been contacts with the estranged Arbab Jahangir Khan but these

have not produced any tangible results. There is an old saying that two swords cannot be put in the same scabbard. This is equally true in the case of Arbab Jahangir and Gen Fazle Haq, both vying for the PML presidency of NWFP North-West Frontier Province], with neither willing to accept the supremacy of the other.

Of late the IJI and ANP [Awami National Party] members in the NWFP House have jointly opposed the Treasury Benches on certain issues. Will this trend lead to any meaningful cooperation between the IJI and ANP in the Frontier remains to be seen. However the majority view is that this development for the time being signifies nothing. An ANP leader has already denied any linkage. The by-elections in Chitral and Mansehra scheduled for 22 May have assumed an added significance in the existing circumstances. A set back to the PPP in these polls will give the initiative to the IJI and put Sherpao and his colleagues in a very difficult situation.

But it has been the Sindh scenario that has exposed the PPP to severe criticism by the Opposition which has questioned PPP's ability to rule the country effectively. Its argument is that if the PPP cannot bring back normality to Sindh despite commanding an absolute majority in the province, it cannot be expected to deliver at the Centre or in NWFP where it has ruled by a waferthin majority. The PML Executive Committee meeting came out with a resolution asking the PPP government to quit, forgetting that the Sindh situation was no better when Mohammad Khan Junejo's PML government was ruling the country. The PPP in return has accused Nawaz Sharif of interference in Sindh's affairs.

Blackmailing

Finding the PPP government beset by multitudes of problems, the opposition and the provinces, ruled by parties other than the PPP, have made all kinds of demands on Benazir Bhutto. Nawaz Sharif from Punjab and Akbar Bugti from Baluchistan are talking tough. Then the crackdown against the 'big fish' in the narcotics business has made this powerful and highly influential element of society an enemy of the PPP. The PM [Prime Minister] has responded to the challenge with her usual resoluteness and firmness and said that she would not succumb to blackmail from any quarter. But pressure tactics by interested quarters have assumed an alarming proportion. The government has already apparently retreated on the issue of taxing agricultural income. It will be a hard choice for the government 'whom to spare and whom to tax further' in the budget. The harsh budgetary provisions (they cannot be otherwise) could create an explosive situation.

Needless to say the Opposition will not let this opportunity pass without endeavouring to make capital gain out of it. How the PPP will handle the emerging crisis will determine its survival. Much will depend on Benazir Bhutto's ability to provide some relief to the common

man who has remained the hardcore of the party. The opposition strategy appears to be to force mid-terms polls on the Establishment. It is difficult to predict future political events. However, one thing is certain that if the PPP falters or falls on the defensive in the coming days, the mid-terms polls will become a real probability.

But there have been some other developments which have put the PPP in a somewhat better position in the existing power-equation. In the first place Premier Bhutto and President Ishaq are now showing better understanding than at any earlier stage. This has been a remarkable transformation considering that not long ago a strongly-worded clarification by the President's Office regarding his meetings with political leaders had signalled that their understanding had touched its lowest ebb. Secondly Gen Aslam Beg, the Chief of the Armed Forces, during his recent statements put special emphasis on the armed forces commitment to the democratic order. His statements were probably designed to dispel the impression, if there was any, that the armed forces have any other role to play. This should serve Benazir Bhutto and her PPP well.

Government Criticized for Inaction

46000144b Karachi DAWN in English 23 May 89 p 7

[Text] Most of us must be suffering from agony and frustration, if not utter despair, on seeing a nation drifting aimlessly, a country headed nowhere, a population gripped by a heightened sense of insecurity, a morally bankrupt and callous society hopelessly trapped in an apparently insoluble political and social crisis, awaiting the impending disaster.

Owing to the pace at which things are getting out of hand one has lost track of time and events. So much has happened and is happening. And yet the perspective remains blurred by a deepening sense of unreality about what one sees and feels in regard to the emerging shape of things. The question is: which of the daunting multiplicity of the issues and problems to focus on? The violence and anarchy in Sindh, the robberies that end in gruesome murders, the fate of the MQM-PPP [Muhajir Qaumi Movement-Pakistan People's Party] accord in Sindh or the PPP-ANP [Pakistan People's Party-Awami National Party] understanding in the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province], the senseless killings of one set of students by another, the terrorism in educational institutions or the saga of the never-ending confrontation between the Centre and the provinces of Punjab and Baluchistan (albeit the differences between the Centre and Baluchistan are being discussed at a more mature level)?

The Government which, when criticised for inaction, reminds us of the compromises (without spelling them out) that it has had to make to first come to power and then to sustain its position—but still chose to set up office in Islamabad. Then, there is the strange phenomenon on the economic front where, although the well

published economic indicators are registering higher growth rates, the gulf between the poor and the rich is widening—conveying an impression of an economy doing well while the people are not.

And in the midst of all this uncertainty and confusion there is the People's Programme which impinges on what we euphemistically label, in our context, provincial autonomy. The apparent lack of strength, political will and, some even say, vision, of the Government to tackle the rapidly deteriorating situation, by explaining away everything as the legacy of the last 11 years, can hardly inspire and instil confidence in the rest of the nation.

Most people, save perhaps the politicians, realise that unless the political leadership prepares itself for the awesome task of tackling the various crises, and does not seize this opportunity to lift the nation out of its current dilemma, the very survival of the State of Pakistan will be unduly compromised. This might just be the last opportunity for civilian rule to justify itself.

There are a multitude of contradictions in objectives, demands and aspirations which threaten a civilian government's tenure in office. Power cannot be retained by either simply compromising on issues or by distributing favours as part of the political spoils system. A representative government must demonstrate how its wares are qualitatively different, and better from those of unelected military rulers. The leadership must, therefore, identify the options, based on needs and available resources, and implement them through an appropriately designed institutional framework.

Without preparing the nation for the difficult choices that have to be made, in sharp contrast to what was being expected by the PPP's vote banks and, to date, the almost eerie silence of the Government on these matters, it is difficult to see how the political leadership can face up to the pressures that are being created by the avalanche of expectations.

The central legislature is today packed with feudals and other segments of the ruling elite. There is a lurking suspicion that the nation will continue to be held hostage in terms of their interests and their perceptions on how Pakistan should be run. The Government is certain to find it exceedingly difficult to bring about the changes that have become essential for a more broad-based and egalitarian pattern of development, both in regional and class terms. Consequently, its legitimacy among the poor and in the minority provinces is likely to remain suspect.

The crisis that we are witnessing today is related to the political, social and economic structures. It would be a grave error to view this crisis as administrative in nature and could be resolved by the simple installation into office of a representative government. The crisis will not somehow sort itself out. Those not seeing this and the contradictions building around us are likely to find that they have put themselves, and the nation, in a bigger

mess, if ever there could be one. In a country where politicians are viewed as running the country as a private trading post it is not surprising that there is widespread fear of continuing corruption, continuing contempt for moral and social values and lack of commitment to fundamental social change.

If those facing poverty, hunger and oppression see that the levers of power are being used to develop a society in the interest of a small section and there is no equitable sharing of the costs that will have to be borne to correct the imbalance in the Government's revenues and expenditures, they might start believing Bagehot: "Democracy is the way to give people the greatest illusion of power, while allowing them the smallest amount in reality."

MQM Leader Interviewed on Party, Ethnic Strife
46000145b Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
25 May 89 pp 1, 6

[Interview with "The Muslim" by Anwar Iqbal]

[Text] Islamabad, 23 May—Altaf Hussain of Mohajir Qaumi Movement has said that some people in the ruling party were unhappy with the PPP-MQM [Pakistan People's Party-Muhajir Qaumi Movement] Alliance.

In an exclusive interview with 'The Muslim' he said some leaders in the PPP's Sindh wing belonged to "the extremist camp." They opposed the agreement signed by him and the Prime Minister in December last year because "they want trouble in the province" he said.

The Mohajir leader who was interviewed at his Azizabad residence was harsh in his criticism of "the extremists and anti-democracy forces." But he was careful not to name names when talking about them.

He also avoided talking too much about the Mohajirs and their problems. Instead he linked the problems of Mohajirs with those of "poor Sindhis, Punjabis, Pashtoons, and Baluchs."

He warned the PPP government to be aware of "the conspiracies to bring back dictatorship in the country."

Throughout the interview the Mohajir leader looked uneasy and uncomfortable. Some people outside the MQM claim that Altaf Hussain has been tense ever since he withdrew his ministers from the Sindh government.

Anti-Mohajir politicians say that Altaf Hussain had alienated his community from the rest of the country and that bloodshed could follow.

Altaf Hussain, when asked about this possible bloodshed, said: "Yes, we have warned all sane people in the country of a conspiracy to shed the blood of the Mohajir."

Following is the text of the interview:

Question: Who wants to shed Mohajir blood?

Answer: The extremists. People who were defeated in the elections. For them the only way to gain power is through the back door. They want to create chaos so that there is an excuse to restore dictatorship.

We have warned the PPP. We have warned all political forces in the country. Now it is up to them to make sure that this conspiracy does not succeed.

Question: Some people say that the MQM has alienated Mohajirs from other nationalities. They also talk of Sindhis, Punjabis and Pashtoons getting together against the Mohajirs. Do you accept the responsibility for creating this situation?

Answer: It is wrong to say that other nationalities are getting together against the Mohajirs. Pakistan's politics has always been dominated by the feudal lords. The MQM, for the first in the country's history, has challenged their domination.

We have introduced a new phenomenon. All MQM leaders are from lower middle class. In this modest house in Azizabad, I receive all my guests. Even the foreign dignitaries.

We have scared the old style politicians and the feudals. They are afraid that other people in Pakistan may also follow MQM's example. If similar middle class leadership emerges from other provinces as well, it will finish their domination.

Question: But your style of politics, your decision to confine yourself to Mohajirs, has caused frictions rather than bringing people together. Hasn't it?

Answer: No, it is not true. We have been misunderstood. We have been misinterpreted. We don't want to confine our style of politics to Mohajirs alone. We want similar leadership to emerge in other areas as well.

The forces who don't want to see the poor of this country getting together have given us a parochial image so that we don't appeal to other communities.

Question: You have withdrawn your ministers from the Sindh cabinet, does it mean that your agreement with the PPP is practically over?

Answer: No. We have only withdrawn our ministers. The agreement is still there. But I am sorry to say that the PPP failed to fulfil its promises. PPP's provincial leadership has no desire to do so. Apparently because it is dominated by the extremists.

Question: Will you consider ending your agreement with the PPP if it continues its present attitude?

Answer: PPP is a party which won the confidence of the people like the MQM. It has a majority here in Sindh and the Centre. We believe in people's verdict that's why we signed an agreement with the PPP. Despite difficulties we are not giving up. We want to keep on trying to make PPP fulfil its promises.

Question: Some people say that you are stuck with the PPP. It does not need your help in Sindh because here it has an absolute majority. It needs your support in the Centre. But if you break your agreement with the PPP and help others in the Centre, here in Sindh you will be seen as a party which is trying to sabotage a Sindhi's government in Islamabad. This, the same people say, may cause the massacre of Mohajirs living in interior Sindh. Do you agree with this theory?

Answer: It is our enemies who produce such theories. They are PPP's enemies too. We are not stuck with the PPP. Our agreement with the ruling party was based on principles as I have already explained.

We believe that in the Centre we have a government which represents all the people of Pakistan. It is not a Sindhi's government. Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto was also elected by people of other provinces.

Question: You won unprecedented support from the people of Karachi and Hyderabad in the last elections. This enabled you to enter into an alliance with the ruling party. You had your people inducted in the Sindh cabinet and have your mayors in Karachi and Hyderabad. But people say that this has not benefitted your voters. Would you like to tell us what have you given to the Mohajirs so far?

Answer: We have restored their pride, their identity. Being a Mohajir is no more a curse. But we don't like to talk about what we have given to the Mohajirs and what we have taken from them. It is not a give and take relationship. It is a struggle. Struggle for our rights.

It is correct that we have an agreement with the ruling party but our ministers in the Sindh cabinet were given no power. Similarly, the local governments in Karachi and Hyderabad also have little power. They have very little funds. But we did not use it as an excuse for not working. We sought people's cooperation and with their help we were able to resolve some basic civic problems in Karachi and Hyderabad. We have built new roads, we have constructed new drainage system. We have cleaned the two cities. Karachi has never been so clean before. During the Ramazan we introduced MQM's cooperative shops where we sold consumer goods without any profit. While prices went up during Ramazan everywhere in the country, in Karachi and Hyderabad they went down.

Question: These are minor issues. What about your demands for Mohajirs recognition as the fifth nationality, for the return of Biharis, for the cancellation of quota system?

Answer: We want to promote harmony and peace among different ethnic groups living in Sindh. To achieve this we are pressing for some of our demands at the moment. We decided not to ask for the separation of Karachi from Sindh. We did not ask for a Mohajir province because we did not want to strain our relations with the Sindhis.

Our agreement with the PPP includes articles which guarantee the return of Biharis and the cancellation of quota system. The ruling party has agreed that all Pakistanis living abroad had a right to return to Pakistan. Whether they are living by choice or were forced to do so.

The quota system was to expire in 1983 but the Zia regime extended it for another 10 years.

We have now been assured that it will not be extended beyond 1993.

Question: Does it mean that you have given up most of your major demands?

Answer: We haven't given up any demand. We are struggling for all of them. But as I told you earlier, it is part of the same conspiracy. They want to restrict this new political phenomenon to the Mohajirs. That's why they present MQM with a particular perspective. They want to keep alive the issues that cause chaos and division. Our struggle is peaceful. It is for our genuine rights. But our struggle is shown as directed against other communities. Our demands are exaggerated and explained out of perspective.

Question: Yet you can't deny that all political forces are getting together against the Mohajir, can you?

Answer: Not political forces but the extremists. Earlier this month they had an anti-terrorism conference in Hyderabad. At this conference people like Mr Palejo and Sarwar Awan spoke from the same platform. I wish somebody could explain what's common between the two.

The conference was against terrorism yet the participants sat on the stage with automatic weapons. It was not an anti-terrorism conference. It was just an excuse to attack Mohajirs. Most speeches at the conference were against the Mohajir.

Question: Would you support Maulana Noorani's demand for a house to house search for weapons in Karachi.

Answer: We are not against it provided it is not confined to Karachi, other places are also included and supply routes of weapons from upcountry stopped.

Question: What are your differences with Maulana Noorani?

Answer: We have no differences with him. He uses abusive language against us.

Question: But he says that you attacked his rallies and killed his workers.

Answer: We never attacked his rallies. On occasions he had problems with the local people when he used abusive language against the MQM in his rallies. It is his bodyguards who are always armed and who open fire at innocent people.

Question: People say that the late President Zia patronised the MQM, Jeeay Sindh and the Punjabi Pakhtoon Ittehad [PPI]. What do you say about this?

Answer: It is baseless, as far as the MQM is concerned. Thousands of MQM workers were arrested by Zia's security forces. They were tortured in jails. I was also arrested and tortured. Hundreds of Mohajirs were killed by his police.

I don't want to comment on G.M. Syed's connection with Zia because I have no knowledge of it. He has been on the political scene for decades. His ideology and his political beliefs are not new. Ask him if you want to know whether Zia supported him or not.

Who supported Sarwar Awan and his PPI is an open secret. I don't wish to comment on it but you can find out if you want.

Question: Did Ghaus Ali Shah, Sindh's chief minister under Zia, support you?

Answer: He supported some people but they were not in the MQM. He was also against the MQM. Nobody supported the MQM except the Mohajir.

Question: Some people say that you don't allow dissent in your party. Those who disagree with you are eliminated. Is it true?

Answer: We have more democracy in our party than the so-called champions of democracy have. We have extensive debates on all the issues in our meetings. All the decisions are taken with by majority vote. But we don't believe in washing our dirty linen in public. We don't bring out our differences for public discussion.

Question: What's the situation in interior Sindh? Have Mohajir families actually migrated to Karachi from there?

Answer: It is not only the Mohajir families who have migrated. There are many non-Mohajirs including Punjabis.

Question: But the Sindh government says that there has been no migration from the interior?

Answer: Wait, I will give you documentary proof. (He ordered one of his assistants to bring the register containing names of the families who had migrated to Karachi. The register had 105 names with their addresses in Karachi and the interior.) Many more have come to Hyderabad. People have also gone to Punjab. About 40 families participated in a special programme that we arranged for them on the Eid.

Question: Do you fear a large scale killing of Mohajirs in the interior?

Answer: There are plans to do that but we warn them that if a massacre is started, it will include all the communities living in Sindh. It will not stop at that. The entire country will have to face the consequences.

Question: Have you made any arrangements to cope with a situation like that?

Answer: We don't have to make any plans. If a community is pushed against the wall then the nature teaches it how to fight for survival. If Mohajirs are pushed against the wall, the natural process will start. It will be better for all if all these talks about throwing Mohajirs into the sea and sending them back to India are stopped. We are not Indians, we are Pakistanis. We were born here. We have as much rights as anybody else.

Question: You have complaints against the PPP but the ruling party says that your demands are impossible to be met. If they are accepted, it will cause a wild reaction in interior Sindh. Do you agree with this?

Answer: No, it is mere propaganda. Our demands are all reasonable. The propaganda is aimed at fooling us but they can't hoodwink us anymore.

I will give you an example. The ruling party promised to release all our prisoners. But so far no one has been released. Instead they have made fresh arrests. When we talk to them, they say it is very difficult. And that they are trying to get our prisoners released.

What is so difficult? They have released all their prisoners. Even those already convicted. What is stopping them from releasing the MQM Prisoners?

Question: Due to disturbances, people are pulling out their capital from Karachi and investing it in other parts of the country and abroad. If it continues, it will cause more unemployment. Are you prepared for it?

Answer: The flight of capital from Karachi is limited. They can't afford to move out their money from here. It will increase the cost of production many times.

Question: If Mohajirs are ousted from all other parts of the country and pushed to Karachi, how will you cope with an influx of so many people?

Answer: It will never happen. But if it does then it will engulf the whole country. No planning will help them. Only God can save us from total destruction, if it happens. But I hope and pray that it does not.

Question: Do you still demand that all Punjabis and Pashtoons should be ousted from Karachi?

Answer: We never demanded it. We only want equal rights for all the people living in Karachi including Mohajirs. Mohajirs were treated as inferior people which was not acceptable to us. When we started the struggle for our rights, we were portrayed as enemies of other ethnic groups, which we are not.

Question: It is said that G.M. Syed used you to create differences within the non-Sindhis living in Sindh. Once Mohajirs, Punjabis and Pashtoons began to fight each other, he discarded you.

It is also said that there is no clash of interests between Mohajirs or Pashtoons or Mohajirs or Punjabis. Their real clash is between Sindhis and you. Would you like to comment?

Answer: It is yet another negative explanation of the phenomenon that created the MQM. The MQM was created because Mohajirs were being exploited. Because they had no jobs despite high education. Because their children did not get admission in professional colleges. Because they were feeling helpless.

The MQM was not created because G.M. Syed or I or anybody else wanted it to be created. Nobody used us. We are only working for the interest of our people and the poor people of Pakistan.

We have no clash of interests with a poor Punjabi, Sindhi, or Pashtoon whether he lives in Sindh or somewhere else. Our interests and those of the poor of Pakistan clash with the feudal lords, and political "thek-edars." It is they who put forth such vicious and divisive theories.

Question: It is also said that the MQM may soon split into two groups as your supporters in Hyderabad want a more militant line where you are seen as a moderate. Is that true? Do you have differences with Aftab Sheikh, mayor of Hyderabad, and did you compel him to go to the United States on medical grounds?

Answer: Yes, we have differences of opinion in the MQM but there is no split in the party. We are all united. I have no personal differences with anybody. Aftab Sheikh is our colleague. He has gone to the United States for treatment.

Question: Did you secretly meet Nawaz Sharif when he was in Karachi recently?

Answer: We had no meeting. In fact no meeting was planned. We don't believe in secret meetings. Our doors are open for all. Whoever wants to talk can come here.

Question: Have you been contacted by the Prime Minister or other central leaders of the PPP since your minister left the Sindh cabinet and are you planning to see the Prime Minister?

Answer: We are in touch with the PPP leaders but the Prime Minister has not contacted us. There are no meetings planned in the near future.

Question: What administrative changes would you suggest to improve the situation in Sindh?

Answer: Transfer of power to the elected people. Real power, not just cosmetic changes. Induction of local youth in the administrative machinery.

And de-centralisation of power. More power for the provincial and local governments. It is very important. No modern city of the size of Karachi is run by the bureaucrats from the Centre. New York, London, Chicago are all run by their mayors and councillors. It is only in Karachi that the mayor has no power.

Causes of Violence in Sindh Examined

46000145d Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
3 Jun 89 pp 4, 7

[Article by Abbas Rashid]

[Text] The month of April in Sindh was probably the worst since the induction of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government late last year. More than 50 people were killed and hundreds injured as ethnic clashes spread out into the interior of Sindh from the main flash points of Karachi and Hyderabad. Both Hyderabad and Nawabshah were put under curfew which was subsequently lifted. Parts of Karachi had already been subjected to a curfew since March. The army was out patrolling in a large number of Sindh's towns and cities. Two of the worst clashes took place in Hyderabad and Nawabshah. On 6 April, tension between Sindhi and Mohajir students sparked off into a full-fledged confrontation in which at least 12 people were killed and more than 50 injured. Only about two weeks later Jaye Sindh militants and Punjabi settlers clashed in Nawabshah resulting in a toll of 10 dead and 35 injured. Tragic as such incidents were, Sindh had seen worse violence as recently as September-October last year when 225 people were killed in the various districts of Sindh. In Hyderabad District alone 151 people had died as a result of the violence spread over a few weeks.

Not Interested

In a democratic dispensation the threshold for tolerating such a regrettable and unwarranted state of affairs should be appropriately low. Nor should democratic

institutions lend themselves to becoming a part of the problem instead of working towards a solution. In the debates of the Sindh Assembly on 11 April, just five days after the clashes in Hyderabad, representatives of the people of Sindh should have been engaged in the task of defusing the situation, the lines were sharply drawn as between partisans who represented, clearly, the ethnic community to which they belonged. Indeed the approach of accommodation and compromise between the Sindhis and Mohajirs that appeared to have been reconfirmed with the alliance between the PPP and the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] was put into question when on 2 May the MQM decided to withdraw its ministers from the provincial cabinet citing a spate of broken promises on the part of the PPP but essentially in protest against what the MQM termed as the unlawful confinement of its leader Altaf Hussain in a private residence at Hyderabad. At a minimum, it demanded the removal of the administration personnel responsible. Its tenor, however, was not of a party interested in seeking accommodation. Giving the Sindh Chief Minister 24 hours to fix responsibility and get rid of the offending personnel the MQM seems to have used the incident as an excuse to get out of an arrangement no longer suited to its purposes. True, the MQM leadership appears to have edged out Hyderabad's hardline mayor and continues to support the PPP in the National Assembly but the resignation of its three ministers in the Sindh Cabinet must clearly strengthen the position of the extremists on both sides.

For its part, IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] is busy scoring points over the incidents in Sindh while conveniently forgetting its own dismal performance in the area—not to mention the contribution of its mentor the late President Zia in qualitatively reinforcing the ethnic divide through the insidious device of partyless elections. Mr Junejo is wont to talk of fresh elections now but what action did he take when during his tenure close to 500 people in Sindh lost their lives as a result of ethnic violence. Of course no one expected President Ziaul Haq to take much notice of the hundreds killed and wounded in 1983, in interior Sindh as a result of his using indiscriminate force to frustrate the democratic aspirations of the people and their demands for their basic rights.

There is no doubt, however, that the situation is serious as both Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the Chief of Army Staff Mirza Aslam Beg have acknowledged in their recent statements on the subject. For some reason the Prime Minister, perhaps to drive home the urgency of the matter used the term "low key insurgency" to describe the state of affairs in Sindh. However, well intended it is an inaccurate description. For one thing, an insurgency would almost certainly imply the use of the armed forces against an identifiable enemy in a given area. The Prime Minister has, to date, given no indication that she favours such a course of action. Subsequently, in fact, the PM [Prime Minister] seems to have reviewed her initial impulse and toned down her observation declaring that the situation in Sindh had improved. That is, of course, debatable. Meanwhile Mirza Aslam Beg terming the situation in the

interior of Sindh as serious has said that the root cause of the problem was the socio-economic disparity exploited by vested interests resulting in ethnic divisions and psycho-social distortions. Suggesting clearly that the army had no desire for—nor would it help by—getting too deeply involved in the Sindh situation, he said that when a law and order situation turns into an insurgency it becomes a very serious matter and by implication it has different connotations and meaning. In a pointed reference to the handling of the Baluchistan situation under the government of the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he observed "while dealing with such a situation in Sindh we must remind ourselves of the so-called insurgency situation in Baluchistan in 1974-75 which put that province through such trouble and turmoil. But today Baluchistan is one of the most peaceful provinces, through political peace and harmony." The preference for the political rather than the military solution is obvious. And so much the better coming as it does from the army chief—given the propensity of those holding this office in the past to undermine or suspend the political process without much ado. Since welcome recognition for the primacy of the political process should not, however, manifest itself in a way that emboldens those who are disposed to use democracy for their own ends and would like to see nothing better than to create precisely the state of affairs that the Chief of Army Staff is apparently so keen to avoid.

'Hidden Hand'

Clearly, the situation in Sindh is at least partly the result of a deliberate destabilisation programme. Notwithstanding the high degree of tension which now characterises the relationship between the major ethnic communities in urban and rural Sindh the pattern of numerous rounds of killing points to the role of a catalyst. Shooting operations characterised by remarkable efficiency and ruthlessness are carried out by a small number of people and the distrust already existing among the communities, with students being the leading edge on either side, takes care of the rest. For any long term solution, therefore, both these components will have to be taken into consideration. Among others it is for our intelligence agencies, long employed in tasks for which they are not meant in independent societies, to uncover the hidden hand frequently alluded to by many—local or foreign is a matter subsequently to be looked into.

As difficult, however, to manage—if not more so—will be the bridging of the divide that has now, in fact, come to exist between the communities in Sindh. One manifestation of that is the disturbing pattern of people migrating from their homes as a result of the perceived threat of violence to what they consider the relative safety of being in the proximity of their respective ethnic communities. Notwithstanding denials by official sources there have been reports of non Sindhi families migrating from the interior of Sindh to Karachi and Hyderabad and to Punjab as well—albeit not in significant numbers. Increasingly however, extremists on both sides will secure a larger following unless the genuine grievances of those concerned

are recognized and addressed. From the Sindhi's point of view the situation became much worse during the martial law years. Particularly so in 1983 when the violence of the state appeared to be directed solely at the Sindhi to the exclusion of the other communities residing in the province.

At the heart of the problem, however, is the economic issue manifested most sharply in the unemployment situation. According to one estimate close to 70 percent of the graduates—including doctors and engineers—from interior Sindh remain unemployed. Most industry in the province is located in Karachi itself which out of a population of eight million has approximately 5 percent ethnic Sindhis. Even industrial estates like Nooria-bad—technically situated in Dadu—largely employ non Sindhi labour from Karachi, only 50 miles away. Similarly, in the allotment of irrigated land to large numbers of civilian and military officers of non Sindhi origin the local sees himself being denied the fruits of development in the province. All this, of course, is not to argue that contesting claims for employment and opportunity by members of other ethnic groups settled or working in Sindh are without validity. It is, however, to suggest that the economic pie, as it stands, is far from large enough to satisfy all communities particularly when they insist on securing what they think is their due, on the basis of differing criteria. Clearly, additional opportunities for employment and income cannot be created in large numbers overnight. Meanwhile, however, what is crucial is the elaboration of a policy framework in which at least a beginning can be made by way of a fair deal for all the communities residing in Sindh—not least for those who have called it home for centuries.

Commentary Urges Bhutto to 'Start Governing with Wisdom'

46000144d Karachi DAWN in English 17 May 89 p 7

[Commentary by A.G. Riza: "The Confusion of Numbers"]

[Text] A few days ago a news item was carried by one of the Pakistani English dailies with the heading 'What is your name?', saying that at the Iftar Party given by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Ms Benazir Bhutto asked one of the invitees who wanted to converse with her what his name was. The invitee replied that he was the Minister of State for Minority Affairs in her Cabinet.

This episode was nothing surprising. It was the concomitant of numbers. It is stated that the late Queen Victoria of England produced so many children that at times when she wanted to take stock of them in a group she preferred to count their numbers instead of identifying them by their names.

It is stated that after the recent induction and swearing-in of the new incumbents in ministerial posts, the number has reached nearly 40 and if all the members of

the Government like Advisors, Special Assistants, etc. are included, the number will be in the range of 70 at the federal level. In Sindh also 11 new incumbents were inducted in office a few days ago.

A large number of persons being included in a Cabinet normally indicates political weakness and uncertainty of a government. Indirectly, instead of being taken and treated as a credit, it falls more on the liability side of the government and not viewed favourably by the public at large. To political observers and our public which has a very acute political sense, it signals political waning of the Government. Ms Benazir Bhutto has solid backing in the National Assembly and one wonders if she needed that much of face lifting and padding for her Government.

There is also another inconsistency. Since the coming into office of the Benazir Government, it has been stated on all occasions by the Government representatives and spokesmen that the country's financial position was very weak and that there was very little money available. If that was the case, how could such a large expansion of office-holders at the federal level and the Provincial level in Sindh be justified since the expansion would obviously result in additional non-productive burden on the public funds?

Interestingly enough, a large and unwieldy Cabinet, instead of being a source of strength becomes a source of headache and irritation for the head of the Government. This invariably happens because the head cannot exercise detailed control and supervision of the doings of the members. In addition, as is human, the members start infights among themselves and try to understand each other at different levels—which, instead of advancing the cause of good government, can sometimes be a source of hindrance, and embarrassment.

The internal working of the ministries and departments also gets hampered when there are so many Ministers, Ministers of State, Advisors, etc. attached to the same ministry/department. The senior officers have to face a lot of difficulty in carrying on their day-to-day functions because every ministerial incumbent wants that all attention should be given exclusively to him and not to his colleagues in the same ministry. Often contradictory orders or advises are given to the functionaries and explanations are called why a particular individual's orders/wishes were not carried out.

Many individuals are interested in getting benefits out of their connections with Ministers, Ministers of States. Not all such benefits can be treated as legitimate or normal under the relevant laws and rules. When these do not conform to the norms, there are gossips and whisper about who got benefits through whom. All this in due course recoils on the head of the government i.e. the Prime Minister.

While it seems easier to appoint a large number of party men and friends to ministerial posts under different

names, a smaller team, provided it is able and energetic, can give better results in the domain of public good and its assigned responsibilities, than a multitude of supporters in office.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is an intelligent and talented young lady who knows how to attract, and reach the hearts of, the masses. She ought to know that the strategy required to secure the votes of the masses while in opposition is different from the strategy needed to maintain the confidence and support of the people while in office. Our politicians have in the past ignored the fact that our masses, while prone to be sentimental and emotional in circumstances, are also very practical and can judge quite correctly what a political leader has given them and how he has helped himself or made benefits available to his relations and supporters, when in power.

Slogans and rhetorics may be good and useful when one is in opposition, but they cannot carry a politician far and for long when saddled with the responsibilities of government. There has to be a big and substantive change-over from the pre-government days to in-government days. The latter has to be more practical and result-oriented to make the people aware of the benefits that a new government has brought for them.

The last five months that the present government has been in power have not turned up much evidence of the conscious change that was expected. Things, on the other hand, have actually deteriorated in this period. I have myself heard people saying that they do not want to read newspapers because they were tired of the squabbles and feuds among different sets of politicians, while the common citizens continue to sink deeper into hardship as a result of ever rising prices of daily necessities. The law and order situation is becoming so hopeless that no one feels safe, irrespective of the province or city he may be living in. The Afghanistan situation is becoming increasingly serious, with disquieting possibilities for Pakistan's own peace and security.

It is time for Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to show some grit, rise to the demands of the situation and start governing with wisdom and foresight, instead of still continuing to act and speak like an opposition leader. It is more important for her at this juncture to carry all shades of major opinion with her on major policy decisions than thinking exclusively in terms of the PPP.

Commentary Sees Urgency for Population Control
46000144e Lahore VIEWPOINT in English
25 May 89 p 7

[Text] Every factor that weighs Pakistan down and impedes its progress and development seems to have remained unchecked, largely out of control.

The list of such factors is a long one—with arms and narcotics near the top—but special significance attaches to

past failure to check Pakistan's unrestrained population growth. At Partition, the region which now constitutes Pakistan had a population of about 60 million souls. By 1987, the figure had risen to 100 million. It is estimated by the World Bank that, at the present annual growth rate of 3.1 percent—probably the highest in the world—Pakistan will reach the frightening figure of 400 million by the year 2030 A.D. An indigenous projection, by the National Institute of Population Studies, brings no consolation, either, because it has been computed that in another three decades Pakistan will be called upon to support a population of 390 million.

Global Trends

The problem is not, of course, limited to any one country. Recently, Dr Nafis Sidiq, the Pakistani head of the UN Population Fund, revealed that, if present global trends continued, there could be a total of 14 billion people on earth in 2100. Some countries, notably China and India, have understood the importance of checking population growth and have taken stern measures to deal with what can become a serious hindrance to major national goals. The consequences of the absence of family planning are visible in the spread of poverty, the steady fall in living standards, a rapid increase in unemployment, shortage of reasonable housing facilities, and our inability even to provide potable drinking water to a large percentage of our people. This also means that proper medicare is just not available to the largest section of our population living in the rural areas. Then, it is seen that the absolute number of illiterates in the country increased from 22 million in 1961 to 43 million in 1981. By the year 1990, Pakistan will have to attain a 44 percent literacy rate in order to keep the number of literates at the 1981 level. Since there is no possibility of achieving this target, Pakistan will continue to have an ever large number of citizens who cannot read or write, a majority being women. The poor quality of diet on which most of our people subsist makes them prey to avoidable diseases and early avoidable death. It has been calculated that, despite the increase in Pakistan's cultivable land from 36 million acres to 51 million acres, the average availability for the rural population has decreased from 1.1 acres to 0.5 acre. While the country's population has doubled, food production has gone up only 29 percent. No elaborate computer work is necessary to prove the point that unless Pakistan's population growth is checked immediately, living standards will continue to fall, exacerbating social tensions and making the solution of economic problems more and more difficult. Stated plainly, human fertility must be curbed, and greater attention given to soil fertility.

A small beginning has been made by the present Government, but the situation has got to a stage from where small efforts are not enough. What is required is a massive countrywide campaign that can bring home to all sections of the people the essential need for population planning in the interests of each family as well as the whole nation.

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